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INTRODUCTION

This is the sixth volume of the Indian Philosophical Annual and is for the year 1970. In December 1970 our Centre in collaboration with the Centres at Varanasi and Santiniketan had the privilege of organizing the first International Seminar on World Philosophy in India. Three sets of papers relating to this seminar are included in this volume; they cover a Panel Discussion on Freedom, a Symposium on Indian Philosophical Perspective, and Public Lectures. Part Two of this volume contains eight special articles.

This volume, like the previous ones, has been published by utilizing the grants made by the University Grants Commission for publications by this Centre. We are grateful to the Commission for these grants. We thank the authorities of the University of Madras for the facilities they have given us for the publication of the Annual.

MADRAS
15-11-1971

T. M. P. Mahadevan
Director

PART ONE

INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR ON WORLD PHILOSOPHY:

PANEL DISCUSSION

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE

AND PUBLIC LECTURES

Eliot Deutsch

ON FREEDOM

Nothing has ever been more insupportable for a man and for human society than freedom.[1] (Dostoyesky)

I

The idea of freedom is most often cast in the negative terms of how one may be free *from* certain constraints—be they external or internal.

For the Greeks this freedom meant by and large a freedom from the tyranny of one's lower instinctual or animal nature. For both Plato and Aristotle that man is free who is able to control his desires and passions in the light of rational understanding: he attains to that happiness natural to man, he realizes his true human being who acts according to the determination of reason. But with the development of Judaeo-Christianity a new framework for interpreting "freedom from" in the West became necessary. God became the source and controller of Nature, and man in order to be responsible for his conduct needed to be free in his power of willing. Morality requires responsibility, and without freedom there can be no responsibility.[2] Freedom, then, is a necessary condition for morality, and this meant ultimately some kind of freedom from the omnipotent will of God.[3]

From the time of the Renaissance, Nature has come more and more to replace Providence and to be regarded as the seat of necessity. Nature, as generally conceived in the seventeenth century, is throughout causally constituted. Nothing happens in Nature without their being an (efficent) cause or (logical) reason for its happening. Man's "freedom from" was thus essentially denied. There was no way in which he could attain to a genuine freedom from Nature.[4] And this denial of freedom has continued to the present in complicated and in subtle way. The various social sciences go to show how so many of our actions and ways

of thought are determined by our social environment; and psychoanalytic theory (of a Freudian form) goes even further to show that all of our conscious action, our thoughts, our desires, our decisions and aspirations, are very much influenced, if not wholly controlled, by various shadowy unconscious forces and demands, with these being traceable for the most part back to experiences of childhood. We become determined in personality before we really even begin.[5]

But whether one accepts "determinism" or affirms "freedom" can one really endure freedom when it is looked upon as freedom *from* constraint? The answer, I think, is an obvious "no." Existentialist philosophers (of a Sartrian mold) have made clear to us that freedom, when taken in the negative sense of "freedom from" (in their case, freedom from any *essential*, god-given nature for man) imposes a great burden on one (for every time one is choosing oneself one is also choosing human nature in general) and, in fact, an intolerable burden. Experience does seem to bear out Dostoyesky's dim view that freedom is insupportable. As I have noted elsewhere:

> Whenever one is in a situation of strong constraint, one may indeed earnestly desire freedom from this constraint; one may even become obsessed with this desire to the point where one is rendered impotent to act effectively within the situation; but once all constraints are removed, one finds oneself facing an abyss. One doesn't know what to do, one doesn't know what to make of one's freedom, and rather than face an infinite possibility, one voluntarily seeks some kind of constraint. We ceasefully chain ourselves to things, to ideas, and to dreams and illusions. From some inner compulsion we turn away from the possibility of freedom. *We imitate the servitude of others and convince ourselves that we are thereby fulfilling our social responsibilities.*[6]

II

Now there is another kind of freedom that can be distinquished, a *spiritual* freedom in which all oppositions between "freedom from" and "necessity" are overcome. This freedom is *sui generis*; it does not merely lie on the other side of constraint.

The Buddhist speaks of this spiritual freedom as *nirvāṇa*, as the perfect bliss and peace out of which compassion (*karuṇa*) flows. The Christian mystic speaks of it as consisting in the establishing of a perfect accord between the human will and will of God; the Brahmanic Hindu as *mokṣa*, as that state of being wherein one attains, through knowledge (*jñāna*) and/or love (*bhakti*), to a unity or identity

with reality (Brahman). "Spiritual freedom" may rightly be interpreted in all of these and other ways. Experientially it is the attaining to an at-onement with the depth and quiesence of being, and with the power of its creative becoming. "Spiritual freedom" is a state of being to be spiritually attained.

The human will, I would argue, is free only when its actions arise out of spirit. Or, to put it another way, it is not so much a question whether or not the will is free, but whether or not consciousness is free—is free to attend to Reality. Spiritual freedom is the realization of that which one already is in one's true being. From the strictly empirical standpoint it is something that is *acquired* (and indeed only by a privileged few); from the standpoint of that state of being itself; it is something eternally and universally present ; it is a *given* of experience.

Spiritual freedom means the realization of the full potentialities of human being. And it is a state of being that can be joyfully endured by man.

1. *The Brothers Karamozov*, Chapter V. (The Grand Inquisitor).

2. Kant's 'freedom is an idea of the speculative reason of which one knows the possibility a priori but not the comprehension of it directly ; we grasp its a priori nature because it is the condition for moral law, which we do know' is perhaps the best philosophical apologetic for this position.

3. Cf. Thomas Apuinas, *Summa Theologica,* Q. 83. art. 1, reply to obj. 3.

4. A major exception to this in the seventeenth century was perhaps to be found in Spinoza's attempt to see in the fact of determinism the opportunity for freedom. For Spinoza, to possess "adequate ideas" means to know Nature's necessity and to be able to determine oneself in accord with it. Freedom consists in a self-determination which arises from the recognition of logical necessity. The search for a freedom from the inexorable order of nature was also carried out by the eighteen-century (and contemporary) empiricists, but their solution —that there is no incompatibility between freedom and determinism insofar as the latter means causal order and the former means liberty from externally imposed constraint, with determinism being necessary for freedom, for without it there would be chaos—is only a redefinition of terms; it is fundamentally only a conceptual affair, bearing little relation to actual human experience.

5. See my *Advaita Vedānta* : *A Philosophical Reconstruction* (Honolulu: East—West Center Press, 1969), pp. 103—4. The recognition that we deny freedom when it is conceived as "freedom from" does not, of course, negate the distinction between choosing one's own constraints and having them imposed on one by others. The word "liberty" is appropriate here and, as a reality, is indeed to be valued both in its own terms and as it may be instrumental to the achievement of a higher freedom.

H. D. Lewis

FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY

I propose to concentrate on the poblem of freedom and responsibility. This is a very vast problem but I shall try to outline very briefly what appear to me to be the main considerations for our treatment of it.

The derivation of the word responsibility will be evident to all. It meant originally that a responsible person was liable to be called upon to answer for his deeds. This carried with it the implication that, if the answer were not satisfactory, a person could be proceeded against and punished in some way. This remains the meaning of the term in a legal or quasi-legal context. We do not regard very young children or lunatics as legally responsible, and this means that although we have to restrain them in some ways, we would not regard this treatment as punishment.

There is, however, a sharp distinction between the moral and the legal meanings of responsibility, although the content of our duties in both respects will often be the same. It is obviously possible to do great moral wrong, to hate someone for example or hurt his feelings, without breaking the law. Some of the worst forms of wickedness are of this extra-legal sort. Indeed it would be pointless to try to legislate against all forms wickedness.

It is also possible to do wrong legally and be morally blameless or indeed entitled to considerable praise. Some of the people we admire most, in the course of history, fall into this class, such as leaders of religion or social and political leaders and other very simple people who have endured severe privation and punishment for their refusal to comply with legal requirements which outraged thier conscience or religious convictions. I shall not stop here to consider further the occasions when this sort of defiance is warranted. There is obviously a

stronger obligation to conform when there are democratic means of righting wrongs. Constitutional procedure is very important for peace and co-operation, and the normal method of change should be persuasion. There are however, occasions, even in democratic communities, when a person must give the priority to the dictates of his own conscience over the requirements of the law at the time. That all this is possible proves again that what we mean by moral enactment and responsibility is not the same as compliance with the law or the discharge of legal duties.

The question then arises whether the idea of punishment enters into the idea of responsibility in the moral sense. Some say that it does, and they find in this a fairly easy way of solving the age-long problem of freedom and determinism. They maintain that, in the moral as in the legal sense, the central idea is that of punishment, if not by the officers of the law then by society or God. It is then pointed out that the idea of punishment would be meaningful even though we could not have avoided doing what we did at the time. This is because the punishment may modify our own conduct or that of other people on some further occasions. The critertion of responsibility will thus become that of whether punishment is likely to have this effect. We would not punish a madman or someone who acted under what is sometimes known as an irresistible impulse. The punishment would do nothing to deter them or others similarly placed.

I am ready to make some concessions to this argument. On the whole I think that the justification of punishment is deterrence, not retribution or some good that may be done to the wrong-doer. I also agree that punishment as deterrence would have a point even though we could not at the time have acted differently. There are of course occasions when such punishment would not be in order, if, for example, we were physically incapacitated at the time of action or in some other way subject to physical compulsion. But we knew what we were doing, even though character and circumstances at the time induced us to act in a certain way, our own inclinations could be modified on some other occasion by the fear of punishment.

There is much that I would wish to add to amplify and clarify all that I have just been saying. All I wish to do now is to indicate the considerable concessions which I would be prepared to make to the now familiar way of reconciling responsibility with at least some forms of determinism. My own serious objection to the argument begins at an earlier stage, namely in the assimilation of moral to legal responsibility. The question whether punishment is in order and, in what sense, is a secondary one in the moral context and presupposes the idea

of responsibility. The latter simply means, I suggest, in the moral context, that an agent is subject to special moral distinctions of good and bad or praise and blame. Such distinctions are *sui generis* and involve distinctive moral insight ; and when moral good and evil are viewed in this distinctive way and detached from misleading considerations of punishment, it becomes more evident that a person is not open to such praise or blame unless his action is within his own control in an absolute sense. There must be choice of a genuinely open kind not determined even by one's own formed character.

It will help here to stress the distinction we draw between moral and non-moral good. Among non-moral goods we may list health and happiness, intelligence and further qualities of mind and character. It is a good thing to be an athelete or a poet or a musician or have a kindly disposition. But these are gifts of nature or fortune, and while the exercise of them requires some kind of freedom (freedom from external compulsion for example) they do not lose their point when it is realised that a person just happens to be able to compose or to understand something while his neighbour does not. If you fail to write a poem or to understand higher mathematics no one will blame you, although you have to be free in some sense to do these things. But if you assault someone or utter wounding words then we do find proper moral fault ; and I suggest that this can only be because the issue is in a very final sense in our own hands in this case. That is why we speak of denunciation or of wickedness, sin, vileness, guilt, remorse etc. These terms imply a control which is peculiar to responsible action and must involve a genuinely open choice.

To this view there are usually offered two standard objections. One is that an action which does not flow from our own character or personality is not our own action but merely blind chance. For the answer to this objection I must refer to what I have said in my main contribution to this Conference, where I outline the view of the elusive self which is more than its formed character at the time and makes a choice which is not determined otherwise at all. The self just makes this choice.

The second objection is that a genuinely open choice would not be compatible with the obvious continuity of character and conduct. We clearly do anticipate what people will do, we rely upon one another, we make arrangements, and none of these would be possible unless we could assume that what a man is like at the time, though indeed variable and sometimes deceptive, will prescribe what he does. Without this, life would become utterly chaotic. How then can there be a truly open choice ?

To this I reply that the choice is restricted to certain occasions, namely those in which our own ideas of what we ought to do at the time are at odds with what we most desire to do, that is to cases of a conflict of duty and interest. For a good deal of our lives we will, on the whole, want to do what we also think we ought to do, and to that extent there is no ethical impropriety in the supposition that our conduct may be predicted. You can be quite certain that I shall not break into song or try to stand on my head in the middle of this address. None of us here want to make fools of ourselves and there is no obligation to do so. In very different circumstances there might be, but as things are at the moment we can clearly rule out fantastic conduct of the kind indicated.

There are however, occasions when the course of duty is sharply at odds with what we most want to do. Such occasions will vary a great deal from one person to another ; the temptations of youth are not the temptations of age, the temptations of a Tolstoy are not those of a Gandhi, the temptations of a naturally dissolute person are not those of a man of saintly nature, the temptations of a man in anger are not those of a man at peace with himself. But in one way or another all will find themeselves tensed in the conflict between their ideals and what their own nature at the time is like. These are the occasions, I submit, when we are left utterly to our own devices and have to be the arbiters of our own fate in a very ultimate sense. The harm that we do on such occasions may be over-ruled, and we do not have to suppose that the situation gets ultimately out of the hands of God or whatever supreme reality we recognise. But it is at this point that we are most like God and most truly creative in our activities.

There is not the time this evening to amplify these points or to meet further objections. But in coming to a close, I should like to stress the importance, as I see it, of reaffirming the sense of responsibility, not only in a moral and metaphysical context, but also in a social and practical one. Few things seem to me more important for world problems of today and for the understanding of points of affinity and difference in various cultures and religions, than to reinstate the sense that the individual is a genuine moral person and truly accountable for his actions in a way that extends from the occasions of genuine absolute choice to the whole of life. This is central for all distinctively human concerns.

As this sounds rather solemn may I end on a somewhat light-hearted note and tell you a story that has some bearing on what I said earlier about the way our temptations vary from one situation to another. I had been lecturing in this vein some time ago in England

to a rather mixed audience of scholars and laymen. At the end, a lady came up to me and said: "Professor Lewis, you told us what sort of things you were not tempted to do—to assault some one or rob a bank etc. But you did not tell us what your real temptations were". I replied that my point could well be made without going into any revealing details about myself. "But", she said, "I know what your temptations are". This was a very different business and disconcerting indeed. So I asked her what my temptations were, in her opinion. She came out with some things that were surprisingly near the mark, being presumably a very shrewd observer and student of human nature. "But", I exclaimed in some alarm, "How do you know all this?" "Well Professor", she said, "You see I sat right in the front and when you lecture you throw out your hands a good deal" (which apparently I do), "*And I read the palm*".

N. K. Devaraja

ON FREEDOM

Man seems to have an intuitive certainty of the fact of his freedom which seems nevertheless to be opposed to the postulate of the universality and uniformity of causation. I shall here attempt to solve the problem by assigning a new meaning to freedom. There is a sense in which the principle of causation may be derived from or reduced to the principle of inertia taken in an extended sense. Things or objects tend to behave in fixed, predictable ways. It happens that man is endowed with several impulses which impel him to move in different, sometimes contrary, directions. Thus, an employee, when insulted by his boss, has the natural impulse to return the insult. However, in consideration of the unpleasant consequences that may follow the indulgence of the impulse in question, he checks it, giving his boss the impression of being absolutely obedient and loyal to him. Man not only lives according to different impulses but also calculates the consequences of permitting gratification of various impulses on different occasions. This may be regarded as one aspect of his freedom.

But there is a wider sense, not unrelated to the one mentioned above, in which man constantly asserts and enjoys his freedom. He subordinates one impulse to another because he is interested in realizing a certain pattern of values. Having imagined or conceived some such pattern at a time he proceeds to manipulate the objects and persons in his environment with a view to realizing the pattern in question. This manipulation, particularly in respect of the physical objects, it may be noted, does not involve any interference with the actual (causal) nature of those objects ; man simply rearranges the physical objects in a manner that would lead to the emergence of a desired pattern of meanings or values. Thus, I rearrange the furniture or flowers in a way that is supposed to produce a desirable utilitarian or aesthetic effect. The growth of civilization, in fact, has consisted in man's growing power to put physical objects and energies to his use. By re-ordering physical

objects and forces man gives rise, as it were, to an order of *meanings* or values supervenient on the created collocation of physical phenomena. It is in this important sense that man behaves as a free agent in relation to nature, and rises above the status of being merely a product of nature.

Needless to say, the actual nature of things, including, men and women, each with his own world of meanings and projects, with whom we have to deal, offer resistance to our plans or manipulative actions. We can succeed in moulding our environment or environmental objects in accordance with our plans only to the extent to which we have aquainted ourselves with their character or modes of behaviour. But having gained this aquaintance, I am more or less free to frame plans and policies in relation to the external environment. Apart from their having each its own character or nature, the objects of my environment come to have meaning or value in terms of the plans and purposes that I seek to realize from time to time. The weighing or evaluation of different objectives, goals or schemes before one or other of them is finally adopted, however, is an operation which is subject not to the *laws of causation* but to principles or *norms of preference* as revealed to me at a particular moment of my existence. To the extent to which my preferences may be shared and appreciated by others, I may claim to be a rational or free agent.

Kalidas Bhattacharyya

FREEDOM

If 'freedom' means (the so-called free) choice of one from among several competing tendencies, it is impossible to decide whether really there is any (free) choice that way, for though there is often the inevitable feeling 'I choose' it is equally true that the so-called choice can, in every case, be also adequately accounted for by means of natural causes. If it is a question of choosing between two or more natural tendencies, there is in a very important sense no choice. One's going over to one of these tendencies is, so far, only another name for one's being compelled to go over to that side, assuming that there is a 'one' who goes over, i.e. an agent other than the actions and the system of those actions.

But that inevitable feeling of 'I choose' is there, and it has to be explained. May it not be, we venture to suggest, that 'I choose' is only another name for 'I do'? The ubiquitous 'I-sense' accompanies all that is called *my action.* 'I-sense' accompanies other mental affairs too, called mine, but we are here concerned with actions. At the primary level of unreflective doing it is not indeed as pronounced as it comes to be at the secondary level of reflection; nevertheless it is there even at the primary level. How otherwise could we distinguish, even at that level, my actions from those which are another's? One cannot distinguish then through the so-called objective distinction between two bodies (physiological organisms), for even at the primary level of action the bodies are distinguished as *my* body, *your* body, etc. 'I do' is thus identical with the situation that there is an action called mine. And if 'I choose' is just another name for 'I do', then it too is nothing but the fact that there is an action called mine.

Two questions have immediately to be answered.

(a) Is choosing itself an action or is it only a necessary presupposition of—a necessary preparation for—action? If the latter, then,

obviously choosing cannot be identified with the simple phenomenon that there is an action called mine.

(b) May there not be actions which are called mine, but regarding which I have no choice? In other words, may there not be an action which I have been compelled to perform? Obviously, in such cases too choice cannot be identified with *my action*.

Let us see how the two questions can be answered.

There is undoubtedly a feeling like *I have chosen*, and we are out to explain it consistently with the type of determinism that, we have already said, has to be admitted. We have been trying to explain it first as just the 'I-sense' that accompanies actions called mine. If, then, suddenly one comes to insist that choice from among alternative courses of action is a necessary presupposition of action, it would only show that one is deliberately overlooking the contradiction between determinism, which is a fact, and the supposed (free) choice. If by the word 'presupposition' is meant *preparation for*, that also would not solve the problem really [1].

Secondly, is not choice itself an *act*, one of my acts? Do I not say 'I choose', 'I have chosen', etc.? It may not be a full act, but may it not be a part of an act, like a small part-act as the means to the attainment of the end of the whole act? But if so, and if also every act is to presuppose a choice, it would follow that every choice is to be preceded by a choice, which would obviously involve a vicious indefinite regress. We may, of course, be told that the difficulty raised is all gratuitous, for choice, after all, is no act. But, then, even as a presupposition of act what is it precisely? Obviously, it is not a case of cognition. Cognition could at most be of the form 'This course of action has more of worth', but, as everybody knows, this is no cognitive judgement proper. The exact meaning of 'has more worth' we shall find later.[2] Whatever that may be, choice cannot be so easily called a *mode of cognition.* It is not also a case of feeling or emotion—this is obvious. It must, therefore, belong to the volitional side of man. As volition, again, it cannot be distinguished from act, and considered as a form of wish or desire, Wish or desire is of two forms to be represented as 'I wish or desire to do this' and 'I wish or desire that this should be (including should be done). The former, again, is of two kinds. One is that I may wish or desire that I shall do something in future (or had done something in the past), and the other that I wish or desire to do such and such thing just now. In the former case (I mean, the former of the last two alternatives) wish or desire is just acting in idea (not an idea of acting), and in the latter case,

there being no time-lag between the wish or desire on the one hand and the act at its beginning on the other, this wish or desire is but the act in the making or the beginning of the act. The case 'I wish or desire that such and such should be' (the second of the first two alternatives) is either simply that of my imagining something or speaking about someone acting in a certain way or speaking about my acting in a certain way in future. Obviously, none of these can by any stretch of imagination be called my *choosing*.

Choosing, then, in so far as it is considered to be on a level with acting, is that acting itself either in making or at its beginning.

We then pass on to the question (raised earlier) whether there may not be actions which are called mine and yet regarding which I had no choice. Certainly, if there were a single such case no one could identify choice with *his* action: I could not say that choice is nothing but *my action*. But there is no such case. Wherever my behaviour is consciously understood as forced by circumstances, or by other persons, I refuse to call this behaviour *my act*. In a sense it is no doubt mine, because it is at least a behaviour of *my* body, and I never deny that circumstances or other persons have forced *me* to behave like that. But normally I refuse to call it my *act*; which means that in the absense of what is called choice there is no act, and, therefore, none of my act, though this by itself does not mean further that choice is *other than* act and precedes it.[3]

Thus there is nothing, so far, for choice to be regarded as anything different from my act, 'my act' or 'I acting' meaning *act with an I feeling*—a feeling which, primarily not pronounced at the unreflective level, may stand pronounced at the level of reflection.

We have shown that if 'freedom' means (free) choice from among different tendencies formulating different courses of action there is no such freeedom, the so-called freedom being nothing but the I-feeling spoken of above. But choice (and, therefore, freedom) may be understood in a different sense altogether. Given a particular tendency determined by empirical circumstances, it is the choice *to submit to it or not*. Often we submit, and when there are competing tendencies we often submit to the strongest of them. But sometimes we also choose *not to submit*. We thus may not, and often do not, submit to an empirical pressure even though it is the strongest conceivable. It is this choice not to submit which constitutes real freedom and it does not clash with complete determination at the empirical level. This *I* that does not submit is a real agent, proved by the very fact of this refusal to submit. It is not merely the adjectival I-feeling, pronounced or vague, nor a mere system of actions that are accompanied by this

I feeling. It is, as we have just said, a real free agent who chooses not to submit to empirical pressure—whether it be of outside circumstances or from another person or from the agent's own inclinations and passions and bodily disturbances.

Herein, precisely, we have the idea of freedom as *transcendence*. Free man transcends Nature. He is over-natural, even though otherwise he is a part of Nature too. So far as he is a part of nature his behaviours are all fully determined. But in so far as he is above Nature he is free.

Two important questions arise here, and they have to be answered :

a) Is this over-natural man free only in *not submitting* to Nature? May he not also freely submit ?

b) Does freedom concern only action? May not other aspects of man be also free? May he not be free even as cognitive and free in his emotions also ?

The first question (a) could be answered satisfactorily if only another question had been answered before. It is—Why is it after all that man sometimes refuses to submit to Nature? Obviously because man considers it bad—immoral, anti-spiritual—to submit that way; from which it follows that ultimate morality which is but spirituality tself consists in realizing—re-discovering—his own being in conscious identification with it. More concrete and detailed morals consist, of course, in organizing Nature according to this freedom in different types of specific circumstances. This latter is positive freedom—better, the positive exercise of freedom. Immortality, therefore, consists in freely refusing to exercise this positive freedom. In other words, it consists in freely submitting Nature.

Mere Nature is neither good nor bad, nor does a sub-human species that can never have a sense of freedom—negatively transcending Nature and positively in reorganizing it according to freedom—commits any act of immorality. In fact, animals have only behaviours, they do not *act*.

But man, because for once at least he can transcend Nature and reorganize it according to freedom, commits immorality, to whatever extent, whenever he submits to Nature, unknowingly or knowingly. Up to an age a child's behaviour is not morally judged. But once beyond it, on the simple ground that he has learnt to transcend Nature every such submission is morally judged. We say, he *ought to have* thought over

the matter, *ought to have been* more cautious, etc., and sometimes we even punish him for that. If we prescribe light punishment or even let him free, that is on other social considerations.

Deliberate submission to Nature is, however, immorality *par excellence.* Be it remembered that reorganization of Nature according to freedom is no form of submission—Nature, there, is no doubt accepted, but it is accepted only as a tool and material. Although, qualitatively all deliberate submission to Nature is immorality *par excellence*, there may be differences in degree.

Let us turn now to answering the question (b) above.

Whenever man transcends Nature he is so far negatively free, and as and when he positively constructs something, by way of reorganization or not, he is free positively. Both these types of freedom are found in the cognitive and emotive life of man quite as much as in the volitional. In the mere sensuous awareness of the given as such, and in mere associational expectation which is just a habit on the natural plane, he has knowledge at the natural level, coordinate with the type of knowledge that sub human species have in various degrees. But as and when he questions Nature he is negatively free, and when he judges and constructs theories he exercises positive freedom.

Similarly with regard to emotion. Ordinarily our emotions are natural, but these in art and religion are freed of the shackles of Nature and proceed on their own logics. They are both negatively and positively free.

As in the case of action, man's indeliberate and deliberate submission to Nature was called immoral—though, in the two cases, of two different qualities—so is the case with knowledge and emotion. Anyone who, though acquainted with reason, accords undue weightage indeliberately to observation commits mistake, but one who does this deliberately distorts. In the field of art and religion also we have the ugly and the irreligious.

There is still another side of the problem of freedom which untouched, our discussion would be left incomplete. It is whether and, if so why, we freely accept one of the competing tendencies. True, at the level of Nature there is no freedom. But once we have learnt to transcend Nature, do we not, even from the point of view of that freedom, accept one of the competing tendencies, and, if so, why?

It is a fact that even from this point of view we do accept one of the competing courses of action, and one of the answers as to why we

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do this—an answer that suggests itself in consonance with what we have already said—is that the particular course of action is in agreement with the over-naturality of man. The idea is that as I work according to that course I never for a moment feel that I have submitted to Nature.

But there are several points against this answer. (1) If non-submission be the be-all and end-all of freedom, why *do this* or *do that?* Why not passively enjoy your free being? (2) Is there no submission to Nature, even in free action? Action means rearranging things of Nature, but for that should we not use these things of Nature, and does this not imply that we have first accepted these things as they are? Does it not also imply that we have to abide by some at least of the compelling rules of Nature regarding the constitutions and behaviours of these things? (3) Often, even from the point of view of freedom, we accept one of the competing courses of action. But did this course chosen stand before the free man with its agreement with the free nature of man writ large upon it, and did the other courses that are rejected stand with no such mark written on them? Do we simply read such writings? Do we not positively deliberate on possible consequences of that course of action, and are the consequences judged simply as to be or not to be in agreement with the free being of the agent? Are there no other considerations in that deliberation, say, the well-being of others or of the state, society, community, etc.?

Many of these questions crop up because of a basic misunderstanding of the freedom of man. If on the ground that any re-arrangement of things of Nature necessarily presupposes implicit acceptance of, and, therefore, animal submission to, its constitutional laws, one feels like holding that there cannot be positive free will for a particular course of action, one may, for the time being; and this may suggest that freedom is only a state of being to be just enjoyed ecstatically. But this is not the only story of freedom. We have already seen another form of positive freedom where man deliberately i.e., freely, submits to natural pressures, though this freedom constitutes the *immorality* of his actions. But immoral or not, there *is* freedom here—he freely submits to Nature—which means that freedom is not incompatible with the acceptance of Nature. Taking this cue from immoral freedom, we can extend the field of positive freedom to cover the cases of *moral* freedom also, freedom, viz. of abiding by a particular course of action considered right. The question, therefore, is not whether freedom disallows acceptance of Nature—another name of this acceptance being submission, at least to its constitution and laws—but, rather, whether such free submission can ever constitute *morality*. Our reply

would be that in moral freedom we submit to it—we accept it—only so far as it is considered *right* or *good.*

How Nature in the form of a suggested course of action, can be right or good is of course a serious problem to which we shall immediately turn. But, anyway, there is nothing to prevent freedom from submitting—and, of course, freely submitting—to Nature, whether in moral or in immoral action.

A course of action cannot be judged right or good *because it is freely accepted.* For, even in immorality, as we have shown, courses of action are freely accepted. Nor can it be held that while in cases of morality the free acceptance has to be self-conscious this is not necessary in cases of immortality. For often, as in immoral action, even in moral ones we submit to Nature unreflectively. Every act of morality need not be self-conscious. Besides, there are self-conscious immoral acts too. Even when unreflective immoral acts are condemmed it is only under the idea that they were somehow done self-consciously; otherwise there could be no question of punishment and, therefore, of immorality.

Mere free acceptance is thus no criterion of the rightness or goodness of a course of action. Nor is that rightness or goodness written large upon it, to be just immediately perceived. Things are not so simple. For, as a matter of fact, we do often think elaborately on consequences before we come to a decision.

What consequences do we really count upon? Sometimes they concern our material welfare of various degrees and sometimes what is called spiritual welfare. It is only in the latter case that what stands before our view as the final objective is the freedom of myself and others and the coordination of these freedoms, freedom meaning conscious non-submission to natural desires and impulses which are mostly self-centered.

As for cases of material welfare, they are broadly of two kinds. In one we consider material welfare for its own sake : we do not consider whether it leads to spiritual welfare or not. In the other we consider it only as conducive to spiritual welfare. In either case, again, material welfare is considered either in the interest of the agent himself or in the interest of others too. It is only in the case of spiritual welfare that the two interests coincide.

In cases of spiritual welfare there is self-conscious deliberation from the beginning to the end. In cases of material welfare, on the other hand—whether considered by itself or as conducive to spiritual

welfare—we sometimes do so deliberate, but sometimes do not. Often the deliberation has been done by others—the stalwarts of the society or State—and we freely accept their verdicts. Morality here consists in this free acceptance of the courses of action that have thus been already declared right or good. Be it remembered again that the goodness or rightness of a course of action does not consist in my free acceptance of it, for I can as freely accept courses of action which are not good or right that way.

Often, again, such goodness or rightness of certain actions is determined by Nature's own adjustment through the course of history, Nature including the behaviours of men in so far as they are animals. Such goodness or rightness is, in short, the result of what is ordinarily called 'practical wisdom'.

The main point to be noted is that though morality consists in freedom—both negative and positive of a sort—this freedom is only its *formal* aspect and its *content* is to be sought outside it, except, of course, where it is a question of spiritual welfare where the very form is sought after as a living content. Except in this case, and as everywhere where the form and the content are somehow distinct, the form is a later discovery from out of a homogeneous form-matter complex. Man begins his life as an animal and only later discovers the freedom which constitutes his distinctive humanity, and when from this new point of view he reacts on Nature he is either moral or immoral—moral when he freely accepts what is determined for him as right or good and immoral when he freely accepts what is determined otherwise. When, however, he is *spiritually* moral he exercises freedom to have that freedom itself as his objective, of course, in automatic adjustment with the freedom of others, or alternatively to have for his objective a whole world of pure moral rules that emanate from his freedom as will, i.e. from his freedom as turned toward Nature for the purpose of changing it into a Kingdom of God.

One may ask the question if free acceptance of what is right or good, and similarly of what is not right or good, is not just another name for 'choice'. We reply, as we did earlier, that we have to abjure for good the phrase 'freedom of choice', choice being but freedom itself; or alternatively, choice is the *action* itself, either in making or at its beginning, not its presupposition, the only presupposition of action as action, i.e., as distinguished from behaviour, being freedom.

II

In Section I we dealt with the problem of freedom independently, i.e., without reference to any philosopher or system, Indian or Western.

In the present section we shall try to show that what we have said so far is mostly in line with what the Indian philosophers have generally held.

Take for example, the doctrine of determinism, the doctrine, viz. that in action there is no *choice* of one from among several alternative courses of action (the so-called choice being either another name for the ubiquitous I-feeling or just action in making or at its beginning). Indian philosophers, practically one and all, hold that all our actions are causally determined, no matter whether the causes of any particular action can be pointed out or not. If there are such demonstrable causes (*dṛṣṭa-kāraṇas*) adequate enough, well and good; if not, we shall have to postulate possible *other* causes (*adṛṣṭa-kāraṇa*), and if these other causes cannot be any event occurring in the present span of life of the agent concerned, they have to be traced to a previous cycle of life, as a disposition resulting from what the agent did in that previous life. And, if for this a whole metaphysics of Karma and Rebirth has to be constructed the Indian philosophers would not fight shy of that. First, that would be much less precarious than admitting that an event could be uncaused and, secondly, they have logical arguments and empirical evidence for the doctrine of Karma and Rebirth. The latter, viz. the question of logical arguments and empirical evidence, is outside the scope of the present paper. As regards the former, the central point of the Indian thinkers is that if any event could be taken as uncaused that would mean an end of all rational enquiry, and this is belied by our actual behaviours. All our activities and behaviours, whether in daily life or in rational enquries,are based on the assurance that all events are causally determined. According to many Western philosophers this is an *a priori* assurance; but according to the Indians it is an assurance derived inductively from repeated observation that events have been so, supplemented by the absence of the knowledge of any event to the contrary. The Indians hold that whatever knowledge we have, whether through perception or through induction (induction being itself a form of perception) or through inference based on induction, is assured till it is contradicted, and 'till it is contradicted' simply means that when such contradiction occurs the knowledge which is contradicted is rejected. This does not mean that we have in the meantime any real apprehension that it may be contradicted—in other words, that the knowledge that we have is ever felt as relativistic or probable on this mere ground. Further, if ever on this ground one entertains relativism there should be no assured knowledge anywhere, and probabilism too, unless it is based on some specifiable solid ground, is not merely empty but also scarcely different from the assurance we are speaking of. The very fact, then, that we have found so many events that are definitely known to have been causally determined and

have found none that are known to the countrary assures us that *all* events have to be so determined. If, as a matter of fact, we, in spite of our best effort, fail to find out significant causes of an event, we cannot, on the ground stated, *deny* causality there: we can only say that as yet we have not found sufficient causal determination there, which means that we should still go on investigating the case. Basic indeterminism with only statistical laws may be a matter of practical expediency, but it cannot be an ultimate theory. Most of the Indians are against *yadṛcchāvāda* and *ākasmikatāvāda*. The whole matter comes to this that there is no freedom of will in the sense that our actions are not causally determined to the full. Yet, however, that feeling of 'I doing' is there, at least when the will (or action) is reflective. But the Indians would never even *confuse* it with the so-called faeedom of will. They regard this 'I-feeling' either as the simple fact that the will in question, quite as much as any cognition, feeling and wish, takes place *in me*, according to some, in *ātman* = self, according to others, *antaḥkaraṇa* = mind, with which the self only appears as somehow identified, or, at the most, as an *internal perception* (*mānasa pratyakṣa*) which has that will as its object. The Indians never hold that will itself becomes self-conscious. Self-conscious will is, according to them, nothing but the internal perception of it, and internal perception, according to them, is but a case of *cognition*. Incidentally, according to them, none of the mental events, except cognition, is an affair of consciousness—consciousness and cognition being just synonymous, there being only a distinction, with some philosophers, between pure and empirical consciousness. Also, according to them, internal perception is not the same thing as introspection (*anuvyavasāya*), this latter being but the awareness (cognition) of a *cognition*. Anyway, whether known through internal perception or through introspection, will is itself no case either of consciousness or of self-consciousness. Western philosophers, on the other hand, do not generally subscribe to this view. They find nothing wrong with *any* mental affair being itself conscious and, on occasions, self-conscious unless, of course, it belongs to the level of mind called sub-conscious or unconscious. It is difficult to show that these Western philosophers are mistaken. In the present essay we have not challenged them, we have rather proceeded in their line.

Anyway, for the Indian philosophers, the proposition 'I choose a certain course of action' would mean no more than that my internal perception would reveal that my action or the will for that particular course of action has taken place in me. For them, all the difference between my action, on the one hand, and the behaviour of an animal or the motion of an inanimate thing, on the other, consists in the uniqueness of internal perception where the perceiver and the *I* that has the action are somehow identical.

Choice too, according to the Indians, unless it is understood in a deeper sense to which we shall turn immediately, is nothing but *wish* as we have described it. Wish, we have shown, is nothing but an action (will)[4] in idea or one in making, or it is just the beginning of the action.

We have seen that choice, understood in a deeper sense, is, first, my freedom *not to submit* to any form of pressure, whether it is exerted by outside circumstances or by another person or persons or by the agent's inclinations and passions and bodily circumstances, and secondly—and this is is the positive characterization—the freedom *to accept* one of the several competing courses of action. We have also seen that this freedom does not clash with causal determination, for it primarily constitutes the *over-natural* side of man, his essential being. So long as man is a part of Nature all his behaviours and actions are causally determind by other events in Nature, quite as much as these events themselves are. But man can also transcend Nature.

This power of transcendence, this attitude of not submitting to Nature, is amply indicated by the Indian notion of *detachment* (*vairāgya*), and the positive acceptance, through freedom, of a course of action by their concept of *practice* (*abhyāsa*).

At the level of Nature man's movements are broadly of three kinds. Some of these are non-biologically physical, some just biological—like automatic movements of viscera and reflex movements—and some that could, in all proper sense, be called *my action*, though these too are mostly, if not always, unreflective. It is these third group of movements, called (my) actions, which though caused by other things, are in a important sense initiated (this initiation is also causation) by inclination (*rāga*) or aversion (*dveṣa*). This inclination or aversion is as much a causal determinat as those other things. Only, the former may, to use an Indian term, be called *karaṇa* (special important cause, or, in Western language, special important causal determinant). The freedom that is said to be felt in such actions is but the I-feeling accompanying—in precise Indian language, the internal perception that reveals the action (will) as having occurred in *me*.

Next higher in the order come actions-through-detachment (*vairāgya*). Detachment is primarily my free refusal to submit to the causal determinants stated above. It too may, in a sense, be due to, i.e. causally determind by, correct cognition or emotional devotion to some ideal. But many Indians hold that once brought to the fore it is realized as an *autonomous* power of man, which, according to these philosophers, means that its so-called causal determinants

have only caused its awareness, not itself. The determinants have, in other words, rescued it from its submerged state. According to some of these philosophers, this detachment is but the general attitude of *cognition*, but according to others it is *volition* in its truest, i.e. free, character. There are others, again, who, contrary to all that we have said so far, consider it as really caused by correct cognition or devotion to an ideal and hold that once so caused it goes on with its task of uplifting man from his bondage to Nature.

If it be held that detachment is only the general attitude of *cognition*, then corresponding to this negative freedom not to submit to Nature the positive side would only be the pure being of man which alone would be the *summum bonum* of life, and man would thenceforward try only to enjoy it in ecstasy. But there is no reason why it should not be *volition* in its truest free character. Rather, as it is discovered in the volitional life itself and, further, as when discovered it is found to be not submitting to Nature—which is evidently a matter of *exertion*, it should, we feel, be understood that way. In the present paper we have taken this negative freedom exactly in that line.

If, now, in spite of this freedom not to submit, we do submit to Nature, this would evidently be an immoral act, immorality basically meaning that one, in his volitional life, has denied his true character as freedom—he has acted in a manner contrary to the realization of his true being. This standpoint we have called that of *spiritual morality*.

Movements up to and including those which are initiated by inclination and aversion are all thoroughly determined by causal determinants. Yet there is some difference in the case of these latter, viz. those which are initiated by inclination and passion. Let us call them *normal actions* or, more briefly, N, and automatic biological and physical actions A. It is a fact that while nobody is held responsible for A, we always speak of some responsibility in the case of N. Although these N-actions are throughly determined many such actions we take as wrong and we decry them as well as their agents. We say that the agents *ought not to have submitted to Nature.* These actions are not indeed immoral to the extent that their agents are to be penalized. Yet they are wrong in the sense that their agents after all submitted to Nature though they *could* resist it, for they *had* the freedom to resist. This is a new type of immorality, called *spiritual immorality* or *sin* (*pāpa*)[5]. In cases where they deliberately submit to natural pressure there is spiritual immorality *par excellence.*

By some stretch of imagination, and in the analogy of the material principle of inertia, one might, it is conceivable. hold that the agent's so-called resistance to Nature is itself but a natural phenomenon and that the so-called deliberate resistance is only this natural phenomenon accompanied by an I-feelling, so that the corresponding submissions too, whether deliberate or not, would, every bit of them, just be events of Nature. One might thus, with whatever justification, interpret the negative freedom of non-submission and the corresponding free submission to Nature, involved in immorality, wholly in the language of Nature. But even, though this is conceivable it has to be admitted that one cannot proceed further and interpret the free acceptance of Nature—whether in spiritual or in normal morality—in that language; for, it is obviously much more than what could be taken in the analogy of inertia.

Not only that, one cannot also interpret that way the ecstatic enjoyment of one's being as a consequence of the negative non-submission. For, that is evidently more than natural inertia, supplemented or not with I-feeling. This ecstatic enjoyment and the free acceptance of Nature in morality are thus wholly over-natural, and the Indians have recognised detachment (*vairāgya*) as the principle that initiates us into this higher sphere. They have also recognised practice (*abhyāsa*) as another principle which leads us either to strive in that sphere to cling to that enjoyment or freely use Nature to build set-ups for the material and spiritual welfare of others, i.e. of mankind in general, however wide or narrow that generality may be. For the Indians, however, this *vairāgya* and this *abhyāsa* are not themselves over-natural. Themselves natural, they are on the bridgeway between Nature and the over-natural—they are constituted of the *sāttvika* elements of Nature, elements which alone, in their full *sāttvika* character, are capable of fully reflecting, i.e. correctly pointing to—even leading succesfully to—the autonomy of the over-natural. The *sāttvika* elements of Nature, in their progressive purity—in other words, in their progressive domination over other two elements which are called *rājasika* and *tāmasika*—constitute the different forms of *vairāgya* and *abhyāsa*.

Vairāgya, supplemented by *abhyāsa*, may lead, however, in two different directions. Its main task is indeed to introduce one to the field of the over-natural, called Freedom; but the *abhyāsa* (practice) that keeps it effective may either help him to get firmly installed in freedom in ecstatic enjoyment only, or without leading straight to that it may begin with inspiring him to deal with Nature again—this time in a free attitude—for the welfare of others; and this welfare of others cannot be a consideration unless it starts with selflessness—unless, in other words, it is *niṣkāma* from the beginning—and unless also it

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involves, in a way, dedication to God, God being only another name for *all* taken as a living concrete whole.

As for which actions would be for the welfare of *all* (ie. others), this, the Indians hold, cannot be left to the individual judgement of a man unless he is wise enough. Normally for us, we are told, such actions have already been defined in the scriptures of various denominations, and by sages, saints and acknowledged statesmen and formulated in detail by acknowledged interpreters—sometimes, modelled in a way by sheer convention or history. *Vairāgya*, supplemented by *abhyāsa*, might—indeed, this is the first thing it does—lead one to accept *in an attitude of freedom* such defined and formulated courses of action.

Welfare of others—including that of mine—is, as we have pointed out in another context, either sheerly material or material in a way as to be conducive to spiritual welfare also or wholly spiritual. It is only the latter two types of welfare that are in view when scriptures, sages, saints and statesmen define actions for us. When, however, it is a question of sheer material welfare the definition is often left to our individual judgement or just to convention and historical forces. In either case, i.e. whether sheer material welfare or one that is of the other two kinds is in view, our action is free in the sense that we accept such courses of action *freely*, i. e., to whatever extent, in an attitude of *vairāgya*—'freely' implying that we feel we could avoid these.

This freedom of action does not, as we have seen, clash with wholesale determinism in the field called Nature. It consists in my accepting or not what stands determined for me, whether by Nature itself for by scriptures, saints, sages and others. Where there is no scope for me for accepting-or-not-accepting things of Nature, as in the case of physical and mechanical biological motions, there is no question of freedom and, therefore, of moral judgement on my movements. Wherever, on the other hand, there is such scope there is the question of freedom and, therefore, of moral judgement. As for actions at the animal level initiated by *rāga* and *dveṣa*, many hold that there is some scope for freedom even there, because the man who moves that way *should yet have resisted.* Some others, as we have seen, may deny this on the ground that they understand sabmission to Nature—or even resistance to it—in purely natural language. Indian philosophers hold the former view: they hold that *vairāgya* and *abhyāsa* are in the possession of every *human* being. They hold, in other words, that though human beings are normally forced by the pressure of Nature (which includes *adṛṣṭas*) they could resist it. Unless this is admitted there would be no point in the generally accepted Indian doctrine that

such actions, on the part of human beings, generate fresh *adṛṣṭas* (*pāpas* and *puṇyas*).[6] Sub-human species do not, according to them, acquire any *pāpa* or *puṇya*.

As for higher actions on the part of a human being—actions, viz. which involve free re-arrangement of Nature, or alternatively, originate from his free *submission* to it—these undoubtedly generate fresh *adṛṣṭas* or, in the least, affect the *adṛṣṭas* already accumulated. In some cases, for example, though no fresh *puṇyas* originate, the actions, because of the *vairāgya* practised, effect some elimination of the *pāpas* already accumulated by other actions, and, anyway, their non-performance leads to some fresh *pāpa*. It is only in the case of continuous keeping away from Nature, in ecstatic enjoyment of one's being, that not merely there is no question of *pāpa* and *puṇya* but all the *pāpas* and *puṇyas*, already accumulated, because of other actions, begin to get eliminated through the progressive conquest of *rāga* and *dveṣa* (because of the continuous practice of *vairāgya*), and when these are completely eliminated the man finds himself permanently in his true ecstatic being without any chance of coming back to Nature.

Pāpas and *puṇyas* get eliminated in two ways—either through corresponding *bhogas* or through *vairāgya* practised for keeping the agent continually away from Nature. '*Bhoga*' means experience (in the field of Nature) with its proper hedonic tone (pain or pleasure). Any actions through *rāga* and *dveṣa* leads causally to proper experience with appropriate hedonic tone. That this is a fact is largely evidenced in our daily life, and if in some cases we do not find this appropriate pain or pleasure attached to experiences resulting from our acts, we have, everyone of us, the compensating absolute faith that nevertheless this ought to be the state of affairs. How, otherwise, could it be a fact that when a criminal does not suffer or a virtuous man suffers everyone of us feels that something has gone wrong somewhere and if per chance in future the criminal comes to suffer and the virtuous one is rewarded we feel that what so happens is exactly what should have happened? This justifies the further faith that if the appropriate reward or punishment has not been accorded in the present life (from birth to death) it must be accorded in a future life.[7]

Where *adṛṣṭas* are not eliminated through the particular practice of *vairāgya*, already referred to, they have to be eliminated through *bhoga* in succeeding cycles of life. *Adṛṣṭas* acquired in one such life get amalgamated, we are told, with *adṛṣṭas* acquired in still previous lives into one homogeneous whole just before the end of the present life and this homogeneous whole leads causally, we are also told, to a next life in only *three* of its aspects, viz. *jāti*, *āyus* and *bhoga*. What *bhoga* is we have

already seen. As for *jāti*, it means the situation, the set-up, in which one is born in the next life, and *āyus* means the span of that life. Why the Indians speaks only of these three aspects I do not know. But the relevant point is that they do not include *actions*, at least not *all* actions. Actions as forms of experience could be subsumed under the concept of *bhoga* if only their results, viz. further experience with appropriate hedonic tones, were had in the present life. As a matter of fact, many of these results are not had in the present life. This is why action as such is excluded from *bhoga*, and the results of such actions that occur in the present life are, therefore, considered as only *additional* experiences not generated by the *adṛṣṭas* of the previous life. The Indians never meant that *all bhogas* of the present life are caused by the *adṛṣṭas* of previous lives; and they further hold—and that is the decisive point—that actions generate new *adṛṣṭas*.

Actions, so far, are free, and be it remembered once again that physical movements of the body and mechanical physiological movements are not *actions*. If actions due to *rāga* and *dveṣa* could be considered in the mere language of Nature these would also be excluded. But, as already noted, the Indians do not subscribe to that view.

Actions thus are free, in spite of the suggested courses of action being all mechanically determined. The course of action that has been freely accepted, being one of the several alternative courses suggested, is also mechanically determined, perhaps better, i.e., more fully determined because often it stands at the strongest of the alternatives, it being borne in mind that my liking or inclination is also one of the causal determinants. Yet it is free in the sense that I have freely accepted it.

Had not the Indians recognised this freedom they could never speak of the other type of elimination of *adṛṣṭas*, already spoken of—elimination, viz. which is not effected through the corresponding *bhogas* but through *vairāgya*, sometimes called *jñāna* (*Jñānagniḥ sarvakarmāṇi bhasmasāt kurute tathā*). Even elimination through *bhogas* is not possible without some bearing somewhere of *vairāgya*.

In fact, if there were no scope whatsoever for freedom there could never be the *mokṣa* that the Indian philosophers speak so much of. Man would only go on adding *puṇyas* and *pāpas* in spite of the elimination of already-accumulated *adṛṣṭas* through appropriate *bhoga*. Even scriptural injunctions—prescriptions as much as prohibitions—would all be pointless; for if all my actions be wholly determined why should the scriptures at all enjoin these prescriptions and prohibitions?

1. In another sense of the word 'presupposition' the thesis could be accepted. But to that later.

2. We shall show that 'has worth' means 'is right or good'.

3. The type of compulsion discussed here is different from one that is implied in the theory of determinism involved even where I feel I have done the act or that I have chosen to do it. The second type of compulsion makes room for that feeling which the first type does not.

4. We have nowhere drawn a distinction, as some have done, between will *as a mental affair* and action *as involving obvert physiological movement.* There is no such clear distinction and no chronological order too between them.

5. The *spiritual morality* we spoke of in the preceding paragraph is not, however, *puṇya.* This we shall discuss later.

6. This is not, of course, universally admitted in Indian philosophy.

7. Rebirth is only the obverse side of a cycle of life (from one birth to the corresponding death) just previous to the present one.

R. K. Tripathi

FREEDOM

Freedom is quite often confused either with some form of freedom or with some expression of it. Not only this, sometimes just a form of freedom is taken to be exclusively the only form, and not unoften the value of an expression of freedom is regarded as the value of freedom itself. It is therefore necessary to distinguish freedom from its forms and expressions and also the forms of freedom from its various expressions.

I

We hear these days quite a lot about different kinds of freedom—freedom of thought, freedom of speech, freedom of worship and so on. These are different forms not of freedom but of the freedom of conduct indicating the absence or negation of different kinds of handicaps or limitations. These represent different directions of will as it were. Moral freedom, political freedom and social freedom also are merely different forms of free will and not freedom itself. So freedom must not be confused merely with free will or moral will which is just a form of freedom. Moral freedom is just a form of freedom because it is relative to certain conditions; it can be there only if there is the awareness of good and evil. Choice is meaningless without the consciousness of distinctions. Like moral freedom, creative freedom also is only a form of freedom and not freedom itself, because it is not absolute but relative to certian conditions. These freedoms may be absolute in their own special sphere, but they are not *absolutely* absolute; they are only *relatively* absolute as Spinoza would put it.

The very variety of forms demands that freedom must be disengaged from them and that it must not be identified with anyone of them exclusively. Freedom as such can be had only by negating or

transcending the various forms which but specify freedom and do not substitute it. Freedom by its very nature must be absolute; it must be infinite; it must be capable of assuming different forms without being tied down to any one of them. In fact, freedom may be regarded as what can assume infinite forms. The different forms are only different directions in which freedom channelises itself under various conditions. It is obvious that when we go from forms of freedom to freedom as such, the term acquires a completely new meaning even as it happens when we turn from beings to being. But we continue to use the term freedom even for absolute freedom because there is no better choice.

Even as freedom is different from its various forms, the forms themselves are different from their various expressions. Moral freedom is a form of freedom which expresses itself in various moral acts. Religious freedom is a form of freedom expressing itself in different kinds of worship. Creative freedom similarly expresses itself in different kinds of arts. Thus an expression of a form of freedom is a further specification of that freedom. Expression is a kind of solidification or concretisation of a form of freedom. A poem, a novel, a picture or a moral act is nothing but the concretisation of a certain form of freedom. Thus there seem to be three levels or grades: freedom, forms of freedom and expressions of freedom.[1]

II

In the middle ages of European thought, theologians used to have hot discussions whether will or intellect, love or knowledge was the senior partner or the predominant element in the personality of God. To our way of thinking, it would appear that it was a very unreal issue. If the question was really concerning the freedom of God, freedom of will cannot really represent it; because freedom of will is only a form of freedom and not freedom itself that God is. God cannot be said to be free in the same sense in which man is. That is why some thinkers have pointed out that freedom does not mean the freedom to choose good *or* evil; freedom means the freedom to choose only the good. In other words, freedom does not mean freedom for but freedom from evil and imperfection and God is free only in this sense. Man has or may have the freedom to choose but he is not free. This is a point which was well appreciated by Spinoza who pointed out that God has freedom but not the freedom of will. He very rightly held that while freedom was perfection, the freedom of will was a kind of imperfection. Man may boast of his freedom of will; the all perfect can never do so. He lacks nothing and has

therefore no need or occasion to choose. He *is* good; He does not choose to be good.

We may incidentally refer to another contemporary thinker. Sartre distinguishes between the in itself and the for itself as two basic types of being. The in itself is a kind of total plentitude in which there is "not the slightest emptiness" or "tiniest crack through which nothingness might slip in," while the for itself is a "decompression of being and is its own nothingness." Thus the two are wholly exclusive and the one cannot attain the other. But at the same time, Sartre would hold that the one cannot be without the other. The fundamental feature of the for-itself is freedom or the capacity to choose; this is so basic that it can never be lost; even not to choose is choosing. We would agree with Sartre that freedom is basic and so it can never be completely lost, but we cannot agree that freedom means merely the freedom to choose. There can be such a thing as the freedom of being which is logically prior to the freedom of choice. The fact that the for-itself and the in-itself are exclusive of each other means that they are also independent and that implies that the in itself also has freedom though not the freedom of choice. This is possible because like the for itself, the in-itself is also a form of being. As being, both the for-itself and the in-itself are free. That which is common to both namely being, is independent of both and has what may be called transcendent freedom or freedom of being. On surface the in itself and the for itself exclude each other but to the extent they are both being, they share the freedom of being. If the in-itself did not have freedom, it could not exclude the for-itself. The fallacy committed by sartre is analogous to the fallacy found in the Sāmkhya. In the Sāmkhya also, two kinds of reality prakṛti and puruṣa are distinguished but no attempt is made to reach the transcendent or the common denominater. In Hegel too we have only a totality or synthesis of the self and the not—self but no transcendence. The transcendent should be equally common to both i. e. it should also be equally immanent. Freedom must be at once transcendent and immanent.

III

It is this transcendent freedom or the freedom of being and not any particular form of freedom that has been emphasised in Indian philosophy. The question of free will is hotly discussed by western thinkers but curiously this question did not bother the Indian thinkers and has not been discussed by any one of them. This can only be due to the fact that their interest lay deeper. The empirical question whether we

are free or not should not arise. So long as we feel free, no amount of argument or reasoning can persuade us to believe that we are not free. As sartre would put it, we are free even to accept or reject the arguments against freedom. If, however, the question is not about the empirical feeling of freedom, the 'question becomes metaphysical and cannot be decided by any amount of empirical evidence or data.

The reason why the Indian thinkers concerned themselves more about the freedom of being rather than that of will is that they were convinced that the former was the ground of the freedom of will and of all other forms of freedom but also of all values. Freedom is the basic value and all other values are derivative. Joy, the supreme value, and freedom are identical. All values emanate from joy or infinity or rather absolute infinity. This absolute infinity can be nothing but the pure self or pure consciousness; the two are convertible terms because only pure consciousness can be absolutely infinite. And since the infinite alone can be free and not the finite, the self or freedom is the source of all values. As the Upaniṣad puts it, everything is dear to us because of the self (*ātmanastu kāmāya sarvam priyam bhavati*). The same idea is reaffirmed in the conception of *bhūmā* or the infinite (Chh. Up. VII, 23). It has been clearly stated that there can be no joy in the finite; there can be joy only in the infinite or *bhūmā* (*Yo vai bhūmā tatsukham nalpe sukhamasti*). The definition of the infinite has also been given; the infinite is that where there is no duality. Wherever there is duality and hence determinateness, there is finitude, there is death, there is fear, there is suffering. But when one attains unity, there is immortality (*amṛtam*) there is freedom fear (*abhayam*), there is freedom from suffering (*śokam*) ; is short there is complete or absolute freedom (*svarad bhavati samrāditi*). There one attains everything (*āptakāma*), one desirers nothing (*akāma*) or rather one desires only the self (*ātma kāma*).

This is not the place to go into any detail regarding the nature of the self as pure consciousness. Suffice it to say that consciousness, if we understand by it pure consciousness and not any particular form of it, can neither be a quality nor an activity nor a relation; it cannot belong to anything; it must be basic. Nor can consciousness be limited; there is nothing which can limit it because there can be nothing which is independent of consciousness. It is possible, however, to doubt the reality of any such thing as pure consciousness on the ground that we have no experience of it. But if different forms of consciousness are accepted, it becomes logically necessary to accept the notion of pure consciousness as basic to all the different forms. One cannot accept a variety of forms without at the same time admitting an underlying unity.

5

IV

Freedom which is the ground of all forms of freedom and all expressions of freedom is necessarily transcendent and cannot thererore be realized by or through any of its particular forms. Freedom of will for example cannot take us beyond morality or the sphere of good and evil. Creative freedom or art cannot take us beyond the sphere of the beautiful and the ugly. Though the forms cannot take us beyond themselves, their plurality serves an important purpose—the purpose of indicating something beyond themselves something which is common to all of them. When we fail to see this, we become idolatrous even as we become idolatrous when we fail to pass on from the symbols to the symbolised. This passing from the forms to the formless is possible only because of the plurality of forms. If there were only one form or symbol, it would be immpossible to disengage it from that of which it is the form or the symbol. The form or the symbol would become the thing. But since there are many forms, it is possible to disengage the forms from the thing itself. Freedom negates itself by taking form, or rather freedom is what can take infinite forms. And so absolute freedom can be realized only by negating the forms a process which is felt as soon as we pass from one form of freedom to another. There can be thus only a negative way of realizing freedom and not a positive way, because by positive methods we can realize only a form of freedom and not freedom itself; for freedom, the forms have to be negated and this is possible because freedom is already immanent in the forms. That freedom can be realized only negatively is not to say that frendom is negative; it is utterly positive or rather beyond the positive and the negative, being the ground of the possibility of both. A form of freedom is at once both positive and negative as it at once excludes and includes both. But freedom is not like that. Further, while freedom is utterly positive and forms are both positive and negative, there is nothing which is utterly negative or completely determined. This is because there is nothing in which there is no being or freedom. Freedom can never lose itself completely. There is nothing which is an utter void or emptiness. There is none who is god-forsaken or unregenerate, none eternally damned. There is hope for everyone.

Freedom though capable of assuming infinite form is all actuality and must not be confused with potentiality or indeterminateness. And though itself all actuality, freedom is the basis of all potentiality and progress. This is because freedom can negate itself though not absolutely, and the negation of freedom or rather the hiddenness of actuality is potentiality. Ignorance of the actuality of freedom or joy is the basis of all effort and potentiality. Freedom cannot be brought

into existence ; production is further loss of freedom and so no amount of *karma* would avail in the realization of freedom which is all actuality. The actual can be only discovered or known. This is why it has been said that there can be no freedom without knowledge. Truly there is nothing like knowledge (*na hi jñānena sadṛśam pavitramiha vidyate*). Knowledge alone can give us salvation as knowledge alone can discover the infinity of the self.

Freedom may be understood also as grace. In human affairs, grace is associated with freedom of will. It is said to be specifically evident when freedom of will expressess or exhibits itself as freedom from rigid rules and regulations. The implication is that grace is free from every external determination. In this man is really not capable of showing any grace. Only he who is not only free but also free from—and that too absolutely—can really show gracc. The grace of God is therefore the exemplar of all grace. The kind of grace that is known in human society is just an imitation or reflection of Divine Grace which is there for all and for ever. True grace, if it is to be distinguished from mere whim on the one hand and licence on the other, must be one with true being or absolute freedom.

1. Brahman, Isvara, and the trinity of Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva may correspond to this hierarchy. Brahman the formless takes form as Isvara and so Brahman is nothing but the self of self of Isvara who is conscious of Himself as Brahman. Isvara and Brahman though distinguishable are not different.

André Mercier

ON FREEDOM[1]

Knowledge and freedom are inseparably connected. Indeed, freedom is in no case "to choose whatever one wants", but "to recognize and to accept one's own limits", and knowledge as cognition is an act (not a fact) which by transcending the momentary situation of cognizance establishes a tighter bond between the knowing subject and reality than was at hand so far.

Now the cognizance is both the awareness of apparent structures of, and harmonies in, reality, and the recognition that these structures and harmonies are but the momentary appearance of reality, i.e. the understanding that suitable further efforts will disclose more elaborate or higher harmonies and the like, meaning that a progress is made both by recognizing the limits and by surpassing (not trespassing) them, i.e. freedom itself. So, freedom is most paradoxical, for, its first condition being the acceptance of limits, it is the acceptance of a situation which amounts to non-freedom (the limits defining our Present finitude). In that sense, freedom is equivalent with its contrary, non-freedom. In other words: I am free to choose not to be free. This, by the way, is the only possibility to be free, whereas to refuse not to be free would re-inforce the state of not being free and hence amount to not being free at all.

Freedom is therefore a will to know much rather than a state of the human person supposedly liberated from some bond or other. If, apparently, a king or a judge can liberate a prisoner from jail, this does not make free the man who was in jail, even if the walls of his cell have collapsed from his look and his walk. Much rather the man in prison might already be free if he has recognized the reasons why he was put into jail, for these reasons are the limits of his self much more than the walls of the cell ; the liberation decided by

Authority is then nothing but a public confirmation of the man's freedom.

The will to know confers to cognitive acts the quality of judgements of value and make the pictures of reality thus obtained loveable. At the same time, such cognitive acts reval harmonies that were concealed to our eyes; these harmonies are always some sensible forms of a perfection which is devoid of the temporality of transient things; hence knowledge has a way of suspending time, for it discloses orders that are timeless in themselves. Now, if one would ask, what is it, which *par excellence* suspends time and puts him into that state of bliss in which time "is no more" and in which inspite of one's necessary worldly life he feels to be in eternity, the answer should be clear and unique: love does it. Therefore, love is the primary motor of knowledge and the warrant of freedom.

Hence the twofold relation originally referred to is a threefold one between knowledge, freedom and love.

This of course assumes a very broad conception of knowledge. Not only is knowledge conceived of as an act, which is generally accepted by European and Asiatic thinkers (though less generally admitted by British philosophers who see in knowledge a fact rather than an act), but it integrates the disclosure of all values. Such disclosure can be realized along two ways: by contemplation, or by judgement. So knowledge implies at least all judgements of value. A value is the quality of beings as disclosed empirically (i.e.in experience in the broadest possible sense) by the application of an abstract view of the mind onto concrete reality; it confirms the said view and insures the authenticity of the steps taken in that application. There are four cardinal types of experience: scientific, artistic, moral and mystic experience. A genuine judgement of value is the successful application just mentioned; it is not the utterance made a posteriori by some critic who recognizes the authenticity of the genuine judgement after it has been passed by its author: a recognition which should not be very difficult if the critic is sufficiently trained in the field involved.

Every value judgement is a piece of knowledge. This implies that not only truth be the reward of knowledge but beauty and bounty (or rather: the good) too, as well as the sublime which is implied in the recognition of divine values and is mediated by the mystic experience. Hence not only the savant is free, but also the artist, the moral man and the mystic.

To neglect any of these four cardinal values, from which all further values can be construed, but which are in an essential sense

mutually irreduceable, is to remain in ignorance. In that sense, ignorance is not the opposite of knowledge, for a man is then in a state of ignorance, whereas otherwise he cannot be said to be "in a state of knowledge" since knowledge is an act. Ignorance is due to the collapse of knowledge, be it by negligence, by passiveness, by aversion or what have you. At the same time, ignorance of the values leaves one in a state of frustration, if not even of fear, hence of pain and grief : all feelings characteristic of a person who is not "in love", for, only a loving person is not in pain, not in fear . . . in one word : is free.

Plato integrated all values into a supreme one often called the supreme good. However, this does not suppress the irreduceable differences between the true, the beautiful, the (ordinary) good and the divine. It only explains their common nature of being values, authentic and not apocryphal. It is not very difficult to understand why there are these four irreduceable values, granted a premise according to which no theory of knowledge is possible without assuming the initial separation of the knowing subjects from their objects. (I shall not deal with the Socratic problem of self-knowledge, though it is a part of the relation between knowledge and freedom.)

In that initial state of separation, the subject feels his isolation as a burden he is to get rid of; it is the brute state of his being un-free, though it is premature to use words like free and un-free at that stage. Anyhow, the subject will do what he can in order to re-establish his relation with reality a part of, or the totality of, these objects from which he is isolated.

There are two essentially distinct modalities offered him to actualize that end : either to pass judgements upon the objects, or—by radically renouncing judgements whose author he would be—to search re-union with reality in a kind of converse judgement passed upon him by Reality itself, as if Reality had the power to judge (which confers It a nature usually rendered by the attribute 'divine' to the disclosed value and—in our opinion—dooms to ignorants those who deny divine value authenticity.

This latter search is called contemplation. In a wording which is not traditionally that of Aritotelian logic but has great methodological advantage, I shall say that there are two distinct modalities : the modality of judgement and the modality of contemplation. (A temple was "a space in which the god resides"; but etymologically it was originally the open space to whose borders the looks could reach; hence: contemplation.) So, man is capable of either judgement, or contemplation. Contemplation on the one hand does not part into

further modes; its unique mode is mystic. Judgement on the other hand admits of three modes, because in its modality, either the subject seeks to retain the greatest possible independence from his objects in order to operate on them at greatest leisure—this is called the objective mode, or objectivity—, or he seeks to submit is ("subject") himself as completely as possible to his objects in order to let these objects so-to-say show themselves and reveal their corresponding value—this shall be called the subjective mode, or subjectivity-, or (third and last possibility) subject and object are mutually involved in their community which requires from the subject (and in principle from the object too, but not always in practice) a behaviour which defines a third mode for which precisely the name community is characteristic.

The mode of objectivity is identical with science and the value it discloses is called truth; the mode of subjectivity is nothing but art and it reveals beauty; the mode of community is morals and it promotes the good. (So, only art is subjective, not morals.) Truth parts into various categories along the several sciences; so does beauty along the arts, and there are various domains of morals according to types of communities where the good is promoted.

These considerations show that freedom is not a subject-matter for ethics proper. Ethics is the theoretical (shall we say formal) aspect of morals, like mathematics is the theoretical of formal aspect of science and aesthetics that of art. Freedom is the will necessay for the authentic achievement of value and is therefore a subject-matter for philosophy itself. The phrase 'necessary will' may sound paradoxical, but here, the words 'will' and 'necessary' are not contradictory, on the contrary they combine precisely in a way which reflects the curious paradoxical aspect of freedom as identical with its contrary the acceptation of the limits of temporality, for else no transcendance is possible.

As a last remark, it should be said that love has a power of allowing the subject to glance through its object and let the perfection of reality shine by transparence. But what is reality? As an answer, let us say that reality is always that which resists the attempts of our grasping it by science, by art, by morals or even by mystic contemplation. (In the latter modality, only the subject himself could actually be reproached with resistance, yet it is another kind of resistance.) Hence the apprehension of reality by the subject amounts always an to attempt at raping (violating) it; but of course the rape never succeeds. It is not by chance that we use such a strong word as rape in a connection where, further above, we had talked about love. (Let us not forget that in the Bible, the consumation of a sexual act is described by

saying that such and such *knew* such and such.) Only, ordinary (sexual) rape is not a free act; for it is made within the temporality and the finitude of our worldly life, and it does neither liberate from the limits of that temporality nor consequently reveal the prefection of Being. (We suddenly say Being instead of Reality, for those who are familiar with European traditional ontology.)

Freedom is the way one gets rid of temporality and escapes finitude.

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1. Being the last to speak, the author had intended to listen first to the other speakers before he gave his talk which was then given *ex temporale*. The present text is an elaboration of the points presented in a form suitable for publication.

N. A. Nikam

INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY IN INDIAN SOCIAL THOUGHT

Whitehead says that Nature is a "Passage". So is Society. It is the larger social process of "affiliation" of societies in Toynbee's interpretation of History. And in each society known to History, there is another social process. This is a "passage" from one kind of diversity to another kind of diversity: from a social diversity based on birth, colour, race etc., to a diversity based on "merit" and "work" *guṇa* and *karma* as the *Gītā* calls it. Broadly speaking, the first diversity is the same as *Jāti*, "Caste" and the second is *Varṇāśrama* dharma of Hindu social Ethics. The second is a diversity based on "function"; the first is a diversity based on "Caste". If the social diversity based on "Caste" were to disappear, and the diversity based on "function" were to come into being then the social-order that comes into being is a "Classless" society. In conceiving a social-order based on *guṇa* and *karma*, Hindu social ethics conceived a "classless" society long before "Classless" society.

Varṇa means "Colour"; therefore wherever there is a social diversity based on "Colour" there is "Caste". And as the "passage" from the first kind of diversity to the second kind of diversity is not completed in any society, there is in all societies some equivalent of *jāti* "caste".

But the "social process" which constitutes the "passage" is a two-way process: (a) it is a passage from *jāti* to *varṇa*; it is a passage from a diversity based on birth to a diversity based on function, on merit and work. (b) But the opposite process: of *varṇa* becoming *jāti*, a diversity based on "merit" and "work" becoming hereditary also goes on. The intent of the Indian Constitution is to transform Indian Society from *jāti* to *varṇa*, from a society based on birth and status to a society based on merit and work and function.

But it is more interesting to inquire how why a social function becomes hereditary, and there arises "castes". In the *Chāndogya* Upanisad, Uddalaka said to son to become learned in the *Vedas*, because, he said that there was no one in their family who was only a brahmin by birth. Now, if there was no one in the family who was only a brahmin by birth, then it is the family that should educate or educates the next generation in the study of the veda. To be able to do so, the older generation must be competent to do so, and one generation must be competent to educate the next generation in the study of the Veda. And this implies that the Family is a place of education, of the preservation of learning and skills ; and this implies the solidarity and integrity of the family. The transmission of cultural excellence in Indian Culture has been through the institution of the Family. And the Family has been an educational institution. The education that is imparted in Indian Universities has not helped to preserve the ancient heritage of our Culture. If all the Arts are inside our Universities, all the Fine Arts are outside its education !

At this point, there is a significant distinction between the concept of State and the concept of Society. The State is "secular" but Society is not secular. No Society is secular ; all societies are organised around a Sacred Book, including the *Das Capital* which is the *Bible* of the Secular Religion of Communism. It is the business of the State to be involved in the instruction of the *veda* ; this is the business of Society. And a Society—the Hindu Society—does it through a Family or Families in which the recitation of the *veda* is handed down from father to son, from one generation to the other. What is the fun of the *veda* is the Fine Arts, Music and Sculpture etc. A secular state may abolish many functions and occupations—such as the *shanbhog* or the traditional village-clerk—but it cannot abolish the hereditary function of a priest. At this point, Society over rules the State. The notion of a "classless society" is a contradiction in terms, while the notion of a State as "classless" is a tautology. But the State has political parties which have the same fanaticism of classes. Therefore diversity of function arises in a Secular State in one way, and it arises in a Society in another way. In a secular treatise like Plato's Republic, diversity of function arises because there is some function which is "more important", as Socrates says, than others : this function is being a soldier or the gaurdian of the State. In a treatise like the *Manu dharma shastra*, which is a treatise on Social-order, there is one function which is "more important" than others, and this is being a "sudent of sacred knowledge" viz., the function of being a Priest. The first need not become hereditary, the second exists as a hereditary function. A mobile society is not ethically incompatible with a hereditary function.

The notion of "diversity of function" is common to the concept of the State and the concept of Society. But "diversity of function" is not simple economic division of labour. The state arises, said Plato, because "all are not alike and everybody has wants". The notion of "diversity of function" which involves differences based on "merit" and "work" *guṇa* and *karma* has in Indian social ethics a three-dimensional quality: It is ethico-socio-economic. This quality is expressed by the term *svadharma*; *svadharma* is like Plato's Justice: It is "doing one's own business". It is like F. H. Bradley's conception of "My station and its Duties" in his *Ethical Studies*. In Indian Social ethics, the ethical quality of *svadharma* has a Categorical Imperative: It may be expressed thus: So act or function that, if you are a potter, you become a *good* potter. *A good* man need not be a good potter but a good potter is a good man, because, he constitutes a good social-order. A social order is good in the same sense in which a potter is good. In Indian Social Ethics, "work" could be transformed into a *Yoga*. "Work" is not only a "function" but a mode of a man's Being.

It is not as if the notion of a "Classless" society is absent in Indian social ethics. But the main point is had a "classless" society to be brought about? Indian social ethics thinks that it is brought about through a "classless" individual, and individual who has no rights or obligations. He is an individual who belongs to an order, the "Order of Nobodies" as Ananda Coomaraswamy calls it. The "Classless" individual is the *sannyāsi* who has no rights or obligations and yet is the need of a social order. He is an individual who has transcended all distinctions and diversities of caste and creed, race and colour. He is a man who does not even belong to a "Religion" and disowns the authority of a State. The test of a "Classless" society is whether it creates a "classless" individual.

Kalidas Bhattacharya

RELATION IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Except in a few cases, very specifically mentioned in different systems of Indian Philosophy, relation is understood as just a real or a series of reals in line with any other real—i.e. not belonging to a different category—between two other reals called, in that context, relata. Betweenness is no relation : it is absolutely nothing other than the situation that two entities stand related. Difference, togetherness, and-ness, etc. are also no relations—they are presuppositions of relations : unless entities are *different* from one another or two or many are *together* and unless they are understood as A *and* B or A *and* B *and* C, etc. there is no question of relation, though this does not entail that wherever there is such difference, togetherness or andness there must be some relation.

When the entities called relata are said to be related, what is there, in addition to the existence of these entities and the intermediate entities said to constitute that relation, to entitle us to say that the extremes stand related? It is the simple phenomenon that the extremes and the intermediate entities have formed an objective unity. If the question is asked—what possibly is the relation between this unity and the entities that are said to be united?—we shall offer our answer very soon.

In the meantime let us distinguish between two types of objective unity. The distinction is on a par with that between natural kind and artificial class. Red-haired persons do certainly form an objective group. But natural kinds are more objectively conditioned. Almost similarly, the objective unity in a relational situation may be a natural gestalt forcing itself upon our consideration unconditionally or a unity selected for a particular purpose, though that purpose may be as wide as scientific study or less wide as in the case of a social purpose or as narrow as the narrow purpose of a particular individual. Indian

philosophers have concentrated more, if not practically exclusively, on relations that form objective unities of the first type. They are (a) the relation between parts and the presented whole of which they are parts, known either after analysis when the whole is first presented or through construction when sometimes the whole constructed comes also to be presented, and sometimes inferred as presentable, (b) the relation between a thing and its changed state where both are present either simultaneously or successively, (c) the relation between substance and attribute (and also motion, but excluding many other things, as we shall soon see, which may be used adjectivally), (d) the relation between a universal and the corresponding particulars, supposing that there is a real universal and it is presented, (e) the relation of contact[1] between two things, whether it produces a presentable unity or not, the contact being of different types, (f) the relation called resemblance when it is not accounted for by identity, and a few others.

Next in order come certain objective relations which, though themselves evident, are definable only in the context of someone perceiving both the relata. These include (a) the subject-object relation called reference, understood from the subject's point of view as *referring* and from the object's point of view as *being referred to*, (b) the relation of greaterness-smallerness, of earlierness-laterness, nearness-farness, etc. These are, no doubt, all objective relations, but their very definitions include some context of one's knowing. Not that the contexts in any way constitute these relations. No context ever *constitutes* a thing. Nor should these relations be therefore understood as subjective in the minimum sense that there are no real objective relations in these cases. They are objective reals but knowable (through perception or otherwise) only when the subject that knows is in the reflective attitude of comparison, comparing being entirely an original reflective act. We may add to the list of relations of this group those of rightness, leftness, northness, etc., which too are contextual but where there is no subjectivity intervening.

Next in order come ordinary relations, such as 'giving', 'secretary-ship to an institution', 'father-son', etc., which, as we have claimed, are not natural, like natural kinds, but selected only for some definite purpose.

In all the three types of cases mentioned above the entity or entities said to be intermediate form a unity with the extreme entities, and that unity is objective. Only, in the second and third types the unities are selected for some Purpose, but even of the two types of purposes the former ones are much wider than the latter, and the cases under the former type are *almost* as categorial as those under the first,

viz. clear natural gestalts. In cases under the first and second types the intermediate entities that are called relation always belong to a separate category or categories. For example, (a), (b), (c), and (d) under the first type belong to the category called *inherence*, and (e), and also (f) too where it is recognised, each form a separate category; and similarly with the cases (a) and (b) in the second group, they forming each a new category, respectively called subjectivity-objectivity (*viṣayitā-viṣayatā*) and moreness-lessness (*paratva-aparatva*). Of these two, again, the latter, viz. moreness-lessness has to be understood either in the language of space or in that of time or of number, etc. One important point concerning the relations under the second type is that though they are genuinely objective they, being contextual (in the interest of comparison), alternate, as it were, between autonomous objectivity and subjective constructedness.

To belong to a separate category does not, however, mean that one which so belongs cannot be subsumed under a wider category. As far as possible there should be such subsumption in order that the basic features of the world may be brought down to the minimum number. Contact and moreness-lessness have, for example, been brought by many under a wider category, viz. *attribute*, and *resemblance*, in a negative manner, under *identity*. What we mean is that while moreness-lessness has been understood as one of the many attributes a thing may have, resemblance has been *denied* in favour of identity, the proposition 'A resembles B' being reduced to 'A possesses many features which are indentical with many of the features that B possesses'. Others, again, have contrariwise reduced identity to resemblance, treating this latter as metaphysically more fundamental. Regarding the *features* that resemble, they would try to understand that resemblence too in the same manner, and in case they, through this regressive analysis, come to two *unanalysable* features that resemble one another they would just consider them as belonging to one *family*. I am not quite sure, however, that any Indian philosopher has actually said this. *Or*, they would treat all resemblance, and therefore, all unity, as mere intellectual construction, as many Buddhists have done. Or, more positivistically, they would hold that truly unanalysable features are only space-points and time-moments and they simply resemble, and that a character *apart from such points* is absolutely inconceivable, only *spoken* of as such.

To come back to the *unity*. How is this unity related to the entities of which it is the unity? Should it be said that between the unity and the extremes and also between it and intermediate entity or entities that constitute *relation* there must be other relations constituted by other intermediate entities, and, if this is allowed, should it not lead inevitably to vicious indefinite regress?

There need be no such apprehension on this account. The unity in question is not on a level with the items unified. It belongs to another level altogether, quite as much as *substance* does for those who admit it and yet do not consider it coordinate with attributes or as the First cause for those who admit it and yet do not take it as coordinate with phenomenal causes. Either, then, the propositions with these unities as subjects have to be understood in a quite different way or, from the point of view of the lower, they have to be understood as nothing other than but only liquidly comprehending the lower entities, so to say. 'Liquid comprehension' means that the unity, *though quite objective* and, therefore, undeniable, is yet, from the view-point of the entities that are unified, *no entity other than these*. One might go further and hold that it belongs to another order of reality, or that though seeming to be denoted by the corresponding word it is not really denoted, the use of language here being non-denoting, or that—if one likes—the unity is wholly a subjective creation for whatever purpose. However, except the Vijñānavādi Buddhist, for whom the unity is only a subjective construction, no Indian thinker has advocated any of these extreme views. Realists *par excellence*, they have understood the unity as objectively real; they only understand the *relation* between it and the other items (which it unifies) by way of identity, as we have already shown.

In the situation A r B, however, they understand the unity as identical this way with *A only*, not with r nor with B. That is because they raise the question of this unity only with regard to the judgement 'A is related to *its relation to B*'. Their point is that this A's relation to that *relation to B*, though quite objectively real, is yet no another entity baside A. Their idea is that the subject of every categorical proposition is not only one of the terms, but equally also the unity of itself with r and B, and r here is nothing but rB. The unity would in this sense be identical also with B, if the proposition representing the same situation were BrA; and it should be always borne in mind that r by itself is nothing if it is not either rB or rA.

I have said that most of the Indian thinkers would take the unity, first, as belonging to another order, like substance or the First Cause, and then, from the lower point of view understand it as liquidly identical with the entities themselves—to be more precise with the subject of the proposition that (that = the proposition) represents the original relational situation. The Naiyāyikas alone differ so far as the first part of the thesis is concerned. They do not believe in different orders of reality. The First Cause, with them, is coordinate with the natural causes and substances just entities beside attributes, and they try to understand the relation between any two items of reality in the

language of other accepted relations, as far as possible. It is only when they fail, as for example, in the case of substance and attributes, that they say they are compelled to postulate a novel relation—in other words, a novel entity as intermediate. This positivistic attitude is commendable. But it is doubtful if they have been able to hold on to it till the end. Between substance and attributes they have indeed postulated *inherence*, and they have even made a *vera causa* of it by explaining *some other* difficult cases by this inherence. But when it comes to accounting for the relation of this inherence of B to A they jump to identity. This second relation could, in whatever sense, be called identity if only they had first enquired about the *unity* of the relational situation. The problem of the relation between A and rB is intelligible only as the problem of the unity of the relational situation. Otherwise, should the problem be directly tackled as an independent one, viz. how A is related to rB, there could be offered all sorts of fantastic (fantastic to the Indians) views, such as the relation in question is completely different in quality from the entities denoted by the terms, or it is a universal, or a flexible entity, or ambulatry, etc. Those who have offered these views have not first examined what they mean by 'relation' in a relational situation. Those, on the other hand, who have done that have naturally turned to the *unity* of the relational situation and have, from that point of view, either stopped with that unity, regarding the relation in question as nothing but the relational situation, or elaborated the situation further and held that the unity of the situation is identical with what is denoted by the subject-term of the proposition in question *and* that this denotee too is identical with whatever could be shown as this denotee's relation to the denotee of the predicate-term (which, incidentally, *here* is not B, but rB). Advaita Vedānta has proceeded along this line, though the Bradleyan paradox about relation could be avoided whichever of the two ways could be adopted.

Whereas, then, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika recognises four entities, viz. A, rB, B and r' rB (in the reverse order, B, rA, A and r''rA) and considers r'rB (or r''rA) as yet not other than A (or B), Advaita Vedānta recognises only three of these, viz. A, rB and B (in reverse order, B, rA and A) and regards rB (or rA) as yet not different from A (or B). While for Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika the proposition 'This flower is red' means (1) there is a substance, viz. this flower[2], (2) there is an attribute, viz. this red,[3] (3) this red inheres in this flower, (4) the inherence of this red is also related in some way to this flower and (5) yet this relation of the inherence of this red to this flower is not entitatively other than this flower[4], for Advaita Vedānta the proposition means (1), (2) and (3) only *and also* that the inherence of this red is not entitatively different

from this flower.[5] For the Advaitin the inherence-of-red belongs to the very essence of this flower.

Y to belong to the essence of X means that X is the proper or genuine situation there, though apparently it also stands *as Y*; which in its turn, means that though somehow we have, for the present, to put up with X *as Y*, a demand for the dissociation of X in its autonomy is nevertheless forced on us. Which, again, means that as and when X is *realized* in its autonomy—how that is to be done is not the relevant question here—it is to be found as belonging to another—a higher—order of being, Y only loosely—one might say, incommensurately—hanging on to it, which is as good as saying that it could even be de-considered completely. Later Advaitins have even substantiated this position by their dialectical refutation of the concepts of relation, difference, etc. as systematically misleading.

There are others, however, who understand the *logic of essence* in another way. Instead of saying that Y *belongs to* the essence of X they would rather use the expression 'Y *is* the essence of X', where, therefore, there is no question of *loosely hanging* with the chance of even falling off. For them, Y as the essence of X simply means that there is no question of separating it from X, that X is X at all only as it carries Y, either as a necessary property or as an inalienable power. X and Y are, in other words, in identity-in-difference. This identity-in-dlfference, again, has been variously understood. Sometimes, it is held that X is the identity-base which stands differently as Y, sometimes that the identity-base gets self-differentiated into various forms because of this Y which by itself can never be pinpointed sometimes that Y is the identity-base (with what consequences I cannot adequately grasp), sometimes that X as the original identity develops into a richer identity through Y, sometimes that X and Y, belonging to the same order of being, are in identity and difference, etc. etc.

Two entities to be in the same order of being and yet both identical with and different form each other is indeed a difficult notion to put up with. This is why some interpret it as identity in one way and difference in another, and some reject the notion wholsale and insist on difference only, treating the so-called identity as an inadequate representation of another close relation between the items said to be identical, viz. characterization of one item by another, the two items being such that at least one of them is inseparable from the other. This is called the relation of *apṛthaksiddhi*—in Nyaya-Vaisesika, *ayutasiddhi* or inherence (*samavāya*). The Advaitin, on the other hand, holds that so long as the superior order of being of one of the two items found in the relation of identity-in-difference is not *realized*, we have to put up

with this paradox at the *vyāvahārika* revel. Indeed, as distict from the *pāramārthika*, the *vyāvahārika* is precisely that which, though it is acted upon and even entertained congnitively, is, at least from the point of view of logic, paradoxical through and through and has, therefore, been either already cancelled or demands to to be cancelled in favour of what is not paradoxical.

Two more points before we close. One of them is about the modern Western classification of relations and the other about the theory of internal relation. Western thinkers, particularly in Great Britain, have classified relations into (a) monadic, diadic, triadic, etc. (b) into transitive, intransitive, etc., (3) into symmetrical, asymmetrical, etc. This they have done mainly in the interest of mathematical logic which, they claim, is more working, more thorough and more general than the traditional formal logic. Indian logicians were never directly interested in formal logic. Even in their logic of inference they have scarcely introduced any formal procedure explicitly. As much in logic as in philosophy their attitude is as empiricistic and positivistic as possible (without, however, espousing what is now-a-days called probabillism). Anyway, not interested in formal logic of any kind, they have hardly proceeded in the way of the modern logic of relations.

Yet, however, one may surmise how they would react if one asked for their comments. Regarding monadic relations like 'A is identical with itself', they would react in various ways. Most of them would first reformulate the situation as 'A has its identity' or simply as "A's identity", in either of which cases, far from there being a relation, there is not even any real difference between A and the identity, all the so-called difference being nothing but verbal. That it is so is clear from a study of the use of language: language often posits things where they are not. That here a difference which is not real has yet been posited is evident in the very use of language. Others, again, hold that sometimes as the uniqueness of each of the ultimate indivisibe entities it inheres in each as a character, and is, therefore, metaphysically different from that in which it inheres, and in other cases it is the attribute *pṛthaktva* which inheres in each and is, therefore metaphysically different.

Regarding triadic relations, or even relations involving four or more terms, they would invariably reduce them to diadic relations of known types. 'A gives B to C' would be interpretted by them as (i) as a series of positions of A approaching C, which constitute a diadic relation or a series of such relations between them, (2) A's hand, in his last position, touching (or almost touching) C's hand (3) in all the

positions of A, as stated in (1), a thing called B being in his hand and (4) just after the last position of A, and since then, the thing called B being in C's hand. B to be in the hand of C is equally no triadic relation, it too being reducible to a series of diadics. Otherwise there would be no end to such complications : one might say that 'B is in the hand of C or A' represents a four terms relation, 'A red B is in the white hand of the tall C or dwarfish A' would represent an eight-term relation, and so on. If mathematical logic or a computer machine could tackle such complicated propositions directly without in any way breaking them into simple diadics, for the purpose of combining them with other such propositions and deducing newer propositions, one could with *some justification* recognise such multi-term relations, though even this by itself need not be logical justification proper until it is conclusively shown that such integral process is *more convenient and more reliable* than the ordinary process of *resolution into simples followed by re-integration.* But even apart from that, all such consideration is purely formal in which the Indians had little interest. They would never favour any formal (purely logical) solution of metaphsical problems.

These formalists often hold that *difference, betweenness,* etc. are triadic relations. Ignoring formal considerations altogether, Indian thinkers would argue, first, that neither difference nor betweenness is a relation, the former, as already said, being a presupposition, and the latter just another name, of there being a relation at all. Secondly, if still it be argued that as M and O being there P can intervene and thus be *between them,* the Indian philosopher would, without the least hesitation, interpret the situation in the language of *dik* or *paratvāparatva* or in some such way.

As for classifying relations into transitive, intransitive, symmetrical, asymmetrical, etc., this too being entirely in the interest of advanced formal logic has no special significance for Indian thinkers.

The problem 'Internal *vs* external relation', once so important in Western philosophy, particularly of the British type, was practically of no importance to Indian philosophers, except in two contexts to be noted in the sequel.

So far as the problem is an epistemological one, arising out of the analysis of knowledge and the concept of truth, or from a consideration of the Bradleyan paradox of relation, the Indians are not in the least worried about it. So far as the analysis of knowledge and truth are concerned, they find no indication anywhere that everything in the world stands vitally related to everything else. Several things in limited fields do often stand so organically connected or have whatever sort of

close connexion. These cases have certainly to be empirically discovered, recorded and studied. But of universal internal relation there is no epistemological evidence. It is not necessary for anything to be real that it has to be connected with everything else. Fitting in with — in other words, coherence with — other things does certainly strengthen its recognition, but, first, this does not make it *real* or even more real — and, secondly, fitting in with *everything else* is never required : there is possibly no compdtable *degree* of recognition this way. What with every other thing is required is not fitting but just the negative non-clash. As for propositions and their truth, coherence is undoubtedly of considerable assistance, but the assistance received that way is entrely formal. If it be argued that even material truth *proper* that distinguishes knowledge from belief, science from opinion, is unattainable in the absence of this formal truth, Indian philosophers would reply that even for that we do not require a system that will have jurisdiction over *everything* of this world. There may well be self-complete limited systems, and as a matter of fact it is enough even for the *truth proper* of a proposition that it is confirmed by some — even one — of the propositions that embody the (assured) knowledge that we already have. What more may be said to be required is, of course, that the given proposition *must not clash* with *any* other proposition ; but this 'must not clash' can never be more than 'must not have clashed'. For, who in the world can assure this 'must not clash with anything'? One may at most in a precautionary attitude develop a positive system of propositions[6]. But, even then, there is no guarantee that the system will never have to be changed in future. Indeed, the whole system may in future collapse. The Indians believe that knowledge *grows*[7]. But for that they do not advocate probabilism or relativism. Whatever knowledge is attained *is* true, according to them. There is no difference in truth-quality as knowledge grows: in fact, the truth-quality does not difler even as one, passes from belief to knowledge. Thus even the analysis of the concept of truth does not lead to the theory of internal relation.

Nor do the Bradleyan puzzles lead to that. We have already seen how the Indians have successfully countered one such puzzle. The other puzzles could be avoided similarly with some careful handling.

Not that the Indians have never admitted the theory of internal relation. The universe as one grand systemic whole where everything is exquisitely tuned to everything else is the very presupposition of their law of Karma and the doctrine of rebirth. Often, again, like some German metaphysicians, they speak of a genuine grand whole, called *Brahmāṇda, Viśva, Virāt,* Pradhāna, Māyā, etc., from out of which

diverse items in their fine inter-relations are believed to have developed. But these are often faiths derived from scriptures, not logically substantiated in as full a measure as desirable. It is not indeed impossible to find adequate logical considerations for these, But this is outside the task of the present paper.

1. When A is in contact with B, the whole situation is understood as that the contact with B is an attribute of A, and contrariwise when B is in contact with A.

2 & 3 — We shall not discuss here the further fact that the universal 'flowerhood' inheres in this flower or the universal 'red-colourhood' inheres in this red-colour.

4 & 5 — We shall not consider the reverse order separately.

6 — Of course, a system is not developed only for this purpose.

7 — Except in the case of scriptural knowledge.

N. K. Devaraja

INDIAN VALUES

Indian tradition recognizes four values of life, viz. *dharma* or righteousness, *artha* or material goods, *kāma* or satisfaction of primal urges or desires, and *moksha* or final emancipation or perfection of the self. During the epic period, when the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata* were being composed, *dharma* or righteousness was considered to be the most important value ; later on, under the growing influence of religious philosophers, *Moksha* or liberation came to be looked upon as the highest value or goal of life. *Dharma*, however, continued to be lauded by the authors of the *Smṛtis*, as it constituted the regulative principle of life. Without the observance of the moral law or *dharma*, we are frequently told, no other values could be realized. Wealth and satisfaction of desires are important, but their pursuit should be regulated by the moral law. Nor could *moksha* be achieved without moral discipiline. Even the Advaita-Vedāntist who believed that liberation could be achieved only through knowledge, conceded that the purity of mind needed for the reception of liberating knowledge could be attained only through moral action. The concept of *moksha* as elaborated in Indian thought carries a rich connotation. Moksha stands for freedom from pain and suffering in Buddhism and in the systems of Sāṅkhya and Nyāya-Vaiśeshika ; it also connotes self-realization or self-perfection. Again, there are different conceptions of self-realization or perfection of the self to be met with in the different schools of thought.

Quite a few systems of Indian philosophy, including Buddhism, Sāṅkhya-Yoga and Advaita-Vedānta, envisage the possibility of liberation in-life-time (*Jivan-mukti*). A man of wisdom leading a pure life may enjoy the state of liberation or *moksha* even when he is still bound to earthly existence. The second chapter of the *Bhagvadgitā* contains a vivid description of the wise sage with a stable mind (Sthitaprajña) ;

Such a sage is Jīvan-mukta, a person who has emancipated himself completely from all sorts of attachment, and is indifferent to pleasure and pain, success and failure, praise and blame. Such a person enjoys supreme freedom, is completely reconciled to his immediate environment and the universe, and dwells in peace forever.

It is in this sense of immunity from the pressures and pulls of desire for objects of various kinds and for approval of others that the wise sage enjoys complete freedom. Freedom so conceived constitutes the highest value according to traditional religious culture of India. In a Jaina work it is stated that the mind free from desires and passions, i.e. from attachment and aversion, is the highest *Brahman*, the highest reality. Inasmuch as attachment and aversion lead to the production of the seeds and sprouts lying at the root of *saṁsāra*, the conquest of those passions is the highest achievement possible for man. The conqueror of passions is equated by Hema Candra to God Himself.

Santosh Ch. Sengupta

SOME REFLECTIONS OF THE HINDU VIEW OF THE SELF

One distinctive feature of Hindu thought vis-a-vis western thought is its inwardness. 'Inwardness' in distinction from 'outwardness' denotes a primal concern for or interest in the inner life of man. The inward character of Hindu thought is reflected in the centrality of the concept of self in Hindu philosophy. It can be stated without fear of controversy that the object of principal philosophical enquiry, as it is in evidence in the Upanisads and the systems of Hindu philosophy, is the nature and the realisation of the self. The persistent philosophical query is : What is the nature of *atman* (self) or how can it be realised? Philosophy in India, in view of the centrality of the self thereto, is characterised as *ātmavidya*—the study of the self. In Muṇdaka Upanisad a distinction, as we know, is made between two kinds of knowledge—*Paravidya* (higher knowledge) and *aparavidya* (lower knowledge which is the knowledge of the infinite the self and the knowledge of empirical and external objects. In *Brihadaranyaka Upanisad* it is urged that the self which is characterized as the unfailing light needs to be meditated or reflected upon. It is the self-oriented character of Hindu philosophy that explains the psychological approach of the Hindu philosophers, even to the fields like ethics and logic. Now the pertinent query is : Can we legitimately talk of the Hindu view of the self (view in the singular)? The obvious answer is that, underlying the varied characterisations or the descriptions of the nature of the self, are certain common commitments which, it may be pointed out, constitute the dominantly Hindu view of the self. The characterisations of the self on which there is general agreement are, (a) the self which is the essence of man is transcendent in nature ; (b) the self is the ultimate reality which, except in the case of the Samkhya, is the infinite-Brahman, (c) the self is irreducibly subject or conciousness ; (d) the self or consciousness is self-manifest. There is a correlation between (a) and (b), and between (c) and (d). To elaborate each of these

characteristics (a) the self which is the essence of man is beyond his actual state—the given complex. This means that the natural state of man is one of alienation or estrangement. Now, on the Hindu view, the extreme form of alienation is a state of self-identification with that what it is not. This identification is another name for error. The principal mode of exposure of error is to show wherein the self is essentially different from the not-self. That is why the transcendent state of the self is characterised negatively. The self is characterised as not this, not that (neti neti). Now the range of this or that is, as it is indicated in the Upanisads, the Samkhya and the Vedanta is wide enough. Commonly, the self is contrasted with the body, the senses, the ego, the mind (mind understood as having physical character). In practice the risk of the superimposition of one of the forms of not-self on the self is so great. Ordinarily man so behaves as if he is not different from the body, the senses or the ego. The motivation to the common illusory behaviour is what we may call the natural urge of man to the satisfaction of the natural demand on him. Now the central point of the distinction between the self and that what is distinguished therefrom is not that having one of the forms of the latter is a property of the former and that to have a property is not to be one with it. The deeper rationale of the objection to the identification between the self and the not-self is that what is predicable of the latter is not true of the former. For instance, what is true of the body is not predicable of the self. Strictly speaking, it is the body and not the self i.e. ill or weak or short. The syntax of the statement 'I am ill' is misleading. We can show this with reference to the other forms by the non-self. I can refer, in this connection, to the way the Hindu thinkers have contrasted jivatva against the state of the self. The point which is emphasised in this connection and which I shall take later is that what constitutes jivatva can be an object while the self can never be an object. Now the question arises: If the self is not this, not that, that is, is not what is material or vital or merely psychical what is its nature? The answer is that the transcendent state of the self admits of positive characterisation. The Hindu philosophers have throughout maintained that it *is*, and is in the nature of consciousness and bliss. In the Upanisads and the Vedanta the equal emphasis is laid on consciousness and bliss.

To come now to the characterisation of the self as the ultimate reality. In the Upanisads and systems of philosophy other than the Samkhya the ultimate reality is viewed as the infinite (Brahman). We can, therefore, say that the principal Hindu position is that the self is the infinite or that the infinite is the self. The *mahāvākya*—the classical statement—that art thou—which is typical of the Upanisads or, that matter, of Hindu thought indicates the equation of the self and the infinite.

Atman ca Brahman (Samkara Bhasya) the infinite, like the self, itself is the beyond—the transcendent. This shows the correlation between the first and the second characterisation of the self. It is urged that the identity of the self with the ultimate reality can be apprehended and justified in two ways: (a) subjectively and (b) objectively. To elucidate the first. The subjective method that is referred to is one of reflection on the nature of the self. The deeper the reflection on the nature of self the greater the disclosure of the ultimate reality—the infinite. What is significant is that two are one continuous process. It follows that the self discovers itself or its meaning completely in the union or the identity with the infinite. The reflective or the subjective process, it is maintained, is dialectical to the extent that with the disclosure of the meaning of the self and the infinite there is an experince of the dissociation of the self from the not-self. The two, we can say, constitute an identical process. The point of the second or the objective approach to the nature of the identity in question is that what is intelligible is only a reflection of the consciousness or the subject. That is, what is viewed as outward is in essence the inward. The totality of what is real is, therefore, in essence the universal self or consciouness. This is precisely the thesis of absolute idealism which is central to Hindu thought. The idealistic thesis is obviously different from subjectivism as the self, which the infinite is, is not individual but universal. We know of Samkara's extensive criticism of subjective idealism. The self-discovery to which we have referred means an awareness of illusory character of individuality. The universal character of the self is implicit in the nature of pure consciousness which it (the self) is. There are some who contend that the Hindu thinkers maintain that the infinite is the self on the ground and that the assurance of the infinite can have its source in self-certitude. This is not at all a correct interpretation of the Hindu position. The Hindu thinkers do not adopt the method of basing knowledge of the infinite on self-knowledge as the assumption underlying the method is that two kinds of knowledge are distinct and that the knowledge of the infinite is inferential. On the Hindu view these two kinds of knowledge are one. There is abundant evidence for identical characterisations of the self and the infinite in the Upanisad and the relevant philosophical systems. For instance, the self and the infinite are characterised as pure consciousness and this brings us to the next section.

The self is characterised as consciousness. It is not that the self is not conscious (or happenes to be conscious) but that on the Hindu view consciousness is its essence which, negatively means that consciousness is not quality (not even essential one) of the self. Thus we have a complete equation of the self and consciousness. (The *Atman* is throughout nothing but intelligence a synonym of consciousness.

Intelligence is its exclusive nature as a salt taste is lump of the salt. The consciousness which, the self is, is characterised metaphorically, as light or radiance and is essentially distinct from ordinary or phenomenal consciousness. It is viewed as pure or transcendent in distinction from the latter. Among the distinctive characteristics of pure or transcendent consciousness are that (a) it can be objectless and that (b) it cannot be an object. To elaborate the charactristics. Ordinary consciousness is intentional so far as it refers to the subject that is aware and the object of one which one is aware. Pure or transcendent consciousness is characterised by the absence of the two-fold reference or directedness. The thesis that pure consciousness is objectles is justified on two grounds which are (a) the self—the consciousness does not depend on any object for its manifestation. The manifestation of consciousness is stated to be analogous to the illuminosity of a lamp. As a lamp radiates light independently of the objects that are illuminated so consciousness reveals itself in an autonomous way. (b) If consciousness is not objectless it becomes essential to its (consciousness) nature to relate itself to an object. It is urged that what is relational cannot be an ultimate reality. The point is that where consciousness manifests or really an object, it does freely. To come to the thesis of self as the irreducible subject. The typical Hindu position vis-a-vis the western is that the self *qua* consciousness cannot be an object. The subject and the object are contrasted as light and darkness. The most distinctive feature of the Hindu treatment of the self is its admission of the latter as the prisistent subject. In all the systems of Hindu philosophy except the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika the self is viewed as subject or consciousness. The western view of the self is on the contrary essentially objective (Kant is the obvious and singular exception). The exposition and the vindication of the self as purely subjective are extensive and elaborate. The contemporary historians of Indian philosophy have rightly focussed on the Hindu emphasis on subjectivity. We shall briefly indicate what we consider to be principal rationale of the subjective view of the self. The rationale consists of the three-fold grounds for the thesis in question. To state the grounds. (a) The self cannot be an object as an object qua object presupposes the subject. In the defence of the necessarily presupposional or the foundational character of the self reference is made to the fact of the implication of the self, not merely in the object knowledge but also in the doubting and proving thereof. The insight into the certitude and the indubitable character of the self which is typical of Descartes is explicitly stated in the systems concerned. It is consistently maintained that what belongs to the object level can be doubled or questioned but the questioning of the self is not logical as it implies what is questioned or doubted. Similarly an attempt at establishing or proving the self presupposes it. "All means of knowledge

(Pramanas) exist only as dependent on self-experience and since such experience is its own proof the existence of self cannot be proved". The point is that the self the subject unlike what belongs to the object-level is itself established. To come to the second ground which follows from the first is that the self is the knower where an object is known. An object *qua* object is known and as such it presupposes the self as knower. The legitimate description of the object is that it is apprehended by X. The self, on the other hand, qua knower cannot be known, If one subject is cognized as an object another subject, by the nature of the case, would be implied and if that subject in its turn is made an object, another subject in its turn would be presupposed and this leads to the infinite regress. The point of the regress is that we cannot avoid the the presupposing the the knower (self) which cannot be known. Thus the attempt at the objectification of the subject is self-frustrating. Now the pertinent question arises : if consciousness cannot be an object of enquiry how psychology and study of consciousness are possible. The obvious answer, the answer which is implicit in the pure subjectivist view of the self or consciousness is that the psychology so far as it studies consciousness as an object cannot yield knowledge of consciousness proper. That is in the language of Hindu thinker, the object of psychological study is *mana*, not *atman*. To take up the third and the last ground. The central point is the same as the other two, viz., what is attributable to the self-subject is not predicable of an object. To elaborate (c) the attitude of being an witness (saksin) is attributable to the subject but not to that what is cognizable as an object. What is distinctive of this attitude is the freedom or the detachment from what is apprehended. The objectification which involves a kind of involvement in the object concerned cannot, by nature of the case, evince the freedom as referred to. This is particularly obvious as one person views another in an objective attitude. The typical of this attitude is the use-approach of one person to another. It is not, therefore, wrong to characterize objectification as a kind of utilization. The point of the Hindu insight into liberation as a state of the self e.g. transcendent or real state is that the self qua subject has the capacity for detachment or non-involvement. The liberation, which the detachment or the non-involvement is, in the nature of the knowledge.

Now the question arises, if the self qua self cannot be an object how self-knowledge is possible ? The answer is (and this brings us to the last characterisation of the self) that self-knowledge is in the nature of its complete manifestation or disclosures by the self. To elaborate. The dominant Hindu position is that the self which is transcendent is characterised by epistemic immediacy. That is, the self-knowledge has directness or immediacy about it. This is so because the consciousness which the self is, as we have observed, self-manifest. It, like

light, illuminates or reveals itself. What is significant is that the disclosure or the illuminosity is total i.e., in the disclosure-situation there is nothing about the self which can be hidden. In other words, the self cannot be a mystery. Nor can it be a postulate. The Hindu philosophers are not content with an agnostic approach to the self. The self which they need is completely evident in a state of immediate awareness. What is characteristic of the knowledge through disclosure or manifestation is its immediacy i.e, one in which there is no differentiation between the knower and the known, the subject and object. It is only lower and the empirical knowledge that can be viewed on the mode of the subject-object distinction. The point is that it is essential to the consciousness or the self to manifest itself. What needs to be noted is that the consciousness which reveals itself, is the essence of individual consciousness. The equation of the essence of individual consciousness with Atman (self) and of the Atman with Brahma which constitute the dominantly Hindu view of the self needs to commit itself to the epistemic immediacy as referred to.

R. K. Tripathi

NEGATION IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY[1]

It seems to us that the problem of negation has not been as well appreciated in Western philosophy as in Indian philosophy. Very few Western philosophers have paid attention to this problem and have cared to go into its intricacies. But when we turn to Indian philosophy, we find that every system has discussed this problem and has tried to take a view consistent with its basic standpoint. This is as it should be, because the problem of negation has an importance which cannot be ignored by any system. There is no system which does not negate some view or belief or hypothesis. It is therefore necessary that it should be made clear as to what negation means, on what it is based, what happens to that which is negated, whether everything can be negated and so on. The answer to these questions becomes all the more unavoidable when we find that a controversy is possible regarding each one of them. The problem would not have been so pressing were there unanimity regarding these questions, but as is well known, it is not so. Hence no philosophy worth the name can afford to evade or shirk the problem of negation.

There are many questions concerning negation that arise : the question of definition, of kinds, of the status of the negated, of the way negation is known and finally the question of the possibility of universal negation. As it is not possible to go into the details of every system, I have selected three typical approaches to this problem ; I have discussed the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika or the realist view, the Vedāntic view and the Buddhist view. I have tried to answer three major questions from the point of view of these three schools, the question regardig the knowledge of negation, the status of the negated and the question of universal negation.

II

Before we take up the above three questions from the standpoint of the Nyāya, we may dispose of the question of definition and kinds. Can negation be defined and if so, how are we to define it? The Nyāya is famous for its definitions and claims the ability to define everything. The definition of *abhāva* given is *bhāva bhinnatva*, that is, difference or otherness from *bhāva* or existence, Obviously, the definition is not successful, because it is cirular. *Bhinnatva* or otherness includes in it the idea of negation. It appears to us that negation is primary and simple and is therefore irreducible to any thing else which is simpler or more primary. Negation can neither be derived nor defined; every attempt to do so can be shown to presuppose it.

For Nyāya, all negation is a type of *abhāva*[2] which is classified into four kinds. The first is the *prāgabhāva* or the absence of a thing before it is produced. This is obviously beginningless but comes to an end when the thing is produced. The second is *pradhvaṁsābhāva* or the non-existence of a thing after its destruction. This has a beginning but no end. Both of these refer to a particular space and time. The third *anyonyābhāva* means literally exclusion. This refers to the denial of identity when we say, for instance, that x is not y. Finally, there is the fourth kind of *abhāva* called *atyantābhāva*, literally absolute non-existence. This refers to the denial of relation, for example, when we say that there is no colour in the air or in the sound. This type of *abhāva* is absolute in the sense that the two cannot be related in any way and at any time. This doctrine of the four kinds of negation or *abhāva* is said to be metaphysically necessary. If *prāgabhāva* is not accepted, then there can be no beginning, if *pradhvamsābhāva* is denied, then there can be no end of things, if *anyonyābhāva* is not recognised then things cannot be distinguished, and if *antyantābhāva* is not admitted then anything can exist anywhere and everywhere. This terminology is useful and employed by all the systems. We may notice here that non-existence for the Nyāya is only relational or relative and not absolute or metaphysical. There is no such thing as utter non-existence.

III

Let us now turn to the three questions which we raised at the beginning and try to ascertain the Nyāya answer to them. To begin with, how is the absence of something or non-existence known? Nyāya view is that just as the presence of a thing is perceived, its absence also is perceived.[3] Absence is as much real as presence is. The difficulty regarding the possibility of having sense-contact with an absent thing is

anticipated. It is conceded that the senses cannot have contact with an absent thing and yet non-existence is perceived and that by a special kind of sense-contact with the locus of non-existence which is qualified by the absence of the thing. The problem is thus claimed to be solved by stipulating a peculiar kind of sense-contact (*sannikarṣa*) called *viśeṣaṇatā*. Apart from the fact that this stipulation is wholly a priori and dogmatic, there are other difficulties too. To know the locus as qualified by absence presupposes knowledge of absence. Again what about the knowledge of absence in the past? I can say today that there was no tiger in my office yesterday, but it is not possible to to perceive the tiger's absence just now. You cannot say that it is memory, because there is no evidence of there being a positive knowledge prior to it. One can recall only an absence of the knowledge of the tiger.

We can well anticipate the Nyāya answer to the question regarding the status of the negated if we remember that the Nyāy a is a realist system. It is said that negation has always reference to time and place or locus. Whenever we say that a thing is non-existent, it is relative to a time and place. If a thing is not there just now or if it is not here, it does not mean that it is nowhere. Negation is only relative. This is so even in the case of the so called illusory objects. When we say that this is not a snake, what we mean is that the *this* is not as nake or that the snake is not here and not that the snake is nowhere. This view of illusion is called *anyathākhyāti*. On this view, the terms are not unreal, only the relation between them is unreal. The same logic is applied to the case of objects called *asat* such as sky-flower or square-circle. It is held that the sky and the flower are real, only the combination of the two is unreal. Consistent with the realist principle that no content of knowledge is false or subjective, the Nyāya thus makes a tenacious effort to uphold the reality of what is ordinarily taken to be false. The weakness of this theory will be pointed out later.

It is obvious from what has been said above that the Nyāya cannot accept any such thing as universal negation. All negation is somewhere and sometime and of a particular object. If everything is to be negated, where will it be negated, when and by whom? The Nyāya is thus a vigorous opponent not only of utter non-existence such as that of the sky-flower, but also of universal negation such as is advocated by the Mādhyamika School of Buddhism.

IV

We may now turn to Buddhism. The importance of negation in Buddhism is particularly noticeable because Buddhism has always been

a Śūnyatā doctrine, whether Hīnayāna or Mahāyāna. The difference among the Buddhist schools is only regarding the direction and the scope of negation or *śūnyatā*. The early realistic schools were interested only in negating substance, soul, unity and universal but accepted the reality of the *dharmas*, the momentary, the particular and the parts. Their doctrine is therefore called *pudgal-nairātmya vāda*; it is the *śūnyatā* of everything except the momentary. The Idealist School or the Vijñāna-Vādins turned the direction of negation toward external objects and thereby extended the scope of negation. Their doctrine is *grāha-dvaya śūnyatā* or the negation of the duality of knowledge and its object; there are only ideas which are self-known and do not require even a separate knower. The Mādhyamika carried negation to its furthest limit and universalised its scope by denying even the reality of *vijñāna* or the ideas; there are neither ideas nor things. Absolute *śūnyatā* or *dṛṣṭi-śūnyatā* or denial of all views is the interpretation of *śūnyatā* given by the Mādhyamika. Thus emphasis on negation is there in Buddhism from the very beginning and in all schools.

The Buddhist logicians are opposed to the Nyāya thesis that non-existence can be perceived. The Nyāya view that *abhāva* is like *bhāva* a reality or an aspect of reality is rejected. Reality is only *bhāva* or existence, as exitence alone can be *arthakriyākārī* or efficient or productive; existence alone is given in experience. As regards non-existence, it is no doubt known and that knowledge is also useful, but it is not directly known. It is a thing of indirect knowledge and so comes under some kind of inference[4] which is based on non-perception. If x were there, it would have been perceived. But it is not perceived and so it not there. It is a case of hypothetical-categorical syllogism, denying the antecedent by denying the consequent. The absent thing is therefore only ideal or imaginary but not in the sense in which sky-flower is imaginary because while the former can be perceived, the latter cannot be perceived. The Buddhist would agree with the Nyāya that the question of *abhāva* arises only with regard to what can be perceived. It follows therefore, that the Buddhist cannot say that metaphysical entities like God, soul and substance are non-existent; he can only say that they are imaginary or due to *avidyā* or false. There is a difference between the false and the non-existent.

It appears that while the Nyāya emphasises the knowledge of absence, the Buddhist relies on the absence of knowledge. The Nyāya claim that we have a positive and direct knowledge of the absent does not seem to be well founded. By merely looking at the table, we cannot enumerate or point out all the things that are absent there. We have got to have the idea of (remember or imagine) the things whose absence we claim to see. Knowledge of the present is not of the same

order as that of the absent. Knowledge of the absent cannot be regarded as direct perception and the Buddhist seems to be right in rejecting the Nyāya claim. But is the Buddhist right in claiming that negation is a matter of inference? To infer non-existence from non-perception — is it not circular? Firstly, how is the relation between non-perception and non-existence itself known? Secondly, how is non-perception or absence of cognition itself known? Would it not lead to an infinite regress if non-perception is again sought to be known from some other inference? It seems to us therefore that the Buddhist while right in denying that negation is a case of simple perception, is wrong in thinking that negation can be reduced to inference; he is not able to appreciate the irreduciable nature of negation.

Unlike the Nyāya, the Buddhist believes in the doctrine of the a priori or the doctrine of transcendental creativity or subjectivity; the Nyāya, as a hard Realist, does not admit anything as subjective; even knowledge is objectified to the extent it is an object of another knowledge. All negation is of the same order, but in Buddhism we find two kinds of negation — negation as non-perception and negation as falsity. Non-perception can refer only to what can be perceived but falsity refers to the subjective or what is due to *avidyā* or *kalpanā*. Relations and metaphysical entities such as substance, soul etc. come under the latter and are treated as a priori beliefs; only the particular and the momentary is given in experience and is real. Things like sky-flower are neither to be taken as *abhāva* nor as a priori construction; they are mere words (*śabdamātram*).

On the question of universal negation, the Buddhist schools are divided into two camps: the realists and idealists both reject the possibility of universal negation while the Mādhyamika accepts it. The Mādhyamika argument is that in order to reject a view it is not necessary to accept some other view. A view is rejected not on the basis of another view but purely on the basis of inconsistency or self-contradiction. And since it is possible to prove that all views are self-contradictory, it is possible to reject all views without accepting any view. In other words, rejection of all views is not itself a view otherwise it will not be the rejection of *all* views. The realist and the idealist Buddhists point out that this would lead to nihilism, but the Mādhyamika avers that he is not a nihilist because he is not denying the truth but only denying *dṛṣṭis* or views of truth or that he is distinguishing truth from views; truth is beyond all views and is as such unspeakable. The Mādhyamika position is not of having no reality but only of having no view of reality as Prof. Murti puts it.[5] Śūnya is not void but devoid of views. Reality transcends thought so much that all views are left behind empty. So the Mādhyamika is not a nihilist. His rejec-

tion of all views including nihilism is only a way of emphasising the utter transcendence of *tattva.*

We agree that the Mādhyamika is not a nihilist but an absolutist. But if this is so, negation in the Mādhyamika is not universal as it leaves behind a residue, the *tattva*. Our criticism of the Mādhyamika approach is that if there is nothing in experience which has any contact with the *tattva*, that is, if we have no foothold at in all in experience, then on what basis can the Mādhyamika take the view that after the abolition of all views, there remains *tattva* or *prajñā* (intuition)? Wherefrom does he get a guarantee for that? For him, views are not falsified by a knowledge of *tattva* but the other way round; the falisfication of views leads to the knowledge of *tattva*, but what is the surety? This question is pertinent because it is clamied that the Mādhyamika does not depend on any extra-logical source. If so, can the dialectic by itself assure us of the transcendent? It seems to us that the Mādhyamika suffers from two excesses: excessive emphasis on logic and excessive emphasis on transcendence. Logic can analyse views and can show their consistency but logic cannot give us truth or falsity; logic is too formal for that. Truth and falsity are given in experience. Similarly while it is right to emphasise the transcendence of the absolute, it is suicidal to emphasise it so much that the absolute becomes completely unknown or *aprasiddha* or *alīka* like the sky-flower. The immanence of the absolute also must be insisted upon, but that can be done only if some element or aspect of experience is accepted as a kind of rock which cannot be denied. The Mādhyamika is not able to do that, because he does not accept anything, with the result that he cannot even show that the absolute is realisable. These two shortcomings of the Mādhyamika are removed in the Vedānta and so let us now turn to that.

In a way the Vedānta takes a middle position between Nyāya and Buddhism regarding the knowledge of *abhāva*. It is a position midway between the rejection of nothing (Nyāya) and the rejection of everything (Mādhyamika), between universal objectivity (Nyāya) and universal subjectivity (Vijñānavāda) or the denial of subjecitvity and the denial of objectivity. With the Nyāya, the Vedānta opposes the Buddhist view that *abhāva* can be inferred; the very premises presuppose the knowledge of *abhāva*. With the Buddhist, he opposes the Nyāya contention that *abhāva* can be perceived like *bhāva*. It is wrong to treat *abhāva* as at par with *bhāva* and to say that *abhāva* is as much perceived as *bhāva*. All negation presupposes affirmation but not vice versa. This means that negation is always the negation of a prior affirmation actual or hypothetical. The realist seems to think that what is negated is only a term or a thing, but really speaking the object of negation is a belief or a suggestion

or a judgment and not a thing. This is why the sky-flower is not negated; there is no assertion or belief about that. Otherwise the sky-flower is as much not here as a tiger. The sky-flower would be negated if only it could be asserted. Negation always refers to assertion. To say that x is not y is to deny that x is y. As Kant puts it "The proper object of a negative judgment is to prevent error."[7] It is in the context of the cancellation of an error or illusion that negation becomes relevant and meaningful, otherwise it would appear as absurd as saying that light is not darkness because light is never mistaken for darkness. For that very reason, there is no point in denying the sky-flower as it is never affirmed. So negation is a more complex process and implies a higher or more critical consciousness than affirmation. It takes into consideration a prior judgment or belief or suggestion; it requires *pratiyogi smaraṇa* or the recollection of the thing negated.

Once it is realised that negation is a higher type of consiousness than affirmation and takes into consideration some afflrmation possible or actual, it will be seen that in all negation, there is reference to a subjective element, namely belief. All negation is negation of a belief or is awareness of the presence of the subjective. From this point of view, all the different kinds of *abhāva* or non-existence are reduced to one type of negation in which we see the falsity of a belief or judgment. The Nyāya being a realist does not want to recognise anything as subjective. The Buddhist realist accepts the presence of the subjective in experience but confines it only to the metaphysical entities. The idealist extends subjectivity even to external entities and the Mādhyamika reduces everything to subjective or *avidyā*. So the real issue regarding negation is whether it refers to anything subjective and how far the scope of the subjective goes.

Although more complex than positive perception, negation cannot be an inference. The knowledge of the absence of knowledge has to be direct and independent. Absence of a possible bnowledge is by itself an independent knowledge. After all, absence of knowledge is known, though negation is not mere absence of knowledge because that may be due to all kinds of obstacles such as distance, darkness, etc., it is rather absence of possible knowledge (*Yogyānupalabdhi*). If God is not seen, it does not follow that there is no God because God is never claimed to be the object of perception. If we do not see the centre of the earth, it does not follow that there is no centre of the earth. So neagation is the absence of possible knowledge. An interesting argument advanced by the *Mīmāṁsā* is that unless *anupalabdhi* or absence of possible knowledge is accepted as a *pramāṇa* or source of knowledge, how can we say that now there is no other source of knowledge? How to reach

the last *pramāṇa*? So knowledge of the absence of knowledge is in its own right a kind of knowledge. It is primitive and irreducible.

We have quoted Kant to support our views that negation arises in the context of the correction of error. This brings us to the second question, that is, the question regarding the status of the negated. Even if it be accepted that negation arises in the form of correction, it is possible to interpret correction itself in various ways aoccording as it suits a particular standpoint. Let us take the famous example of rope-snake. The negative judgment "this is not a snake" is interpreted by the Nyāya realist to mean that *this* is not a snake or that the snake is elsewhere and is not this. The intention is to safeguard the reality of the snake. The this and the snake are both real, only the relation between them is false just as the sky and flower are both real, but the relation between them is false. Thus the Nyāya negates the snake merely in the sense of excluding it from a certain context and not in the sense of rejecting its reality. But is it not quite wrong to say that the particular snake seen in the context of the illusion can be traced anywhere? It is not a universal (jāti) but a particular snake that is seen here and that can neither be traced in the past nor in the future. So the Vedānta emphasises that the snake should be regarded as false, as what cannot be had anywhere. For the realist, consciousness is passive and receptive and not creative and so no content of consciousness can be false. The realist does not see the point that unless consciousness is active and creative the very confusion between two contents of consciousness—the this and the snake—cannot take place. This is why Prabhākara does not accept illusion as an act of commission but of omission only; it is a case of non-perception or non-distinction and not of confusion. But unless there is confusion, there is no error, and contents do not confuse themselves; you and I confuse them. The Buddhist idealist goes to the other extreme; he regards consciousness to be so creative that there is no place for any independent object; everything becomes idea or vijñānna. The idealist tekes the negative judgment "this is not a snake" to mean that the snake is not a this or an external object but just an idea. The error is just in seeing it as an object and not as an idea. But if this were so, the form of the correcting consciousness should be "the snake is not this" which is not the case; we say "this is not a snake". The idealist view makes the knowledge of the rope irrelevant to the cancelling consciousness. In fact, in his view there is nothing to be known; emergence of an idea and its knowledge are simultaneous. The idealist position therefore does not seem to be tenable. When we come to the Mādhyamika position, we see that he takes the extreme view that the rope too like the snake is false. But if the rope and the snake were equally false, how could the knowledge of the rope cancel the

knowledge of the snake. The snake and the rope cannot belong to the same order. The Vedāntin would ask: by what criterion do you regard the rope as false? You cannot say that the rope is self-contradictory. In fact the principle of self-contradictoriness does not apply even to the snake. The snake is false not because it is self-contradictory, but because it is negated by a higher type of consciousness. Truth and falsity therefore refer to two orders of consciousness and not merely to dialectic or the principle of self-contradictoriness. Unless some consciousness is superior to the other, the former cannot sit in judgment over the other. The Vedāntin therefore comes to the following conclusion regarding the negative judgment, this is not a snake. Firstly, the snake seen here is not merely excluded but rejected from all contexts; it can find place nowhere else. Secondly, it is not merely the externality of the snake that is rejected, because the rope which is objective comes to be the object of true judgment. Nor can you reject the snake and the rope both, because there is no basis on which you can do that. The negative judgment therefore means that this is a snake is false because this is a rope. The negated is something which claims to be real but which is not real. So the negated is at once different from the real which is not negated and also from the *asat* (sky-flower) which does not claim to be real; it is a new category discovered by reflection and not given in natural experience. Negation means only the discovery of the locus which is concealed by the negated; absence is not a qualification over and above the locus as the Nyāya claims. Absence or *abhāva* is *adhikaraṇasvarūpa* or of the nature of the locus and nothing more; negation of the snake means just the awareness of the rope.

It would appear that the Vadānta too like the Mādhyamika believes in universal negation in as much as it denies the reality of everything, the whole world of plurality and difference. It is true that the Vedānta rejects the world of plurality and change as mere appearance, but that is bucause it accepts their underlying ground as real; nothing can be regarded as false without something being true. When everything has been rejected, the rejecting consciousness is left over as something which cannot be rejected. So universal negation is impossible, a point which the Mādhyamika must see. Instead of saying that the Vadānta like the Mādhyamika accepts universal negation, we should say that the Mādhyamika should like Vedānta see the point that universal negation is not possible.

A possible objection may be anticipated. It may be argued that the subject and object are relative to each other and so if the object goes, the subject cannot remain; the two have to go together. This is true, but what the Vedānta accepts as the undeniable self is not the

empirical subject of Descartes, but rather thc absolute which is beyond subject-object duality. It is beyond not in the sense in which the absolute of Hegel is beyond, because it is not a synthesis like Hegel's absolute ; rather it is the transcendent ground of both. Being featureless and formless it would appear as pure nothing because we are in the unconscious habit of regarding only the determinate (Nāma rūpa) as real. This unconscious attitude has to go after the experience of the rope-snake. The Brahman or the Śūnya of the Mādhyamika is not nothing like sky-flower but no thing ; it is like space. It is our innermost self which can be realised here and now by removing the obsessions which prevent us from doing so.

1. Read at the colloquim of the Department of Philosophy, Brock University, St. Catherines (Ont) Canada 1970 March.

2. The term *abhāva* literally means absence or non-existence but as all non-existence is expressed as a negative judgment, *abhāva* is translated as negation. But there is a distinction between non-existence and negation ; while *abhāva* refers to a thing or entity negation refers to a view. The Nyāya takes the two to be the same.

3. Older Naiyayikas regard *abhāva* as inference.

4. Th. Stcherbatsky *Buddhist Logic* Vol. I, p. 370.

5. *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism* p, 234,

6. Ibid p. 159.

7. Quoted in *Buddhist Logic* Vol. I, p. 391.

Olivier Lacombe

WISDOM AND TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS

There may have been in remote prehistorical times some pre-human being endowed with a kind of craftman-ship. But, philosophically speaking, real man is characterized by a twofold ability to develop craftmanship *and* wisdom; *homo faber, homo sapiens,* as the latin saying goes.

Now, "wisdom" is traditionally interpreted both as the supreme degree of theoretical knowledge and the power of true and right discernment in the conduct of life.

It is not our present purpose to investigate how far man has actually carried on the pursuit of such a lofty ideal. We only want to emphasize that, in spite of generally poor achievements, the craving for wisdom is essential in the constitution of man, and that this craving is not to be eradicated from our hearts, notwithstanding so many disheartening failures of mankind in its endeavours to become wise.

On the other side just as elementary tools are extensions of our hands, that make their work more easy, more efficient and far-reaching, so machine is a magnified tool.

For millenaries, technical development was more or less a matter of empirical, and sometimes haphazard, discovery and invention. With the advent of modern science, both theoretical and applied, technics entered a new era, known as the industrial age, and everybody is aware that we, men of the seventies in this twentieth century, have already passed the second industrial revolution.

"The discovery ... of the immense possibilities offered by technical progress and industrialization, could not but induce philosophers to consider, sooner or later, the problem of the "technician" and the role he should play in the society to come. Saint-Simon is a forerunner in

this respect, since he announced, as early as 1830, in his *Catechism for Manufacturers*, the advent of a new type of leaders having more in mind the management of things than claiming to govern men ... The kind of socialism he advocates is a socialism, so to say, of producers. Saint-Simon has a foreboding of the importance that will accrue to means of production and technics in the new world, and his sympathy is with technicians of all kinds who are "industrious bees as opposed to political hornets": he even caught a glimpse of an organized society entirely controlled by technocrats instead of political power."[1]

So, our ancestors have used tools to alleviate the toil of man and they have slowly and gradually succeeded in overcoming some of the constraints that matter imposes upon us. We have at our disposal machines that are swifter and more "clever" than the old tools. But through them, too, what we aim at is to become more and more independent at least from external hindrances.

And now the issue that is placed before us, is to decide whether technology will some day be able to make man entirely free, both inwardly and outwardly, and to supersede traditional wisdom, or will have to acknowledge that wisdom is forever irreplaceable.

II

History teaches us that as long as the hold of man over the universe has been uncertain and scarcely effective, that form of wisdom which insists on abstention appealed widely to philosophically and religiously minded people.

I do not mean that the days of asceticism are now gone. Ascetic life for the sake of eternal life and the Kingdom of God retains its full meaning.

What I am speaking about, is the secondary significance of asceticism in the days when man did not even imagine that he might considerably increase his power to resist almighty nature and fate.

If the sage wanted to retain peace in the midst of turmoil from without, if he wished to gain *ataraxia*, he had to "refrain and sustain" as the Stoics would say, and resort to his inner Strength of will and his internal freedom.

In the same way, Descartes provisionally admitted that we have to refrain from wishing what is not within the reach of our power. But of course, as one of the fathers of the modern world, he did hope that

science would increase considerably man's power over natural forces and fate.

III

May I be allowed to turn now to Mahatma Gandhi's drastic pronouncements concerning industry.

We must not forget that when he wrote "Hind Svaraj", industrial civilization was already in full swing at least in the West, but that the economic and social situation of human labour in the factories was as at very low level. The ruthlessness of industrial development during the nineteenth century deserved the most severe criticism from all socialists and from Gandhi himself.

We may think that industrial civilization has, since, to some extent, improved its social policy, that technology itself has become more refined, allowing for modes of labour more in accordance with human dignity, for some decentralisation of factories.

Were he still with us, Gandhiji would perhaps take into account such improvements.

Whatever the case may be, his statements concerning industry are not absolutely uniform nor unbalanced.

He has of course written that machine as such is an evil. But he has also said that the spinningwheel, after all, is already a machine, and a good one. He has declared that what he condemns is not machine in itself but the human craze for machine, and he is certainly right in blaming a strange propensity in man to become the slave of his own fabrications.

But the main reason why Gandhiji looks so suspiciously at industrial civilization has to be found elsewhere.

Mahatma Gandhi wanted that not only the sage, but the common men should be self-sufficient. Of course self-sufficiency does not mean to him selfishness, but an ability for every one to find in himself the light, the strength, the courage to carry on a truly human life in loving inter-relationship with other people. Now man is not only a purely spiritual being. He has to care for economic needs. In this field also Gandhi wants him to self-sufficient, as far as possible. Industrial civilization does not care for such a kind of self-sufficiency. On the contrary, it makes every one radically dependent on every one in a purely mechanical and unethical way.

This was perhaps the main grievance of Mahatma Gandhi against industrial civilization.

IV

Let us now attempt to elucidate our problem with the help of philosophical analysis.

The products of art or technics are opposed to natural beings.

It happens that nature is extolled above artificialities. On the contrary artful and technical skill may be praised at the expense of gross nature.

In Sanskrit, for instance, *svābhāvika* or *sahaja* means natural in the higher sense, with reference to essential and metaphysical nature. *Prākṛta* means natural in the gross sense of the word nature and *saṃskṛta* or *alaṃkṛta* signifies that which has been refined and perfected by elaborate art and technique.

Aristotle (4th century B. C.) draws a sharp line between natural beings and artefacts. In his opinion, the most "clever" machines or the most beautiful works of art are not and cannot be equated with living and intelligent beings. Even if he could have foreseen the development of modern computers and other contrivances of superior rank, he would not have changed his mind. Nature is immanent in natural beings as the inner law of their accomplishment, whereas the pattern after which the human inventor has built up the artefact, piecing together part after part, remains in the mind of the maker and is transcendent to the product. The most perfect artificial and technical arrangement can only create an automaton.

Plotinus (3rd century A. D.) not only distinguishes between nature and art as his Greek predecessors, but shows a decided bias in favour of nature, in as much as he considers wisdom akin to nature and estranged from technics. The reason is that nature and wisdom both animate man from within, although of course nature is unconscious and wisdom spiritual and supra-conscious. Art works from without, assembling parts in a non-integrated whole.

It may be that Bhartṛhari, the author of the Vākyapadīya, felt the same. Witness the following quotation borrowed from the learned book devoted to this brilliant Indian thinker by Dr (Miss) Biardeau:

"Who transmutes the song of the male cuckoo at spring time? Who teaches untamed animals and birds how to eat, love, hate, swim and so on...? It is only *āgama* in the form of inner impulsions—bhāvanā—. ...Six kinds of *pratibhā* are known, deriving either from the being's own nature...or from yoga, etc..."[2].

So, with Bhartṛhari, *āgama* or universal and immanent Tradition manifests itself in the instinct of the lower animals as well as in the intuition of the sage (*pratibhā*), with the help of subsidiary external factors—that would be art or technique—or of the integral discipline of yoga.

Henri Bergson (XIX—XX century) also considers that animal instinct and metaphysical intuition are in many respects closer to each other than to what he calls "intelligence" (in a very restricted sense, indeed): intelligence, as he understands it, is precisely the rational and technical faculty in man that deals deftly with external objects but is blind to inner realities.

Nevertheless, Bergson who advocates so strongly intuition and even mystical experience, is at the same time in favour of modern industry in its ever more powerful and refined forms. Now industry is the product of intelligence, in the Bergsonian acceptation of the word. But these contrasted statements are not contradictory. The technological adveuture of modern humanity is a grand adventure that ought to be admired as such, and may also turn to a blessing for suffering mankind, if it is not used as a lethal display of power but as an efficient instrument for wisdom and kindness.

Are we not following a blind-alley? Is not the dilemma wisdom or technology without a way out? Must we consider either that technology has to supersede wisdom or that wisdom has to get rid of technology?

I wish and hope that humanity does not find itself for ever in such a predicament, provided we do not follow the path of some unbalanced option and try to make the best use of our free judgement. "Industry is a symbol of ambiguous powers: out of steel a ploughshare or a sword can be made."[3] Out of applied atomic physics, we may have the atom bomb or undreamed of energetical possibilities for peaceful use.

The power of the new psychological and sociological techniques that handle not external nature, but the inner springs of human behaviour are still more ambiguous.

Things being so, absolute technocracy appears as an undesirable nonsense. Technology provides us with instruments evere more powerful, not with the right insight into our superior ends, the pursuit of which is not a mere matter of spontaneity served by technical means, but of enligtenment and virtue.

So the use of technology and technics has to be controlled by a higher vision of nature, man and God. Politics not as mere skill but as ethical wisdom is empowered to control directly technocracy along with economic forces. But supreme Wisdom commands politics with the authority of knowledge and goodness.

Practical wisdom involves restraint and detachment (*vairāgya*) in the very midst of affluence and strength, because unbound lust for power, riches and sensuous pleasure is a curse that results in violence and misery.

But of course the positive aspect of wisdom as loving knowledge of God and man is far more important not only in itself but to counterbalance the enticements of technological civilization and that almost "irresistible tendency in man to make himself the slave of his own achievements."[4]

On the other side, man has a duty as well as a right not only to "follow" nature as old Stoics used to say, but to transform his environing conditions of life—and his environment may be as large as the solar system—so as to make them more humane.

The control of blind natural forces, of the pressure that is brought to bear upon man by the world of matter, the endeavour to alleviate the toil of human labour, and to turn wildernesses into flower gardens are activities that must be approved of and encouraged.

This is the range of means, not the realm of ends. Means should not develop into an overdone system working for its own sake. They have to be honest in themselves and constantly related to the welfare of man. They must follow the lead of wisdom, but wisdom is not supposed to suppress them, when they are the genuine fruit of humane creative activity.

1. Jacques BILLY, *Les techniciens et le pouvoir*, Paris, P.U.F., 1963, p. 7 (Freely translated).

2. The above English translation is a shortened and free one—cf. : Madeleine BIARDEAU, *Thiorie de la connaissance et philosophie de la parole dans le brahmanisme classique*, Paris, 1964, p. 333.

Svaṛavrttiṃ vikurute madhau puṃśikokilasya kaḥ /
jantvādayaḥ kulāyādikaraṇe kena śikṣitaḥ //
āhārapr̄ityabhidveṣaplavanādikriyāsu kaḥ / jātyanvaya prasiddhāsu prayoktā mṛgapakṣinām //
bhāvanānugatād etad āgamād eva jāyate //
āsattiviprakarṣābhyām āgamas tu viśiṣyate //
svabhāvacaraṇābhyāsayogādṛṣṭopapaditā, viśiṣṭopahitā ceti pratibhāṃ ṣaḍvidhām viduḥ //

Bhartṛhari, Vākyapadīya, II, 151—4.

3. Pierre DUCASSE, *Histoire des techniques*, Paris, P.U.F., 1968, p. 10.

4. P. DUCASSE, p. 124.

Eliot Deutsch

VEDĀNTA AND ECOLOGY

I propose in my talk with you today to articulate a core of ideas, the adherence to which seems necessary for us to establish and sustain a proper relationship between ourselves and physical nature, and to examine how these ideas find an historical locus and expression in the classical Vedānta philosophy of India. I will then try to apply these ideas to our present and near-future ecological situation by way of examining some aspects of the working relations that we have with physical nature.

Before I sketch the core of ideas, however, I think it is appropriate that we consider two questions: (1) Are the ideas true? and (2) Whether true or not can or should they be subscribed to in the form in which they were expressed in Vedānta? I am asking if the ideas that seem to be at least necessary if not sufficient for us to establish and sustain a proper relationship between ourselves and physical nature are true, and if they should be held by us in the manner in which they were originally put forward in ancient India.

The ideas that form the core model that we will refer to are not, it seems to me, so much *propositions* the truth or falsity of which might be ascertained by empirical investigation or logical inquiry, as they are *attitudes* and *values* the adequacy of which is to be found in experience itself. This "spiritual pragmatism" is typical of Vedānta, which holds that there is warrant for believing some idea if that idea is consistent and commensurate with the deepest spiritual insights of man and if the idea may lead others to, as well as exemplify, those insights. The basic spiritual insights of the Advaita school of Vedānta are summed up by Śaṁkara, the main exponent of this principal school of Vedānta, as follows: *Brahma satyaṁ jagan mithyā jīvo brahmaiva nā 'paraḥ*......"Brahman is real, the world is false, the self is not-different from Brahman." The statement is affirming that Brahman, the

oneness of reality, is the most fundamental ground of all existence; that the individual self, in its essence, is identical with this reality; and that this world, when taken as independent and self-sufficient, when taken as purely "objective" and separate from man, is a false world. Vedānta would maintain that each of the ideas, of the attitudes and values that I will speak of, is justified by this criterion of adequacy: the ideas are consistent and commensurate with the affirmation of the oneness of being and man's at-onement with it, and they may lead others to, as well as exemplify, these insights.

If this is the case, should we therefore become Vedāntins? I do not believe that one can become an exemplar of another tradition that is remote in time and place from one's own culture in anything other than in a superficial way. Or, to put it another way, which may sound contradictory to what I have just said, but I don't believe is, one cannot become an exemplar af another tradition in any way other than at the deepest spiritual level, — at the level that goes beyond external symbols, beyond all rites and rituals, beyond all cultural expression. But then we still need to translate this understanding into the terms of our own time and place. We need to see how certain ideas as deeply reflected upon and maintained in another tradition can assist us in working out our own creative response. I do not know of any Sanskrit equivalent to the word "ecology," and it was not of course a subject of direct analysis by Vedāntic philosophers. We turn to Vedānta, then, not for imitation or for direct instruction, but for inspiration and for enriched understanding.

I

The first and perhaps most obvious core idea needed by us to establish and sustain a proper relation with physical nature is the idea that everything in nature is *interconnected* with everything else. This idea means that nature is so constituted that any action performed will have its effect over a wide, complex and oftentimes unforseen terrain. In a journalistic piece by a Mr. Tom Wicker on the problems the US Army has had disposing of its oversupply of nerve gas, he notes that it is not "convincing when august scientists, mostly in the pay of the government, assure us there is no danger from the dump. It is conceded that they cannot know what effect it may have on the plant and animal life of the seas, even if there is no present danger to humans. When will we learn, "he goes on to ask, "that life is of a piece, a vast and mysterious entanglement of species, that the earth is the home of all, and that what endangers one must have its ultimate effect on others."[1] Now this idea is not, of course, entirely unfamiliar to traditional

Western thought. In philosophy it was given very full expression by nineteenth century German idealists with their doctrine of "internal relations". Fichte expresses the idea this way:

> "In every moment of her duration Nature is a connected whole; in every moment each individual part must be what it is because all the others are what they are, and you could not remove a grain of sand from its place without thereby, although imperceptible to you, changing something throughout all parts of the immeasureable whole."[2]

Now this rather extravagant way of expressing the idea is still very abstract. We must, I think, turn to Indian thought for a more concrete and subtle understanding; and we find this, I believe, in the ancient idea of *karman.* In one of the earliest Upaniṣads, the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (c. 1000 B. C.) it is written: "According as one acts, according as one conducts himself, so does he become."[3] According to the doctrine of *karman,* every deed or act that one performs has its effect in the world and forms a "tendency" (*saṁskāra* or *vāsanā*) within the doer to act in a similar way in the future; to form, in the other words, a *habit* of action. This habit of action produces further consequences in the actor and in the world and, accordingly, the wheel of life turns around and around. Whatever one does will have effects not only in the immediate present but in the long future as well: any act, in short, will have consequences that reach out far beyond the act itself. And everthing in nature is so interconnected through causal chains and relationships that we ourselves become part of the natural process and are conditioned by it. The DDT that is apparently already deposited in our body testifies to this. *Karman* thus implies precisely man's full involvement in natural causal processes and is the philosophical-religious expression in Hindu thought of the sentiment that "what endangers one must have its ultimate effect on others."

We tend to see things and events as isolated processes or as closed systems. Assuming, as we do, that objects are separate, unique, individual things, we tend to be unaware, until often it is too late, of the consequences of actions within the wider framework of nature. We like to think that acts can be performed without their having any formative consequences on either the actor or on others. With our polluted streams, lakes and oceans, with our foul air and blackened lungs we now are beginning to know otherwise.

A second core idea, and one which is closely related to the first, has to do with the *continuity* of man and all of physical nature. In order for us to work out a proper relation with nature we must, I think,

come to understand and to feel deeply a natural kinship with all life. Since Darwin, the idea of an original creation of fixed species has been shattered in favor of biological evolutionism. But our *knowing about* a continuity between man and other animals with respect to origin is quite different from our *experiencing* this continuity as part and parcel of our basic attitudes and values.

But what does it mean to affirm a continuity between man and the rest of life? Vedānta would maintain that this means the recognition that fundamentally all life is one, that in essence everything is reality, and that this oneness finds its natural expression in a *reverence* for all living things. The term *ahiṁsā*, of non-injury to all living creatures, is cast in the negative, *a-hiṁsā*, but its import is clearly positive. It calls for a living care of everything in nature. It demands that we accept the responsibility for being guardians of, as well as participants in, the natural order and balance of things.

This continuity of man and nature, this spiritual kinship, if fully assimilated, would rule out the possibility of any gross exploitation of nature and of ourselves. It is certainly one of the greatest follies of man that he still believes that, as an individual (whether incorporated or not), he has an inalienable right to exploit and destroy nature for his own personal gain, or indeed for the mere satisfaction of his own idiosyncratic taste. But surely nature does not *belong* to anyone. The idea of *possessing* or *owning* nature is utterly alien to Vedānta, as it ought to be to any sophisticated spiritual perspective. "Possession" has no meaning where there is no real possessor. If everything in nature is already one's own basic self, and the self of all others, then clearly no single individual or group of individuals can lay claim to it. And if the Hindu gods laugh, as assuredly they do, then the skies over India must rock from time to time with hilarity over some men's nonsensical claims to ownership of the universe. The Hindu god Śiva, the god of destruction, is certainly quickening the steps of his cosmic dance, pleased that man has been so cooperative with him in his work of destruction. Yet, on the other hand, Śiva has his appointed hour in the rather distant future and might be very upset if we tried to usurp his role completely. He might then break away from the other gods and prevent the re-creation that is to follow always from his work.

This brings me to the third and final core idea, which has to do precisely with a doctrine of creation. It has often been pointed out that Western man has interpreted the account of creation given in *Genesis* to mean that he has an absolute dominion over nature, it having been created to satisfy his needs and ends. Whether this is a correct

way of reading *Genesis* or not (in terms of the intentions of its author) I do not know; but it does seem clear that any doctrine of creation that calls for radical splits in life—say between man and God, God and physical nature, physical nature and man—is one that makes it very difficult for us to deal effectively with the ecological situation today, and may in fact have contributed considerably to bringing about that situation.

I cannot go into the details or the fuller implications of the Vedāntic theory on this, other than to point out that it, like most of Indian thought, subscribes to an emanationist theory that sees "creation" as a natural unfolding of spirit in the world—and that it also sees, accordingly, that everything in nature, when properly seen, is invested with intrinsic spiritual worth. Nature thus becomes infused with quality, with spiritual life, as well as with quantity, with measureable processes. Nature, in other words, is the stuff of poetry as well as of science. And nature, if we may employ a spatial metaphor, thus becomes connected vertically as well as interconnected horizontally. This means that for Vedānta there is no sharp duality between the body and spirit of man; each, rather, contributes to the whole and may express the full integrity of the whole. In the West the dualism between body and spirit has lead to an extraordinary amount of neurosis over anything that concerns the satisfaction of natural biological needs —from sexuality to the act of relieving ourselves. We seem to have a kind of unconscious desire to revenge ourselves on nature and to heighten the distance between ourselves and our physical environment. We seem bent on being what from a Vedāntic viewpoint can only be considered *un-natural.*

The core ideas that I have articulated are that nature is interconnected, that there is a continuity between man and all other living things, and that everything in nature, being an inseparable part of the whole and retaining, in essence, its qualitative origin, has intrinsic value.

Now I could go on and elaborate these ideas at some length. I think, though, that it is sufficiently clear that our present social-economic system, our technocasey is predicated on a rather different set of ideas – of attitudes and values. In our culture (and by "our" I mean both American and Indian) we tend to regard ourselves either as a mere product of nature or as a priviliged creation of God—and at the same time to regard nature as a mere exploitable background to our human drama. By taking the forces and powers of nature as if they were opposed to our own, we act as though it were our destiny merely to control and master the material processes of nature for our own limited

and usually selfish and short-sighted purposes. We build cities which exclude nature other than as certain organic things may be decorative, and then we pride ourselves upon our conservation of nature because we might set aside certain portions of the wilderness as communal playgrounds. But, ironically (and this is maybe our best hope), the very technology which is the product of this system may force us to transform the system into something more closely akin to a life-affirming organization of human energy.

We can turn now, I think, to the second main part of my presentation which will be an effort to apply the core ideas that I have articulated to the concrete situation of our working relations with nature.

II

Since the dawn of history man has worked in order to live—in order to derive from nature the necessities of life and to have the limited leisure to enjoy a few of the so-called luxuries of life. Our most fundamental relationship to nature has been our "working" relation.

Historically, it seems there have been three main stages in the development of our working relations with physical nature. The first of these, and by far the longest of the stages, is centered upon man as a tool-making and tool-using creature. The tool is an extension of an individual's limited physical power and its proper use involves him in a rather immediate practical understanding of, and respect for, the physical laws of things. The tool-user must expend his own energy directly in the task that he performs, but still the tool was the servant of man and represented (and continues to represent for many millions of of persons) their primary means of excercising control over physical nature.

The second stage in the development of our working relations with nature comes about with the invention of all sorts of machines. To a considerable extent machines function independently of man—or at least the more efficient of them carry out tasks that have no practical equivalent in terms of a substitute expenditure of human energy. The machine replaces many kinds of tool-using labor and often works in a time-world of its own making. But whereas the tool was the servant of man, the machine, although producing great quantities of goods, not infrequently was his master. As Hannah Arendt notes: "Unlike the tools of workmanship, which at every given moment in the work process remain the servants of the hand, the machines demand that the laborer serve them, that he adjust the natural rhythm of his body to

their mechanical movement."[4] And with the advent of a highly organized machine-based economy, of an industrial state, the machines must be kept running by men not so much for the sake of the tasteful use of what they produce but for the gross consumption of things which will insure their continuous production.

As we know, we are nearing the end of the machine-age, of the first industrial revolution, at least in the West—and indeed, I think we realize, the sooner the better. The industrial state in the last century, as Marx saw, alienated man from his labor and objectified him; in this century, and especially in the most recent decades, it has also despoiled nature and our most vital, sustaining relations with it.

The third stage to which it might be possible for India to move to a considerable extent directly has been called by various names, but which I will call simply the "new technics". This stage involves the development of those very special kinds of machines which are capable of replacing (or at least drastically reducing) man's physical labor in operating and in being incorporated into machines, and also of taking over many aspects of his routine mental labor. The first two stages are of course still with us. We continue to use tools and ordinary machines, but something quite new has in recent years clearly been added to these and is bringing about a new revolution in man's working relations with nature. "This something new," this "new technics" is tied up with automation—with those systems of work that use self-regulating electronic processes to coordinate and control the qualitative and quantitative dimensions of activity. We are only now at the beginning phase of this stage, and I would venture to submit that it is with this stage and a corresponding transformation of our social-economic organization that our main hope of restoring a proper relation to nature is to be found.

Before I bring the core ideas that I mentioned before together with the "new technics," though, I think it is necessary that we be very much aware of a real problem that we face—and that is the danger that with the new technics man himself will be "automated"; that he will respond passively and predictably to the new processes of production and all that they entail. There is a very real possibility that in freeing ourselves from servitude to conventional machines, we will only become robots in our turn.

The basis for this is perhaps to be found in the fact, long recognized in Vedānta philosophy, that one is always influenced by that with which one relates. A man does take on some of the characteristics or qualities of whatever he attends to, of whatever he gives himself over to. With the new technics it is no longer necessary for man to adjust

physically to the movement and noise of the machine. Machines can be made to adjust physically to each other, with men having only to read some dials and push some buttons. But in the new techinics a much more subtle adjustment takes place. In his economic productivity, and more importantly in his recreation, education and indeed entire social experience, a man may very well become psychically attuned, as it were, to programmed processes. To illustrate this one can already multiphy examples almost indefinitely; from the adjustments made to punchcard business, through television-watching habits, to being a dumb statistic in politics.

Our problem, then, is how will we live with the new technics without merely imitating it, without having it condition our entire psychic being and inward life? Futurists often warn of man's inability to adjust to rapaid change. I would submit, though, that our problem is really just the opposite; men adjust all too readily to technological change, and in a blind, imitative, unthinking way. We adjust to just about everything in our society—and so thoroughly that we never even question the adjustment or seem to realize that there might be alternatives to it. The first industrial revolution tended to dehumanize the worker; the second revolution, the new technics, unless we are careful and wise, may very well despiritualize him, and all of us, as well.

So much for the warning; now for the promise. It seems to me that a very fruitful marriage between our core ideas and the new technics is possible. I do not maintain that there is nothing that we can do now and that we must merely wait for technological development and rely entirely on it. This attitude, it seems to me, is an irresponsible fantasy. There are undoubtedly a number of things that can and should be done immediately within the existing social-political-economic order in controlling the ever-mounting abuses to our environment. I do think, though, that these controls will at best be stop-gap measures and that really to get hold of the problem we need both a new way of thinking and a new way of working.

William Morris believed that "when there is joy in work, as there should be everyone, we then by that very fact have art."[5] We can—and should, I think—have our most fundamental working relations with nature be art-ful. In a somewhat impatient and sarcastic mood, George Santayana once wrote that "Doubtless the most industrial people would still wish to be happy and might accordingly lay down certain principles which its industry should never transgress, as for instance that production should at any price leave room for liberty, leisure, and beauty. ..."[6] Another and perhaps more specific princi-

ple might be: do not let industry manufacture those finished products for human use which could be produced (finished) more artfully by tool-using man. Through a wise and restrained use of the new technics, it would seem, we can have a renaissance of craftsmanship—and one that is based solidly on the recognition that everything in nature is interconnected, that there is a real continuity between human life and the rest of nature, and that everything, when properly seen and understood, is invested with spiritual worth and value. Through a bold alliance between the automated machine and tool-using man we can have a new creative relationship established between man and his physical environment.

Herbert Read, the distinguished British authority on art, held that "art is the skill with which objects are made."[7] The artist, and whatever his medium, is perhaps more than any other human being deeply aware of the principle of inter-connectedness in nature. His skill is very much based on his ability to work with the natural rhythm of some process, with its inherent *tao* or *dharma*, and with the proper balance between himself and his material, insofar as they do form a single working process. And there is an artist in each of us; not, to be sure, a professional, highly talented and dedicated one, but one who has a capacity for sensitivity to structures and relationships, to skillful action. In the *Bhagavadgītā* it is said that yoga is "skill in action," and that everyone is potentially a yogin.

The new technics may also enable us, if we work with it creatively, to re-establish an intimacy with nature and allow us once again to realize a continuity of our being with it. We are learning increasingly from the new technics that many of our most cherished differences from the rest of nature are illusory, e.g. we are learning that many our mental processes can be better performed by non-human electronic "brains;" and we are also learning as a consequent of this that our distinctive spiritual life is one that must find itself in a dynamic accord with all of life.

Finally it might be possible once again to see everything in nature, and everything that we ourselves make, as invested with value. When things are produced for joyful use and not merely for profit, and by a system that allows the integrity of the human mind, body and spirit to function, they are produced with loving care and readily reflect that care. We work this way when we have respect for nature and ourselves, when we approach nature in a spirit of reverence and kinship, when in short we recognize the informing spirit of nature.

To sum up: I am not a cheerful optimist. For me the record of stupidity, brutality, perverseness and suffering, that we call human history and which is still so pervasive today militates against an optimistic view. But I do see that there is this wonderous possibility for a good life by our creating a philosophy—or if you prefer a philosophically informed religion—that can find much support in the major classical tradition of Indian thought, and by our applying it, and in turn having it be strengthened by, a new pattern in our most fundamental working relations with nature. For this possibility to be fully realized there will, no doubt, have to be a change in our entire organization of life. But for ecological problems to be "solved" in such a way as to provide a rich and creative life for man, nothing short of this would seem to make any sense.

1. "Nerve Gas and National Security" (c. N. Y. Times), in *Honolulu Star Bulletin*, August 12, 1970.

2. *Die Bestimmung des Menschen* (II, 117, 23).

3. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, IV, iv, 5, in R. E. Hume trans., *Thirteen Principal Upaniṣads* (London: Oxford University Press, 1931).

4. *The Human Condition* (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1959), pp. 128-129.

5. See Gilbert & Kuhn, *A History of Aesthetics* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1953), p. 422.

6. *Reason in Art* (New York: Collier Books, 1962), p. 20.

7. *The Grass Roots of Art* (New York: Wittenborn, Schulz, Inc., 1949), pp. 34—35.

John Hick

THE IDEA OF REBIRTH— A WESTERN APPROACH

I

In making my approach to the idea of rebirth or reincarnation I hope you will not mind if I begin with some remarks about the religious situation in the West, and then approach the East from that direction.

Religious thought in the West has for some time now been in a state of turmoil and change, owing very largely to the impact upon it of modern science and technology. The scientific point of view pervades the Atlantic culture of Europe and North America, and has affected religious men and women as much as it has affected those who call themselves atheists, agnostic and humanists. As a result we have all become acutely conscious that the classical formulations of Christian belief, in the creeds of the early centuries of the Christian era, were the work of men who lived before the immense expansion of scientific knowledge that began in Europe in the seventeenth century and has been accelerating ever since. The men who composed the creeds naturally thought within the framework of the limited scientific knowledge of their own time, and assumed as permanently valid the concepts and categories which they had received from the philosophers of ancient Greece. And so it is inevitable today, after great revolutions in both science and philosophy, that we should find ourselves criticising those older formulations and trying to restate the meaning of the Christ-event in terms which make sense in our twentieth century.

An important part of this critical work consists in what has come to be called demythologising — that is to say, identifying the mythological elements within our inherited beliefs and then restating in contemporary terms what was there being expressed in

pre-scientific picture thinking. And I would suppose that a parallel process is going on here in India, and that it is therefore possible without offence to approach such an idea as that of rebirth in this same spirit of critical enquiry and without excluding the possibility that demythologisation may be the outcome.

Let me first make a comparative remark about Christian and Hindu conceptions of human immortality. Indian religious thinkers sometimes refer to the traditional Christian conception that men have only one life to live, namely this present earthly life, and that their eternal salvation or damnation is determined by their spiritual success or failure in this brief and chancy existence. They criticise this idea as involving an intolerable unfairness. For example, Sri Aurobindo in his *The Problem of Rebirth* (1952), says that there is 'the difficulty that this soul inherits a past for which it is in no way responsible, or is burdened with mastering propensities imposed on it not by its own act, and is yet responsible for its future which is treated as if it were in no way determined by that often deplorable inheritence, *damnosa hereditas*, or that unfair creation, and were entirely of its own making. We are made helplessly what we are and are yet responsible for what we are, — or at least for what we shall be hereafter, which is inevitably determined to a large extent by what we are originally. And we have only this one chance. Plato and the Hottentot, the fortunate child of saints or Rishis and the born and trained criminal plunged from beginning to end in the lowest fetid corruption of a great modern city have equally to create by the action or belief of this one unequal life all their eternal future. This is a paradox which offends both the soul and the reason, the ethical sense and the spiritual intuition' (pp. 39-40).

Now I entirely agree with this; and indeed many Christian theologians, including myself, have frequently made this same criticism. The position, however, which we thus agree in rejecting is not the only Christian view of death. There is another, minority strand within the Christian tradition which some of us prefer to follow. As rather rough and ready labels, the two Christian approaches can be called the Augustinian, which represents so to speak the majority report of the Christian mind through the ages, and the Irenaean—naming it after Irenaeus, who lived in the 2nd century A.D. — representing a persisting minority report, but a minority report which has gained very greatly in acceptance during the last two or three generations. This Irenaean type of theology — which has, incidentally, interesting partial affinities with some aspects of the thought of Sri Aurobindo — sees the divine creation of personal life as taking place through a long and slow process which extends far beyond this present earthly sphere. It sees

the origin of personal existence in the complexification of matter through the process of organic evolution, within which at a certain stage man has emerged from the lower forms of life. It differs, however, from Hindu thought, if I understand this rightly, in that Hindu thought regards individual human souls as having existed throughout unlimited time. But so far as their future is concerned there is considerable agreement. For the Irenaean type of Christian theology rejects the idea that men are at death distributed to an eternal heaven or hell. It thinks instead in terms of continued responsible life in which the soul-making process continues in other environments beyond this world. Thus it speaks of an intermediate state between this present life and the ultimate heavenly state — the traditional Catholic doctrine of purgatory being itself an approach to this idea. Further, in attempting to envisage such an intermediate state, even though necessarily only in very general terms, it postulates many worlds, or spheres of existence, beyond this physical world; and envisages the progress of the soul through them towards a final state of perfection and of perfect relationships to God and to other finite beings.

Now in a sense the difference between this conception and the idea of reincarnation, in at least one of its forms, is not very great. For they agree about the basic principle of continued resposible life in which the individual may still learn and grow by interacting with other human beings in a common environment or enviroments. They differ only as to *where* this continued life takes place. The Christian belief has been that it takes place in other worlds beyond this one. The Hindu belief has been that it takes place by means of repeated returns to this world. But this difference seems relatively slight in comparison with the more fundamental agreement. Indeed the qusetion whether man's continued life takes the form of progress through other spheres, or progress from incarnation to incarnation within this world, seems to me to be a matter of probable judgment rather than of essential Christian and Hindu faith respectively. Apart from the weight of tradition behind us, which is of course very liable to determine what we think, I see no compelling reason why a Christian should not come to believe in reincarnation instead of in continued life in other spheres, or why a Hindu should not come to believe in continued life in other spheres instead of in reincarnation.

Thus for a number of us at least in the West the idea of rebirth is not by any means ruled out from the start as incompatible with our most central beliefs. It is an idea, or an hypothesis, to be considered on its merits; and we want, accordingly, to know what is to be said both for it and against it. But the approach which a Western philoso-

phical training leads one to take is not initially through arguments directly for and against, but rather through an enquiry into the precise meaning of the hypothesis itself. For if we can become clear as to just exactly what it is that is being asserted, we may then be able to appreciate why it is being asserted.

II

The Westerner trying to understand the doctrine of reincarnation is liable to be confused by the fact that he meets it in such apparently different and even incompatible forms — not, needless to say, that this is the only religious doctrine, either of the East or of the West, which presents itself in this kind of bewildering variety. It may be that there are really two or more distinct doctrines, affirmed by different groups of people, which all go under the same name of reincarnation. At any rate the right initial approach seems to be to distinguish the dlfferent forms of the idea and discuss them separately, though noting at the same time possibilities of a composite doctrine.

The varieties that I have been able to distinguish are as follows. First, there is reincarnation as an empirical (or factual) hypothesis about the rebirth of the conscious, memory-bearing self, this hypothesis being supported by the evidence of individuals who claim to remember a former life. Second, there is reincarnation as a mere metaphysical theory about a spiritual entity, the *jīva* or *jīvātman* which lies behind the empirical self. This produces a series of empirical selves as its expressions and instruments, these successive selves being described as reincarnations of the same eternal *jīva* or soul. And third, there is reincarnation as the mythological expression of the ethical doctrine of what has been called collective *karma*.

III

Let us look first, then, at reincarnation as the rebirth of the conscious, memory-bearing self.

There is a fairly extensive literature reporting and discussing cases of individuals who have apparently remembered a previous life or even lives. The American psychologist, Professor Ian Stevenson of the University of Virginia, in his two books *The Evidence for Survival from Claimed Memories of Former Incarnations* (1961), and *Twenty Cases Suggestive of Reincarnation* (1966), has examined some of the most impressive of such cases. A number of these come from India, two of the best-known

being, I suppose, the cases of Shanti Devi and of Prabhu Khairti. I am not going to discuss these cases in detail or attempt to assess their evidential value. I am interested in them at the moment from the point of view of the light which they throw upon the *meaning* of the doctrine of reincarnation. And cases of this kind do suggest a particular meaning for the idea of rebirth. Let me therefore now try to formulate a reincarnation hypothesis on the basis of these cases of claimed memory of former lives.

Consider the relation between the John Hick who is now speaking to you, whom I shall call J.H.^{48} and John Hick at the age of two, whom I shall call J.H.^{2}. The main difference between them are, first, that J.H.^{48} and J.H.^{2} do not look at all like one another and, second, that their conscious selves are quite different. As to the first difference, if you were shown a photo of J.H.^{2} I do not think that you would know, without being told, that it is a photo of J.H.^{48} as he was forty six years ago, rather than of almost anybody else at the age of two. For there is very little similarity of appearance between these two visible objects. And as to the second difference, if you were to hear the two-year old J.H. revealing his thoughts in words and other noises, you would I hope feel that the present J. H.^{48} has a very different mind. No doubt the same basic personality traits are present in both the child and the man, but nevertheless the conscious self of the one is very different from the conscious self of the other — so much so that a comparison of the two would never by itself lead us to conclude that they are the same self. There are, accordingly, immense differences between J.H.^{2} and J.H.^{48} from the points of view both of physical and of psychological description. But nevertheless J.H.^{48} does have at least one fragmentary memory of an event that was experienced by J.H.^{2} He remembers being told when his sister, who is two years younger than himself, was born. Thus there is a tenuous memory link connecting J.H.^{48} with J.H.^{2}, despite all the dissimilarities which we have noted between them; and this fact reminds us that it is possible to speak of memory even across the gap of almost any degree of physical and psychological difference.

Now let us see if we can say the same of someone who remembers a previous life. To spell this out in the well known case of Shanti Devi: Lugdi, who was born in 1902, who lived in Muthra and who married Kedar Nath Chaubey, was (presumably) very different as regards both physical and psychological description from Shanti Devi, who was born in 1926 and lived at Delhi. But Shanti Devi had (or claimed to have) certain memories of people and events experienced by Lugdi, which memories are said to have been confirmed by impartial investigators. And our reincarnation hypothesis is

that despite the differences between them they are in fact the same person or self, in a sense comparable with that in which J.H.^{48} is the same person as J.H.^{2} In speaking in this way of the same person being born in 1902 in one part of India, later dying, and then being born again in 1926 in another part of India, we are presupposing the existence of a continuing mental entity which I am calling the conscious self, or the person. The hypothesis we are considering is that just as J.H.^{46} is the same person as J.H.^{2}, though at a later point in the history of that person, so also Shanti Devi is the same person as Lugdi, though at a later point in that person's history. The big difference — concerning which we have to ask whether or not it is *too* big a difference — is that these are not now earlier and later points in the same life but in two successive lives. They are, as it were, points in different volumes of the same multi-volume work instead of in different chapters of the same volume.

Now I am not, as I have already said, concerned to try to assess these cases of claimed memories of former lives. It could be that they establish, or at least show to be probable, that a certain small number of persons have lived before in this world or, in a very few cases, more than once before. I do not personally feel able to affirm confidently that they *do* show this; but this would be what they show if they are accepted as evidentially compelling. But the reincarnation doctrine has always been — has it not? — that everyone, and not just a few special individuals, are subject to rebirth; and not only once, or even two or three times, but innumerable times; and even, according to some widely believed versions of the doctrine, in animal as well as in human lives.

Let us therefore now focus our thoughts on the claim that all human selves have lived many times before, even though the great majority, even perhaps some 99%, have no memory of any such previous lives. The claim is that just as J.H.^{48} is the same person as J.H.^{2}, and would still be the same person even if J.H.^{48} had not happened to remember an incident experienced by J.H.^{2}, so we are all of us the same self as innumerable apparently other selves of whom we have no knowledge or memory, who have lived one after the other in the past. And the question that I want to raise, derived from discussions in Western philosophy of the topic of personal identity, concerns the criterion or criteria by which someone living today is said to be the same person or self as some one who lived, let us say, five hundred years ago, of whom he has no knowledge or memory.

When we remove the connecting thread of memory, as we are doing in our present rebirth hypothesis, we have taken away one, and a

very important one, of the three strands of continuity which constitute what we normally mean by the identity of a human individual through time. A second strand is bodily continuity, an unbroken existence through space and time from the newly born baby to the old man, a continuity stretching thus from the cradle to the grave. It may be that none of the atoms that composed the baby's body are now part of the adult's body. But nevertheless a continuously changing physical organism has existed, and has been in principle observable, composed from moment to moment of slightly different populations of atoms, but with sufficient overlap configuration and population from moment to moment for it to count as the same organism. Hewever this strand of bodily continuity is also taken away by our rebirth hypothesis. For there is no physical connection between someone living in the India today and someone who lived, say, in ancient Greece two and a half thousand years ago. Nor does it even seem to be claimed by the doctrine of rebirth that there is any bodily resemblance; for it is said that one is sometimes born as a man, sometimes as a woman, sometimes in one andsometimes in another branch of the human race; and sometimes indeed, according to one version of the reincarnation doctrine, as an animal or perhaps as an insect.

Thus all that is left to be the bearer of personal identity is the third strand, which is the psychological continuity of a pattern of mental dispositions. It is this that now has to carry all the weight of the identity of two persons, one of whom is said to be a reincarnation of the other. For the only connection left, when memory and bodily continuity are excluded, lies in the psychological dispositions which constitute one's personal character. It is claimed that B, who is A reincarnated, has the same personality traits as A. If A was proud and intolerant, B will be proud and intolerant. If A become in the course of his life a great artist, B will start life with a strong artistic propensity. If A was kind and thoughtful, B will be kind and thoughtful. It should however be noted that the doctrine of reincarnation does not claim that there is anything like a one hundred per cent similarity of character between the same person in two different incarnations, but only a general similarity of dominant characteristics. And so the central question now becomes whether such similarities of personal characteristics are sufficient to entitle us to call A and B the same person or the same self.

Now it seems to me that to affirm that they do, in a case in which there is neither bodily continuity nor any link of memory, would commit us to the principle that all individuals who are not alive at the same time and who exhibit rather similar personality patterns are to be regarded as the same person. But in that case there would be far too many people who qualify under this criterion as being the same person.

How many people of Lugdi's generation were as like Shanti Devi in character as Lugdi was? Probably many hundreds of thousands. How many people in the last generation before I was born had character traits similar to those that I have? Probably many hundreds of thousands. On this basis alone, then, it would, never have occurred to anyone that Lugdi and Shanti Devi were the same person, or that I am the same person as any one particular individual in the past. On this basis I could equally will be a reincarnation of any one of many thousands people in each past generation. Thus this criterion of character similarity seems far too broad and permissive. If it establishes anything it establishes too much, and has therefore not enabled us to formulate satisfactorily a doctrine of reincarnation of our first type.

Let us turn now to the second form which I distinguished of the idea of reincarnation. On this second view we have to draw a very important distinction between, on the one hand, the present conscious, memory-bearing self or I, who am now speaking and, on the other hand, my eternal soul or *jivātman*. The terminology used to express this distinction varies in different writers; but I shall speak on the one hand of the conscious or the empirical self and on the other hand of the immortal soul or *jivātman*. The empirical self is mortal; it comes into existence at physical birth (or at some point between conception and birth) and it dissolves at death. But the *jivātman* is immortal and gives rise to a series of empirical selves as its successive instruments and modes of expression. The link between the different members of the succession of selves is thus the immortal soul, which carries a complete memory of all past lives but normally withholds this memory from the empirical self in order that this latter shall not be distracted from its immediate tasks. Occasionally however fragments of memory leak down, as it were, into the consciousness of the empirical self and provide one of those cases of memory of a former life to which I have already referred.

In some influential versions of the theory an important part is played in the mechanism of rebirth by the 'subtle body', the *liṅga śarīra* or *sukshma śarīra*. This is a continuing projection or 'sheath' of the immortal soul, embodying the developing personal characteristics that become expressed in the succession of empirical selves; and it is this subtle body that is reborn by influencing the growth of a new empirical self. This more complex mechanism does not however seem to affect the basic logic of this second type of reincarnation theory.

There is however another very significant link between the successive empirical selves produced by the same atma or soul, namely

the link of a common karma. Each receives and continues to work out the karma left by his or her predecessor in the series. The karma of each completed life is recorded in the immortal soul which has created it, and the immortal soul then embodies this karma in a new life. Thus the karma of a man who dies is transferred as a unit to a baby about to be born. When a child is born his innate character and genetic inheritance have been selected by the karma of previous lives, and when eventually he grows old and dies, having worked this karma out a stage further in his own life, it is then transferred to a new life. So the chain of lives goes on, not reincarnating the same empirical self but reincarnating the same on-going karma in a succession of different empirical selves. Further, although I have spoken just now of the immortal soul creating a succession of empirical selves one after the other, this suggests altogether too deliberate and purposive an activity. We are rather to envisage a process which takes place automatically, in accordance with a universal law of course and effect, without having to be planned or guided by anyone.

Now the main question that I want to raise concerning the doctrine of reincarnation, when it is understood in this way, is whether it is being put forward as a factual claim about what is actually happenning, or as a metaphysical idea which is devoid of factual content. I am of course here making use of a distinction which has proved fruitful in the critical investigation of Western religious ideas. For we would I think be most unwise to turn our backs upon the clarification which has come out of the logical positivist phase of modern Western philosophy, despite all the excesses that occured within that phase. The basic commonsensical point was established that to have factual existence (as distinguished, for example, from fictional or imaginary existence) is to make a difference at some point within the realm of human experience. If, for example, it does not make any difference within human experience — past, present, or future — whether God exists, then talk of God is empty or pointless in just the way that the positivists emphasised when they called it meaningless. And the same question arises with regard to the claim that there exists an immortal soul which forms a succession of empirical selves, each continuing the same karmic history from the point at which its predecessor had left it off. To ask whether it makes any difference whether this claim is true or false is to ask how it may be verified or falsified, or at least confirmed or disconfirmed, by facts that are evident or are to be evident within human experience.

It would seem that the reincarnation theory, in this second understanding of it, could be presented as a factual claim which

connects with the circumstances of human history so as to lay itself open to at least some degree of empirical confirmation or disconfirmation. For is not each karmic history supposed to form a gradual moral and spiritual progress, with some advance normally taking place in each new incarnation. True, there will be many ups and downs, and therefore no uniform progress. But still, will there not be a general drift of progress, however gradual? And should we not in that case expect a gradually rising moral and spiritual level of human life to be evident over the centuries as the procession of evolving souls moves slowly upwards? Ought not the general spiritual state of mankind today to be observably superior to its state one thousand, or two thousand, or three thousand, or four thousand year ago?

If this is indeed a correct understanding of the implications of the rebirth hypothesis, is any such spiritual progres(through the ages in fact discernable? There has undoubtedly been progress of several kinds. There has for example been an immense accumulation of scientific knowledge and technological know-how. But has there been a comparable, or even less than comparable, moral and spiritual improvement? Regretfully I must admit that I am inclined to think not. And the lack of it, if it is indeed lacking, might prompt one to prefer the alternative idea that the spiritual progress of each individual takes place in other realms beyond this world rather than through successive lives in this world.

There are I think two other questions which have to be asked of the reincarnation theory when it is thus construed as an empirical hypothesis. One concerns its relation to the facts of human genetics. For these seem to account by themselves, without the aid of reincarnation, for the observed phenomena of the changing pattern of human characteristics from generation to generation. Thus, under Occam's principle of not multiplying entities without necessity, it seems that no support for the theory of rebith is to be found within the realm of human character. The other is the neighbouring question of the theory's relation to the current population explosion. If there are a fixed number of souls, each producing its own succession of embodied selves, one would expect the world's population to be more or less stable. But in fact, as we know, it is mushrooming at a tremendous rate.

These questions treat this second form of reincarnation doctrine as having implications concerning the course of human history, and thus being capable to some extent at least of empirical confirmation or disconfirmation. In so far as this is a correct understanding of it I have

to confess that I am far from clear whether the doctrine is in fact confirmed by historical observation.

But it may be that the answer to the questions I have posed would show that reincarnation is not after all subject to observational testing. Perhaps, for example, it is held that each soul produces a conscious personality only once every (say) three thousand years, so that the moral and spiritual progress of a karmic history should not be expected to be evident within the span of our human records. Perhaps, again, only a fraction of the total number of souls is held to produce empirical personalities at a given time, and the current population explosion corresponds to the fact that this proportion is for some reason now sharply on the increase. Or again of course, if one takes seriously the thought that the field of reincarnation includes the animal, bird, fish and insect realms as well as humanity, one can speculate that what is happening in our population explosion is simply that an increasing number of karmic histories are moving out of animal life into human life. But I confess that such a speculation strikes me, as a Western observer, as a desperate expendient. For any difficulties that there may be about the transfer of a karmic history from one human life to another are multiplied a hundred fold when we speak of the transfer of a karmic history from a human to an insect life or from an insect to a human life.

But, more radically, it may be that this evolutionary conception of karma as involving gradual moral and spiritual progress over the years — a conception which one finds for example in the writings of Sri Aurobindo — is not the classical Hindu conception. Is not the classical view rather that there is no moral and spiritual progress within human history but only an endless cycle of births and deaths, with no direction or pattern — *saṁsāra* being conceived as pointless and valueless? Here we have the ancient Upanishadic teaching of the emanation of finite existence from Brahman and its return to Brahman a divine breathing out and then breathnig in again of the phenomenal world, each occurrence of the world, each *kalpa*, including entire cycles of karma to be lived out and endured. Here, it would seem, we have a metaphysical picture of reality which entirely eludes empirical testing. And within this picture reincarnation is itself an idea to which no verification procedure could ever be appropriate. The case for adopting it would not then be in terms of the sense that it is supposed to make of the facts of human experience. It would rather depend upon the recommending of a wider system of religious ideas, namely the general Vedantic philosophy, which includes reincarnation as an element within it. By what kind of procedure, and by appeal to what criteria, such a total vision of reality is to be established, or re-

commended, is much too large and difficult a question for me to attempt to enter upon it now.

V

This possibility of construing reincarnation as an unverifiable and unfalsifiable metaphysical idea takes us to the borders of the third form of the doctrine that I distinguished. In this form it is a mythological expression of the fact that all our actions have effects upon some part of the human community, and have to be borne, for good or ill, by others in the future. It is this ethical sense that has been attributed to the Buddha by some scholars, notably by J. C. Jennings, formerly Vice-Chancellor of Patna University, in his book *The Vedantic Buddhism of the Buddha* (London : O.U.P., 1948). Whether these scholars are right in making this identification I am not myself competent to judge. But Jennings says, "Disbelieving in the permanence of the individual soul he [the Buddha] could not accept the Hindu doctrine of Karma implying the transmigration of the soul at death to a new body ; but believing fully in moral responsibility and the consequences of all acts, words, and thoughts, he fully accepted the doctrine of Karma in another sense, implying the transmission of the effects of actions from one generation of men to all succeeding generations" (p. xlvii). Again, Jennings says, "Assuming the common origin and the fundamental unity of all life and spirit, he [the Buddha] assumed the unity of the force of Karma upon the living material of the whole world, and the doctrine of Karma taught by him is collective and not individual" (p. xxv.).

On this view Karma, with reincarnation as its mythological expression, is really a moral truth, a teaching of universal human responsibility. All our deeds affect the human future, as the life of each of us has in its turn been affected by those who have lived before us. Instead of individual threads of karmic history there is a common karma of humanity to which each contributes and by which each is affected. Understood in this manner the idea of reincarnation is a way of affirming the corporate unity of the human race, and the responsibility of each towards the whole of which he is a part. We are not monadic individuals, each one a separate island to himself, but mutually interacting parts of the one human world in which the thoughts and acts of each reverberate continually for good or ill through the lives of others. As the ways in which men have lived in the past have formed the world in which we now have to live, so we in turn are now forming the world in which future generations will have to dwell. And as our inherited world, or state of world karma, has

formed us as individuals born into it, so we in turn are helping to shape the environment that is to form those who live after us. So conceived, the idea of karma has (as Professor Deutsch was suggesting to us here on Monday) immense practical implications at a time when the nations are grappling with the threat of the pollution of our human environment, with problems of environmental planning and conservation, with the prevention of nuclear war, with the control of the population explosion, with racial conflict, and with so many other problems concerned with the ways in which the actions of each individual and group affect the welfare of all. Seen in this way, karma is an ethical doctrine. And both the more popular idea of the transmigration of souls, and the more philosophical idea of the transference of karma from individual to individual in succeding generations, can alike be seen as mythological expressions of this great moral truth.

This last form of reincarnation doctrine is one which I, and I imagine very many other Western philosophers, will have no difficulty at all in accepting. For it is a vivid affirmation of human unity; and the world today is one in which if we do not unite in a common life we are only too likely to find ourselves united in a common death! But to what extent this is an acceptable interpretation of the idea of rebirth whinh has for so many thousand years been cherished by the great religions of India is not for me to say.

PART TWO

SPECIAL ARTICLES

U. Venkatakrishna Rao

THE CONCEPT OF LIBERATION AND ITS RELEVANCE TO PHILOSOPHY ACCORDING TO MADHVA

The old order changeth, yielding place to new
And God fulfils Himself in many ways.
Lest one good custom should corrupt the world.

So declared Tennyson; this is also true of the history of religions in India. All our great Ācāryas were messengers of the Timeless and their messages were exactly suited to the times in which they were delivered. Even the socalled *nāstika* systems of Jainism and Buddhism were historically necessary at the time at which they were expounded. The all absorbing Vaṭa Vṛkṣa or Banyan tree of Hinduism with all its sixteen branches as explained in the Sarvadaśana Sangraha of Mādhavācārya, we may declare, shines with all its 16 kalās or digits unimpaired. Sri Kṛṣṇa's message of tolerance—as they pray to me, I accept them[1]—every Ācārya has tried to interpret for his followers; this could be referred to as the coping stone for the edifice of 16 gopurams; Vedavyāsa, an Avatāra of Sri Kṛṣṇa is revered all over Bhārata Varṣa as he has provided us with the triple texts, Brahma Sūtras, Upanishads and the Bhagavad Gītā. Every Ācārya, to deserve the title Jagadguru like Vyāsa had to explain these three basic texts according to his lights and lead his followers across the ocean of *saṁsāra* to Sri Kṛṣṇa Puruṣottama. This *mukti* or release from the cycle of births and deaths is realisable by us only after understanding that Sri Kṛṣṇa is supreme, surrendering ourselves to His will with the *mantra*.

Our wills are ours, we know not how,
Our wills are ours, only to make them Thine.

We should turn our *bhakti* or devotion into a flower to be dedicated to Him wholeheartedly.

Advaitins might think of a Higher Supreme a Nirguṇa Brahman, but for the present, we might satisfy ourselves with Saguṇopāsana, say of the type suggested by Madhusūdana Sarasvati or Appayya Dīkṣita. The former expressly declares that he would pray to Kṛṣṇa whose hands are decorated with the flute[2], the latter cannot tolerate any obstacle to his meditation on the worship of Thy Holy feets[3]. If we view *bhakti* from this standpoint and define it with Madusūdana as the mental attitude which attains to the state of a flood, as a result of the melting of our godly devotion[4], we can easily declare that our three great Ācāryas, Śaṁkara, Rāmānuja and Madhva almost agree. The great prophet of Advaita comes down to our level and defines *bhakti*—

> Just as an ankola seed gravitates to the parent tree,
>
> just as the chaste wife moves only to her husband
>
> so the devotee attains to the Lotus Feet of Paśupati.[5]
>
> —that is *bhakti*.

To Sri Rāmānuja, *bhakti* is not a mere wave of emotionalism, it should be the outcome of deep study and patient reflection.[6] To Madhva also, it is a firm affection deeper than towards any thing else, firmly founded in the idea of His Supremacy; it cannot be had otherwise at all.[7] His commentator clarifies it still further.[8] All the Ācāryas take their stand on the sloka in the *Bhagavad Gitā* VI. 29. All of them elaborate the simple *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* idea denouncing outward show.

> That rogue who approaches selfishly, has no devotion

They also elaborate Prahlāda's declaration in that Purāna:

> That unfaltering devotion of indiscreet people
> towards their own things
>
> Let such devotion of mine be directed to thee and never
> swerve from my heart.

Such devotees care not for heaven, kingship etc.[9] So many of the devotees in Bhāgavata Purāna do not aspire for material comforts. *Bhakti* must thus be based on the true knowledge of the greatness of the Supreme, must be unceasing and nnwavering and what is most important, must exceed a thousand fold our love to worldly objects including our wife and children. In one word, it should not be a "fair weather *bhakti*", an offering we do, if we pass our examination, secure a higher job, or win a lakh in a lottery or horse races. He who prays for such material comforts, declares Prahlāda, is only a trader.[10] As Sri

Śaṁkara beautifully puts it, we must have the feeling that even our eulogies are not ours, Oh mother they are thine.[11] To continue our trend of Madhva's concept of *mukti,* those who enjoy *mukti,* even Lakṣmī or others there, have to look up to the Lord even after they have managed to secure a place there, the comforts enjoyed by them are primarily those to be enjoyed by Viṣṇu. A private secretary for example privileged to enjoy his master's wealth, cannot claim the money as his own, so are Lakṣmī and others in *mukti.*[12] In other words Madhva declares that Lakṣmī even has no absolute right to *mukti.* She may enjoy herself living in a place higher than others as she is not in *jīva koṭi* or list of human souls, but she is infinitely inferior to Viṣṇu in knowledge and power. She may coexist with Him in time and space, she may have no prākṛtic body like ours, she may be untouched by sorrow, she may be eternally free from saṁsāra ; all the same, she has to be dependent on Him and infinitely inferior to Him in virtues. Even she cannot know Him fully, though she may be herself eternally free, *nitya muktā,* (Vedānta Deśika differs and assigns her even a higher place than Viṣṇu,[13] but this is evidently a poetic flourish as the next word "depending on Him" shows.) Thus according to Madhva *tāratamya* or gradation between souls persists even after redemption. Vādirāja Svāmi, the Madhva poet-pontiff, declares in his Kāvya Rukmiṇīśa Vijaya (X. 71) that Akrūra saw the Lord, both in the Yamunā waters and also on his own chariot, testifying to His being served by those who had served redemption. Madhva's authority for this is *muktānām paramā gatiḥ* in the *Viṣṇusahasranāma* and the *Brahma Sūtra* : *Muktopastya vyapadeśāt.* Madhva declares also that such differences *inter se,* presist as per our individual natures even after the Lord's grace dawns upon us. The Lord alone has to assess our merits.[14] *Śravaṇa, manana* etc. are steps leading us upwards in a sort of spiritual ladder as his *bhāṣya* in the context makes it clear. One can attain knowledge of the Lord after constantly hearing, meditating and thinking, casting aside false knowledge.[15] The following *śloka* of his biographer (*Trivikrama*) makes the point more clear.[16] O Teacher, according to the devotee's efficiency, you make the truth-knowers enjoy, arranging that people of mixed temperaments wander in heaven, hell or earth. Viṣṇu's orders have to be carried out strictly and Vāyu, Uttama jīva, whose incarnation is Madhva, is entrusted with this portfolio. The *sañcita karma* or our accumulated action in our previous births, must yield its reward, while the *āgāmi* alone, being committed by us now, might be written off, if the Lord so wills it. The *mukta jīva* or released soul, can immediately get what it desires, but he cannot obtain what he has not fitted himself for. There is no unhealthy competition there. As regards ourselves, we are of mixed understanding, good, bad, and indifferent, and logically our destiny should also be similar. We

have therefore to be satisfied with this world alone. Men differ in point of their capacity, character, hope and aspiration for joy or misery. If one *karma* of one individual is the result of his past, that in its turn going back likewise, there must be an unending chain. The fact is its *svarūpa* or spiritual essence could be the main spring of all aspirations and activities. Whatever body it migrates into might accidentally lead it into different paths from which it might be retrieved and switched on to the right path. So one is compelled to accept *svarūpa yogyatā*. All souls are either *cidātmānaḥ*, spiritual and *acidātmāna* material. The former are full of bliss, while the others are full of sorrow. These again vary in various souls in the lower grades, unalloyed ignorance might lead to intense and acute misery. If Sri Kṛṣṇa in the Bhagavad Gitā XVI is satisfied with *daiva* and *āsura svarūpas*, Brahma-sūtras make the position clearer by adding one more class, *miśra* souls who deserve to be always in this world of births and deaths. Thus God coexists in the souls which are infinitely graded. Even their immortality is subject to His will, but He does not, or would not transform their *svabhāva* by Himself as He has to afford equal opportunities for one and all without *vaiṣamya* (unequal treatment) and *nairghṛṇya* (mercilessness). The attainment of freedom involves thus a long course of gradual evolution resulting from the efforts and spiritual *sādhana* of each. God's laws are immutable. The *Brahma-sūtra upamardaṁ ca* provides for His writing off our *prārabdha karma*; if some souls are to be eternally damned, they are segregated and packed off to Nitya Naraka so that their future mischief might be curbed. The Upaniṣads themselves declare that those who devote themselves to *avidyā* enter into hell where there is blinding darknes.[17] This Nitya Naraka is accepted by Muslims and Christians but many schools of thought even among us, try to argue that it compromises with God's mercy, the fact is logically, we cannot escape therefrom.

Our true nature is hidden when we are in the bondage of *saṁsāra*. If the outer husk is pulled out, the rice grain can reveal itself. Similarly the soul must be provided with opportunities for casting away the outer accretions growing around us without our knowledge.

God does predetermine the destiny of the soul. He has simply shown the theoretical course to be adopted for removing the 'husks' covering our souls. He does not interfere with our efforts. Each one of us must evolve our destiny if possible through His grace. We are assured that we are all spark of the Divine and can attain His *sāmya* or similarity ultimately. Shall we then discard the advice and eat of the fruits of the forbidden tree? We can show our mettle by "refusing to be tempted." *Bhakti* is thus both the step and the final fruit. This is clearly explained in *Bhagavata* II-23. The *yoga* of devotion directed

towards the divine Vāsudeva produces renunciation quickly, leading us on to *jnāna* which shows us the Lord. Madhva here comments: Devotion leads on to knowledge, which in turn lands us into devotion—this itself is real bliss.[18] This is also explained similarly by Kālidāsa in his Vikramorvaśīya Nāndī. Madhva advises us in his famous *Dvādaśa stotra* to perform our duties in a spirit of dedication to Hari.[19] In another context he clearly sums up his doctrine saying.[20]

> One attains to heaven by his meritorious deed,
> To hell by his bad deeds;
> To everlasting perdition by false knowledge.
> Highest Mukti he reaches by true knowledge.

Thus the concept of Mukti agrees more with that of Rāmānuja rather than with that of Śaṁkara. Tāṭakā, Kali and Kālanemi are persons who are assigned to everlasting misery as evil is a thing which naturally coexists with the good in the world at all times. Like the proverbial phoenix evil rears up its head at some other time in some other shape, though once killed. Śaṁkara and Rāmānuja seem to agree with reference to *ānanda tāratamya* in the pre-*mukti* stage, but according to them all differences are obliterated when the soul attains *mukti*. The waves merge into the ocean, losing their individuaity. Sri Rāmānuja takes his stand on *niranjanaḥ paramam sāmyamupaiti*, interpreting *sāmya* as full-fledged equality. But Madhva emphasises that the differences persist and the *jīva* continues to serve the Lord for ever in *mukti*.

Let me conclude with the verses of Madhva in his *Tattvasaṅkhyāna* dealing with this topic.

> duḥkhaspṛṣṭam tadaspṛṣṭam iti dvedhaiva cetanam
> nityā' duḥkhā ramā, anyetu spṛṣṭaduḥkhāḥ
> spṛṣtaduhkhā vimuktāsca duḥkhasamsthā iti dvidhā
> duḥkhasamsthā muktiyogyā ayogyā iti ca dvidhā
> devaṛṣipitṛ ca narāḥ iti muktāstu pancadhā
> evaṁ vimuktiyogyāśca tamogāḥ sṛtisamsthitāḥ
> muktyayogyā daitya rakṣaḥ piśācakāḥ
> martyyadharmāscaturdhaiva tamoyogyāḥ prakīrtitāḥ
> te ca praptāndhatamasas sṛtisamsthā iti dvidhā.

The basic *tāratamya* is fundamental. The *Gītā* also approves of this idea when it says

dvāvimau puruṣau loke kṣarascākṣara eva ca
uttamaḥ puruṣastvanyaḥ paramātmetyudāhṛtaḥ

XV et seq.

Such a seminar in which the concept of *mukti* according to the various schools of philosophy was discussed seems to have been held under the auspices of the Vijayanagara University in about 1525 AD. It was presided over by the Vice-Chancellor of the University, Vyāsarāyasvāmi. When the question 'who can attain mukti?' was mooted Kanakadāsa, the shepherd saint seems to have declared boldly "*nānu hodare hodenu,* implying that one who has abjured egoism completely alone can go there.

1. *Bhagavad-gītā*, IV, 11.
2. *Bhagavad-bhakti-rasāyana*, I, 1.
3. *nāhaṁ sahe tava kathā śravaṇāntarāyām*
   nāhaṁ sahe tava padārcanavicyutiṁ vā.
4. *drutattvaṁ bhagavaddharmāt dhārā vāhikatāṁ gatā sarveṣe manaso vṛttiḥ bhaktirityabhidhīyate.*
5. *aṅkolam nija bīja snatatiḥ...............sā*
   bhaktiḥ iti ucyate — Śaṅkara's stotras.
6. Rāmānuja's *Gītā-bhāṣya*, IX, 24.
7. *māhātmyajñāna pūrvakastu sudṛdhaḥ sneho bhaktiriti proktaḥ tayā muktiḥ na ca anyathā.*
8. see Jayatīrtha in *Nyāya-sudhā* on
   bhakti.
9. see *Bhāgavata purāṇa*
10. *ya āśiṣa āśāste sa vai vaṇik—Bhāgavata purāṇa*
11. see *Saundaryalaharī*.
12. *parādhinena vittena bhunjannapi hi yo naraḥ*
    vittavāniti noktaḥ tathā srīrmuktigaapi
    —Madhva's *Aitareya bhāṣya*
13. *asyeśānā tvamasi ....saṁsrayanti*
    mukundam—Śrī Stuti.
14. *yamevaiṣa vṛṇute sa tena labhyaḥ.*
15. *śrutvā matvā tathā dhyātvā tadajñāna viparyayau*
    saṁśayaṁ ca parāṇudya labhate brahma darśanam.

16. *tattvajñānamuktibhājaḥ sukhayasi guro yogyatā tāratamyāt,*
ādhāste miśra buddhin tridiva niryaya bhūgocarān.

17. *andhaṁ tamaḥ praviśanti ye avidyaṁ upāsate.*

18. *bhaktyā jñānaṁ tato bhaktiḥ tato dṛṣṭiḥ tataśca sā,*
tato muktistato bhaktiḥ saivasyāt sukharūpinī.

19. *kuru bhuṅkṣva ca karma nijaṁ niyataṁ,*
haripādavinamradhiyā satatam.

20. *śubhena karmaṇā svargaṁ nirayaṁ ca vikarmaṇā mithyājñānena tamaḥ jñānenaiva param padam—Anubhāṣya*

R. V. De Smet

ŚAṄKARA AND AQUINAS ON CREATION

1. The Cause of the Universe

St. Thomas Aquinas holds that the only access we can have to the Godhead, short of divine revelation, is divine causality. Neither this finite universe nor any of its beings can be sufficiently explained it its existence, activity and positivity unless there exists an absolute Power and universal Cause of being. In order to be that, this Cause must itself be, not a be-ing, one that shares in existence in a limited way, but pure unrestricted *Esse*. The verbal term '*esse*' (to be) is here used absolutely in preference to the verbal noun '*ens*' (being) which, as a participle, would connote finiteness. As pure *Esse*, the world-cause is obviously the Fulness of all positivity, without any division, ontological distinction, graduation, dependence, negation or defect of any kind. Hence, it is single and simple, *having* nothing, but *being* all that can be thought of without an implication of negativity. In it, truth, goodness, power, consciousness, will, power, bliss etc. are not qualities of a more radical substance but are identically the absolute *Esse* and there is no difference between essence and existence. Further, as the universal Cause, it is most intimately present in all its effects, all-poweful, all-knowing and all-loving. The relationship which those terms imply is real only from the side of its effect ; from the side of the Cause itself, it is only logical, i.e., due to the imperfection of our knowledge.

For Śaṅkara also, Brahman is first signified and defined as "that omniscient, omnipotent Cause from which proceed the origin, subsistence and dissolution of this world" (B.S.B., 1.1.2), This is its relational definition (*taṭastha-lakṣaṇa*, which is *sāpekṣa* or *upalakṣaṇa*) but it leads immediately to its essential and unrelational definition (*svarūpa nirapekṣa lakṣaṇa* as pure Power, pure Consciousness, "Reality-Knowledge-infinite" (*Satyam-jñānam-anantam*). Indeed, Brahman could not

be all-knowing and powerful, were it not the absolute Reality that simply is Knowledge and Power. The idea that Brahman is *Esse* is not expressed by using the verb 'to be' as a noun, although Śaṅkara speaks of its 'is-ness' (*astitva*), but by calling it *Sad-eva* (Being only) or *paramā-rthataḥ*) *Sat* (Being in the most elevated sense of the term), or even *Asat* (Non-being, i.e., the opposite of all participial beings). As single, undivided (*akhaṇḍa*, *advaita*) Perfection, it is Fulness (*pūrṇa*) and, therefore, *nirguṇa* (not having qualities, but being them). As the one Cause of the universe, it is the *Ātman* of all (*sarvātman*), i.e., the Reality-Consciousness-Bliss (*Saccidānanda*) Principle that pervades and energises all and whose innermost presence can only be signified by saying that it is seated in the cave of the heart of every creature. To our ignorant mind, it thus appears to be situated and related, but in reality it remains ever free of any real relationship.

2. *Creation according to Aquinas*

The term 'creation' is reserved by Aquinas to designate the divine causation of the world. Since this causation is divine, it is unique and has no real parallels. We can only define it by borrowing terms from the realm of finite causation *on the basis of analogy*. Hence, these terms have to be adapted to this unusual function. This adaptation proceeds in three steps : first,the step of confused affirmation which corresponds to *adhyāsa* (superimposition) : creation is the production of the universe by God ; second, the step of purification or negation (*apavāda*) : this production is unlike any secular production ; third, the step of elevation (*paramārthāpatti*) : creation is the entire emanation of the totality of this universe from the pure *Esse*. Let us examine the last two steps.

The negative definition provided by the second step is as follows : creation is the production by God of a reality that did not exist independently either in itself or in its materials or in any of its elements (*productio rei ex nihilo sui et materiae* : cf. *Summa Theologica*, I, 45). It is a production of reality (*vastu*, *artha*), not of a sheer illusion. It is production in the sense of ontological origination, not of mere manifestation : the thing is produced from previous non-existence *arthasya prāgabhāvāt*), not from a state of latency, dormancy or concealment. In other terms, it exists only as divinely produced. Further, this production is unlike any production of nature or man in this that it presupposes and employs no previous materials or any other constitutive elements : it is *upādānabhūtānāṁ prāgabhāvāt*. The matter of the universe is itself co-created together with the forms in the very creation which is a total causation and not a trans-

formation. However, this does not mean that nothing at all is presupposed by creation. For it is true for Aquinas as well as for Śaṅkara or the author of the *Gītā* that nothing can arise out of absolute nothing (*nāsato vidyate bhāvaḥ* : *Bh. Gītā*, 2,16). Ultimately, for him things can arise only out of the absolute Being. Thus, they preexist virtually in the Power of their Cause, just as they are eternally known by it independently of their actual production. "And as such," writes Aquinas, "creatures preexisting in God are the divine Essence itself" (*Et sic creatura in Deo est ipsa Essentia divina* : *De Potentia*, 3,16,24). Thus Aquinas is a partisan of *satkāryavāda*. However, this must be well understood. If we ask whether the Godhead is the material cause of the world and has been transformed into it, his answer will be an emphatic no (*Summa Theologica*, I, 41, 3). The Godhead is immutable, without parts, untransformable. It is spiritual and, in that sense, immaterial. For Aquinas matter or material cause (*materia*) is of itself non-spiritual (*jaḍa*) and formless; it is but the counterpart of form in material beings; hence, it can never be identified with the divine. But if we were to ask whether the Godhead is the world-*upādāna* in the sense used by Śaṅkara in the same topic, i.e., the innermost Cause that provides the whole substantial reality of the creature, he would fully answer yes. The creature as created, he writes, "is not the essence of God but its essence is from God" (*non est ex essentia Dei, sed est ex Deo essentia*: *Ibid.*, I, 41, 3, 2,). 'For in Him we live and move and are, since we are His very offspring" (*Ibid.*, 1,8,2; 18,4; 18,4,1). How can the creature be from God without being a part or a modification of God? Because it is produced by the sheer power of His intelligent will, by His allmighty command. Since this power is not applied upon any preexisting material which it would have to shape up, it needs no instrument (*Ibid.*, 1,45,5). Since it is the power of the most free will, it is not activitated by any necessity, internal or external to God, whose divinity implies no necessity to create and is independent of anything else (*Summa Contra Gentiles*, II, 30; *S.T.*, Suppl., 91, 1, 2). Since it is the power of the most blissful will, eternally in possession of the absolute Good, it does not create in order to satisfy any unfulfilled desire but through sheer gratuitous liberality (S.C.G., I, 100). Thus nothing accrues to the Creator, neither any self-accomplishment nor any accidental adornment such as a real relationship.

In order to reconcile the two ideas of 'divine' and 'production' we have, in this negative step, eliminated the ordinary connections of 'production' with either pre-existing object or pre-existing matter and with instruments, desirable end, need and necessity, agent's mutability or self-improvement and real relationship. We should further remark that creation is not bound with time. Time is co-created with the

world since it does not precede but follow from its essential mobility and evolving changeability. Whether the world-duration is without beginning or starts from a first instant depends entirely on the Creator's free decision and cannot be settled by any deductive process (*S.T.*, I, 46, 1).

In our third step we can now define creation absolutely and eminently (*paramārthataḥ*) as the free emanation of the whole reality of the universe from the pure *Esse* (cf. *S.T.*, I, 45, 1). Aquinas uses the term 'emanation': flowing out (from *ex*: out of + Indo-European root *mad-*, to bubble, to flow) which in his time was still free of the pantheistic sense given to it by Leibniz. This emanation is free, voluntary, dependent on the sole free decision of the Godhead which has no unfulfilled desire and, hence, it is purely liberal and gratuitous. It is the emanation of the whole reality of the universe, not excepting matter; and it is from the pure *Esse* whose fulness is its Source. The relation of the universe to its Source is a relation of total ontological dependence. Being ontological, it is not contingent and amissible but pertains to the very being of the universe which is necessarily and in every condition relative and inseparable from its immanent though transcendent Cause. This relation is non-reciprocal: real in the creatures, it is only logical in their Cause which it does not affect in any real way.

3. *Creation according to Śaṅkara*

From the writings of Śaṅkara we can also cull elements of information which will amount to a parallel definition of creation. We have already recalled that Brahman is the one total Source of the universe and, therefore, its most pervading Ātman. Since Brahman is "that from whence (*jataḥ*) these beings are born," it is their *upādāna* or immanent and reality-giving cause, as indicated by the ablative case '*yataḥ*'. "There is no other substance from which the world could originate" (B.S.B., 1,4,23). "It is at the same time the *nimitta-kāraṇa*, the shaping or determining Cause, of the world because outside Brahman as immanent Cause there is no other ruling principle for Śruti says that previously to creation Brahman was one without a second" (*Ibid.*) How could Brahman be the world-*upādāna* and provide its reality? Because, "in the beginning, before creation, when the differences of names-and-forms were not yet manifested, this world was but the one Ātman" (*Aitareya Up. Bh.*, 1, 1, 1). As such, the *nāma rūpas* pre-existed only in a virtual state *bhāviṣyena rūpeṇa*), as future effects preexist in the present power of their cause. "These *nāma-rūpas*, which are identical with the Ātman in their

unmanifested state, can become the materials (*upādāna-bhūte*) of the manifested universe. Hence, it is not incongruous to say that the omniscient (Ātman) creates the universe by virtue of his oneness with the materials, namely, names-and-forms, which are identical with itself" (*Ibid.*, 1, 1, 2). However, the manifestation of distinct names-and-forms through creation does not mean that the partless Ātman undergoes a process of diversification. "The case is rather like that of the clever magician who, independent of any materials, transforms himself, as it were (*iva*), into a second man seemingly climbing into space" (*Ibid.*) Further, "What *Śruti* calls *ajā*, i.e., the causal matter of the four classes of beings, has itself sprung from the highest Lord" (B.S.B., 1, 4, 9). Creation presupposes "no independent matter, unreducible to the Ātman, such as the *Pradhāna* of the Sāṅkhyas or the primordial atoms of Kaṇāda" (*Ait. Up. Bh.*, 1, 1, 1).

As *nimitta-kāraṇa*, the Brahman-Ātman creates through an intelligent decision: "That Ātman who, being omniscient by nature, can think without body and thinking organs, being then the only Existent, thought, 'Let me now create worlds, and, having thus thought, i.e., considered or visualized those worlds, he created them after that deliberation" (*Ibid.*, 1,1, 2). "Passages like, 'He wished, may I be many, etc.,' show that the Ātman is the agent in the independent activity which follows his reflection" (B.S.B., 1, 4, 24). This intelligent wishing does not imply any active change (*pravṛtti*) in the Ātman himself. "A thing which is devoid of motion (*pravṛtti-rahita*), for instance, a magnet, can nevertheless be a *pravartaka*, i. e., stir other things into activity . . . So the Lord also, who is immanent in all, the Ātman of all, the all-knower and the all-power, can, although immune of motion set the whole world into activity" (*evaṁ pravṛtti-rahito' pīśvaraḥ sarvagataḥ sarvātmā sarvajñaḥ sarvaśaktiś-ca san sarvaṁ pravartayet*: B.S.B., 2,2,2).

This intelligent Source is universally immanent in real existents but the being of the latter is wholly relative; they are neither parts nor modifications of the Ātman but only external adjuncts (*upādhis*) of which he is the causal substrate: " the Ātman should be realised as Existing, as productive of effects in which existence inheres (*sat-kārya*), namely, buddhi, etc., which are his *upādhis*" (*Kaṭha Up. Bh.*, 2, 3, 13). " *Prāṇa*, the life-Breath, (i.e., the Ātman), is equal to all these bodies of white ants, mosquitoes, elephants, ete., in the sense that it is present in them in its entirety (*kartsnyena-parisamāpta*), somehow as cowness (*gotva*) is present in each individual cow. But it cannot be merely of the size of those bodies for it is formless and all-pervading" (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up. Bh.*, 1, 3, 22). It is because of this causal presence of the whole transcendent Ātman in each being that they share with him, though

altogether differently, the universal *sattā* (real-ity) (Cf., e,g., *Taittirīya, Up.* Bh., 2, 1, 1).

When creating the Ātman needs no instruments : "the absolutely complete power of Brahman does not require to be supplemented by any extraneous help...; his high power is revealed as manifold, as inherent, acting as force and knowledge" (B.S.B., 2, 1, 24). He creates "like gods etc., who, without availing themselves of any extraneous means, produce palaces, etc. by their mere intention, which is effective in consequence of those beings' peculiar power" (*Ibid.*, 2, 1, 25).

The wish which Śruti attributes to the creating Ātman must not be understood as alike to the wants and needs which impel us to action. "Desires cannot thus impel Brahman. How then (are they found in it?) As essentially Reality-Knowledge, and as pure in virtue of their being their own Ātman; and, as such, they do not impel Brahman..... Therefore, Brahman is independent in its volitions; hence, it does not want things as yet unattained." (*Taitt. Up. Bh.*, 2, 6, 1). "We see in everyday life that certain doings of princes or other men of high position who have no unfulfilled desire left have no reference to any extraneous purpose, but proceed from mere sportfulness... Analogously, the activity of the Lord may be supposed to be mere sport (*līlā*), proceeding from his own nature without reference to any purpose.... And if in ordinary life we might possibly, by close scrutiny, detect some subtle motive even for sportful action, we cannot do so with regard to the actions of the Lord, all whose wishes are fulfilled, as Śruti says" (B.S,B., 2, 1, 33). Yet, though creating is in no way useful to the Creator, it is useful to the creatures since "it is performed for their welfare" (*Bh. Gītā Bh.*, 3, 24).

The relation of the effects to their divine Cause is called *tādātmya* (having that as one's ātman). "It is an accepted principle, even in the world, that an effect is intimately dependent (*anuvidhāyin*) on its (internal) cause" (*Bṛ. Ār. Up. Bh.*, 1, 5, 14). This relation must be said to be real in the effects for "as long as an effect subsists, it is impossible to assume the dissolution of its (internal) cause, since on the dissolution of the latter the effect also cannot exist. On the other hand, we may assume a continued existence of the cause although the effect is destroyed; for that is actually observed in the case of clay" (B.S.B., 2, 3, 14). Hence, that relation is not real in both terms. It is not reciprocal. *Tādātmya* is often thought to mean absolute identify of its two terms but, "if absolute equality were insisted on, the relation of inner cause and effect would be annihilated....(If you were to demand that not only *sattā* but all the characteristics of Brahman should be found in the effect if the latter has to be non-different

(*ananya* from its cause), this demand would lead to the negation of the relation of cause and effect which is based on the presence in the cause of an excellence (not found in the effect)" (*Ibid*, 2, 1, 6). "Names and forms in all their states have Brahman alone as their Ātman, but Brahman has not its Ātman in them (in other words, this *tādātmya* is not mutual). Since without this (Brahman) they simply do not exist, they are said to have their Ātman in it (*tad-ātmaka*). And it is because of these two *upādhis* (*nāma* and *rūpa*) that Brahman is related to all mundane activities which imply the significations of the words 'knower', 'knowable', 'knowledge', etc." (*Taitt, Up. Bh.*, 2, 6, 1). "Of the effect it is understood that in reality it is non-different (*ananyat*) from the Cause, i.e., has no existence apart from the Cause (*vyatirekeṇā-' bhavaḥ*)". This theory of *tādātmya* "does away with the independent (*svābhāvikā*) existence of the embodied ātman ... and of the world" (B.S.B., 2, 1, 14).

On the other hand, it is because Brahman is the absolute Existent (*Sat*), what Aquinas would call the pure *Esse*, that it can emanate a full universe freely and without being affected by it. "It is a matter of common experience in this world that anything from which something is produced does exist, as, for instance, clay, the cause of jars, aud seed, the cause of sprouts. So Brahman does exist, since it is the Cause of space, etc. Nor is any effect perceived in this world as having been produced from nothing at all (*asataḥ*). If effects, such as names-and-forms, had originated from nothing, they could not be perceived for lack of ātman (*nirātmakatvāt*); but they are perceived, hence, Brahman exists. Should any effect originate from nothing, then, even though perceived, it would be imbued with unreality; but this is not the case, hence, Brahman exists." (*Taitt. Up. Bh.*, 2, 6, 1).

Such is Śaṅkara's theory of creation. The universe exists only because in all its elements, including matter, it is freely originated from Brahman which is the universal Ātman. *Tādātmya* signifies that constant ontological dependence which implies the pervading causal presence of Brahman in all other beings. These exist by the power of its free command. They neither add to nor do they subtract anything from the fulness of their Cause. Their real relation to it is not reciprocal. And this Cause is not an intermediary Īśvara but the one Brahman-Ātman, the supreme Existent, that remains *nirguṇa* and *nirapekṣa* even though its creating makes it appear to our ignorant minds as *saguṇa* and *sāpekṣa.* I have been struck by the close similarity between the creation theory of Aquinas and that of Śaṅkara. Their critical acceptance of their respective scriptural authorities and their outstanding metaphysical genius may explain this remarkable encounter of two philosopher-saints who have blazed for us the difficult paths towards wisdom.

Frederic H. Young

HISTORICAL SURVEY OF ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA

The history of Oriental philosophy in America, is a fascinating story; but it has not often received systematic treatment. In preparing this lecture I was delighted to discover that this story was both longer in time, and deeper in range, than I had anticipated; and I think you will be equally and happily impressed as was I. It is apropos to define my line of direction in offering this survey; and so I here state that I shall be presenting Oriental philosophy in America, not in terms of the ideas involved, but rather in terms of exhibiting the thinkers, books, and journals that have been involved.

Definition of the term "Oriental" is also in point, here at the outset. For purposes of this occasion, I stipulate the word "Oriental" to be understood as referring only briefly to the Near East's contribution to American thought. As everyone knows, the religions of Judaism Christianity, and Islam, have, along with their philosophical impacts, profoundly penetrated all Western thought and belief, including of course, the United States of America. I shall here be referring primarily to the Middle East and Far East's influence in American thought. And I must add further, that even within this frame of reference I shall be speaking more frequently of Indian influence than of Chinese and Japanese, not because I am trying to flatter an Indian audience, but am simply recording a factual report of the situation; for Hindu philosophy has in truth made, according to my knowledge and judgment, the dominant impression among the different Oriental impacts in America.

In the larger sense, Occidental and Oriental thought have been in closer touch than is generally assumed. An increasing number of scholars in the West are finding more and more internal, if not external, evidence of Oriental stimulation. To state it most comprehensively, this Oriental stimulation has been variously Indic, Arabic,

Iranic, and Hebraic. In the Bible—which is the most universally known book in Western civilization—is found the supreme illustration of the Near East Asian impact upon Western humanity ; furthermore, the theological and philosophical systems built in part upon the Bible, reflect, especially in Jewish and Islamic theology and philosophy, the continued influence of Near East origins.

Coming directly to the main topic—the history of Oriental philosophy in America—we find the real development beginning in that movement known as Transcendentalism. It was then that Oriental, and especially Indian thought, made its entrance into America. It is significant to note that in the early years of the Transcendentalist movement, the American Oriental Society was founded, in 1842. This Society began publishing its *Journal* in 1843, which has been published continuously to the present date. In its pages have appeared many articles indeed on Indian and Chinese philosophy.

Ralph Waldo Emerson, greatest of the Transcendentalists, was also the greatest Orientalist of his time in America. He was the father of Comparative Literature, Comparative Religion, and Comparative Philosophy, in the United States. He was well-read, in Persian poetry and in the Chinese classics, but most of all in Hinduism. His study of the *Bhagavad-Gita* proved to be a powerful stimulus in arousing the interest of his friends in Indian literature, philosophy, and religion, including Thoreau, Alcott, Margaret Fuller, Channing, and Parker, and the celebrated bard of Democracy, Walt Whitman.

I would like to show Emerson's profound, intuitive response to Indian inspiration, by quoting from a letter by him to his friend, Samuel Ward :

> "...there was nothing for me but to read the Vedas, the bible of the tropics, which I find I come back upon every three or four years. It is sublime as heat and night and a breathless ocean. It contains every religious sentiment...It is no use to put away the book (i.e., the Vedas) : if I trust myself in the woods or in a boat upon the pond, nature makes a Brahmin of me presently : eternal necessity, eternal compensation, unfathomable power, unbroken silence—this is her creed."

And I cannot refrain from quoting the last two verses of his celebrated poem, entitled "Brahma."

> "They reckon ill who leave me out ;
> When me they fly, I am the wings ;

I am the doubter and the doubt,
And I the hymn the Brahmin sings.

"The strong gods pine for my abode,
And pine in vain the sacred seven;
But thou, meek lover of the good;
Find me, and turn thy back on heaven."

The interest in Oriental thought generated by Transcendentalism found, after the Civil War, 1861-1865, further expression in *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, founded by the Hegelian thinker, William T. Harris. This Journal, incidentally, was the first philosophical journal, not only in America, but in the English speaking world. In its pages American readers and students were kept informed of all major news pertaining to translations of, or commentaries upon, Oriental philosophy; for example, Colebrooke's *Sankhya-Karika* was reprinted, circulated, and discussed in philosophical circles and clubs.

America's leading literary magazines, such as *The Atlantic Monthly*, *The Nation*, *The Century*, *Harper's Athenaeum*, besides half a dozen more, printed a tremendous number of articles on Buddhism, on the *Vedas*, the *Upanishads*, the *Bhagavad-Gita*, as well as on works of Confucius and Lao-Tsze. Developments in India such as Ram Mohun Roy's Brahmo Samaj, Devendranath Tagore's and Keshub Chander Sen's promotion of reforms within Hinduism, as well as Chandra Mazumdar's visit to America, all worked conjointly in arousing widespread interest in the culture and intellectual achievements of India. In 1893, at the Chicago Exposition, was convened the Parliament of Religions, at which Swami Vivekananda, of the Ramakrishna Order, spoke, provoking a remarkable response on the part of those who heard him, both at the Exposition and subsequently in major American cities from coast to coast.

A while back I spoke of the founding of the American Oriental Society in 1842, and of its famous Journal. In the post Civil War period, or about 1870, other journals such as *The American Historical Review*, *Bibliotheca Sacra*, and the *American Journal of Philology*, began to devote space to the consideration of Oriental literature, languages, and thought. From the definitely restricted viewpoint of academic philosophy, there occurred a setback when movements such as Yoga Institutes, anthroposophy, Rosicrucianism, and theosophy were introduced. However sincere, and to whatever degree they were authentic expressions in their original form, they soon became passing fads of fashion in America. The missionaries of such movements sometimes pandered to a taste for the occult rather than to the intellectual

integrity needed for high spiritual discipline. The fantastical pretensions of these fads, and the exploitation through esoteric symbols and rituals, of the human hunger for probing the mysterious and even the magical, combined to keep true scholars from confessing any concern for such activities. But this, fortunately, was only a temporary depression.

An important date is 1854, when William D. Whitney was installed as the first Professor of Sanskrit, in America, at Yale University. Soon, American publishers were including in their lists of books the titles of works by such Indologists as Max Müller and Rhys David; while in the 1880's there came to America a remarkable German, Paul Carus, who proved to be the most conversant with Oriental philosophy since Emerson. In his two periodicals, *The Monist*, and *The open Court*, he gave generous space to the presentation of Oriental philosophies and religions. Well into the present century, these periodicals have continued to be a major source of knowledge of the thought of mid-eastern and far-eastern Asia.

Scholarship in Europe concerning Oriental contributions to the world's philosophies began to be felt in America near the beginning of this century. Deussen's great work, in Germany, on the *Upanishads*, produced reverberations in American circles. Williams James, in his classic, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, used copious illustrations from the sages and seers of India. In fact, Pragmatism created such an interest in the psychology of religion that courses in this field were introduced into American universities. At Harvard University, Lanman and Warren introduced a journal known as *The Harvard Oriental Series*. It is important to note, in passing, that Josiah Royce at Harvard, known as the greatest of American Hegelians and brilliant expounder of absolute idealism in metaphysics, was a deep student of Indian thought, and incorporated basic elements therefrom, into his system.

It was not, however, until after World War I, that teachers of philosophy commenced to realize the vast riches in Oriental thought and literature. Pragmatists and Empiricists were attracted to the naturalism of Chinese thought, while the Idealists were drawn to Indian philosophies. One or two American colleges began to offer students a chance for specialization in Asian philosophy—whether Indian, Buddhist, or Chinese. At Oberlin College in Ohio, Professor MacLennan imparted knowledge in this great field of study to students such as Ethel Kitch, Kurt Leidecker, and Y. P. Mei (distinguished Chinese scholar). And if one were to consult the publication entitled, *Doctoral Dissertations Accepted by American Universities*, for the first third

of this 20th century, he would find a growing number of works devoted to the exposition of themes from Oriental philosophies.

The leading American theological and philosophical journals began now, at Harvard, Chicago, Cornell, Columbia, Yale, Univ. of California, to gather and publish much solid, scholarly material in the Asian field. There were such journals as *The Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, *Speculum* (published by the Mediaeval Academy of America), *The Far Eastern Quarterly* (at Columbia), *The Moslem World* (at Hartford Seminary), and *Isis* (again at Harvard), all of which pursued studies in the vastly rich jungle of Asian thought and culture.

On the more popular side, general magazines such as POET LORE, and ASIA, published—though admittedly appealing to the layman primarily—occasional essays of high quality. General news, literary, and religious magazines also carried a number of notes about, and references to, and reviews of, Asian works, writers, and thinkers. I recall reading an article of great length and quality on Daisetz Suzuki, the great scholar of Zen Buddhism, in that sophisticated magazine, THE NEW YORKER! The only popular, non-technical organ at present devoted entirely to Indian thought, is, so far as I can discover, VEDANTA AND THE WEST, published in my home state of California, at Los Angeles.

On the scholarly front again, we find Sanskritists such as Walter E. Clark, Maurice Bloomfield, Franklin Edgerton, Edward Washburn Hopkins, Daniel Ingalls, and Eugene W. Burlingame. Among Sinologists we find Creel, Hummel, and Derk Bodde. Also, comparative religionists like Clarence Hamilton and Eustace Haydon; skilled interpreters of Indian art such as Ananda Coomaraswamy and Ernest Fenollosa; librarians, like Albert J. Edmunds; men of letters such as Lafcadio Hearn and Moncure Conway;—all these belong to the goodly company who have brought Asian art and thought to America with devotion, power, and knowledge. Moreover, these individual scholars were supplemented by a few journals of high technical competence which print important articles and monographs and Oriental philosophy: I mention *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, *The Journal of the History of Ideas*, and paramount in value in this special area, *Philosophy: East and West*, sponsored by the University of Hawaii.

Professors of philosophy have been making contributions to the pursuit of Oriental studies. As early as 1876, C. D. B. Mills of the St. Louis, Missouri, school of philosophy, wrote a work on Budda and Buddhism. Royce, as I said previously, used Indian elements in cons-

tructing his imposing metaphysic of absolute idealism. George Santayana also exhibited insights gained from his Asian studies. Arthur William Ryder was a scholar who was both linguistically and philosophically competent, giving us superb translations of sanskrit works; while James Haughton Woods at Harvard, performed important studies of Patanjali's Yoga system. Other noted American scholars seriously concerned with Indian pbilosophy, were, or are, Lovejoy, Brightman, Conger, Schneider, Schaub, Burtt, Robinson, Leidecker, Northrop, and the late Charles Moore, founder and chairman of the East-West Conferences in Philosophy convened once in each decade, at the University of Hawaii, at which your own Professor Mahadevan has been a delegate.

The Fulbright program, conducted by the United States Department of State, has, along with other educational foundations, exchanges, and grants, made it possible for various American professors and students to visit India, to study and lecture here in person. Among those so privileged I may include myself, since, in 1958-59, I was a Fulbright lecturer at major universities all over India, including a six-week stay at this University of Madras. But, as my topic is Oriental thought in America, I must turn for a moment to name some of your scholars who have made in person, their high contributions in presenting Indian philosophy to America. I speak of such men as your own T.M.P. Mahadevan, Dasgupta, Malalasekara, S. C. Chatterjee, and Sri Sarvapali Radhakrishnan.

At the institutional level, many valuable things have been happening. There are now regular courses, and summer institutes, in Indian languages, literature, religion, and philosophy, offered at many American universities and colleges. May I cite a personal illustration? At Chapman College in California, I introduced the course on "The Philosophies of India", and am now teaching this course on the ship of World Campus Afloat, sponsored by the same Chapman College.

Turning now to publications again, I mention helpful surveys published by the American Council of Learned Societies, from time to time, under the title, *Indic Studies in America* (first one in 1939), and *Southern Asia Studies in the United States* (in 1951). Exceedingly helpful source material is now available, such as Radhakrishnan and Moore's *A Source Book in Indian Philosophy*, Emenau's *A Union List of Printed Indic Texts and Translations in American Libraries* (1935), and the listings of books and Asian periodicals in that superb journal, *Philosophy: East and West.*

Channels of communication concerning exchanges, grants, congresses, lectures, and publications, are kept open in "News of the Profession" section of the *Far Eastern Quarterly*, as also in the "News and Notes" part of *Philosophy: East and West*. Conferences on the teaching of Oriental philosophy have been held, In Upper Montclair, New Jersey, the New Jersey State College has been host to a China Institute each summer for over fifteen years. Our national philosophical society, The American Philosophical Association, is hearing an increasing number of papers at the annual sessions, devoted to some aspect of Oriental philosophy.

Perhaps the chief avenues by which we are made conscious of Hindu religion and thought in America, are the Ramakrishna Centers in our leading American cities, whose leaders are swamis of that Order whose headquarters are at Belur, in Bengal, and at the Ramakrishna Mission of Culture, in Calcutta. These swamis are usually men of high thought and scholarship, as evidenced by their publications. Swami Nikilananda of New York City, who aided me so wisely in preparing me for my first lecture tour of India in 1958, has been author of widely read books on Vedantic doctrines. Also, the Sri Aurobindo Center and Library in New York has been active in arousing interest in the synthetic system, or integralism, of the sage of Pondichery.

This brings the history of Oriental thought in America to the present time. As we look back over this story, we must be impressed, I believe, by the length and breadth and depth, of the American interest in the thought of Asia, especially of India. Recently an American Academy of Asian Studies was organized in San Francisco, while Oriental Institutes are flourishing, in summer sessions, in major American universities from the Atlantic to the Pacific. These Institutes are offering courses in Indian, Chinese, and Japanese linguistics, archaelogy, economics, civilization, religion, literature, arts, and philosophy.

May I bring this lecture to its close by speaking of my own experience of growing contact with Oriental, and more specifically, Indian thought? It began in my undergraduate days when I read the *Bhagavad-Gita*, which, seemed to me then, and does now, to possess an inexpressible greatness of spiritual elevation. In later student days, when I was studying philosophy at the Princeton University Graduate School, I had the joy of listening to Sri Radhakrishnan who, to our small seminar group, spoke to us with his genius for golden phrase, comprehensive vision, and spiritual greatness. In further graduate studies at Columbia University

I listened to Dr. Fung Yo-Lan discourse on Chinese philosophy. I also heard Dr. Suzuki, world-renowned Zen Buddhist scholar, at the Ramakrishna Center in New York City. But always I found myself drawn back to the probing depths and heights of Indian speculation, in the masterpieces of Indian thought—the *Vedas*, the *Upanishads*, and the commentaries of great thinkers like Śankara. The belief which has impressed me most deeply is the Vedantic doctrine of the identity of the *atman* in each individual, with the *para-atman*, or Brahman. I continued my studies by reading Tagore, S. C. Chatterjee, Hiriyanna, Dasgupta, Sri Radhakrishnan, and Sri Aurobindo. And now I conclude with a quotation from Whitman's "Passage to India.

> "Passage to India!
>
> Lo, soul, seest thou not God's purpose from the first?
>
> The earth to be spanned, connected by network ...
>
> The oceans to be cross'd, the distant brought near,
>
> The lands to be welded together."

C. Ramalingam

DETERMINISM AND MORAL FREEDOM

An Examination of some Reflections on Moral Responsibility

Paulweiss in his paper '*Comon-sense and Beyond*' has made the following observations. In his opinion contemporary discussion of the problem of determinism and freedom rests on a number of unexamined assumptions. These must be brought to work modified or replaced, if we are to make progress. To contend that men are determined and now are free seem opposed. "Determinism applies to what has happened when all the conditions are already present and fulfilled. Freedom applies to what is happening and will happen ; it concerns the creation of new conditions and thus of consequences that until then have not been necessitated.

Most discussions of freedom do not distinguish among (1) Freedom *from* (2) freedom *to* (3) freedom *for* and (4) freedom *with*.

Freedom From : If men are subject to unusual or unconventional restraints they act under compulsion. When these restraints are removed they are free. A released slave is a free man.

Freedom To : It is the power to act either inwardly as one who wills or outwardly as one who can outwardly express his wishes or carry out duties and obligations. One who wishes to take drugs is free to take them.

Freedom For : This is the power to commit oneself to an *end* and to work to bring it about. This end may be set by society or the state. One's commitment may be due to the intented factors and environmental forces. Men are at their best when they have been made free for a civilized life of man.

Freedom With: We are men in a society and men in a cosmos. We are free only when we are in harmony with equally free fellow men. Each of these types of freedom has a number of distinct cases. The second and third types are interesting and most germane to questions of morality and ethics. Freedom of preference refers to the selection of some means to an accepted goal, good or bad. Freedom of choice concerns the formation of a single unity of means and end, where the end promises to make good whatever loss in value the means involve. Freedom of will, finally, is related to the adoption of a final good in such a way as to necessitate a fresh approach.

Paul Edwards in his paper contributed to the symposium on 'Determinism and Freedom in the age of Modern Science' has adopted the distinction introduced by Campbell in his article 'Is free-will a Pseudo Problem?' (Mind, 1951) Campbell distinguishes two conceptions of Moral Responsibility. First there is the ordinary unreflective person who is ignorant and is not greatly concerned with theories of Science, Philosophy and Religion. To him, it should be made sure weather the agent to be judged was acting under coercion or constraint. If he is, he is responsible. If, on other hand, he acted on his own quite unimpeded, then assumption of moral responsibility is justified. Besides these unreflective persons, there are those who have reached "a tolerably advanced level of reflection". These would require that the agent was not coerced or constrained, that he "could have chosen otherwise than he actually did". Here Paul Edwards adds that the Agent " originally chose his character"—character that now displays itself in his choice and desires and efforts. Campbell concludes that determinism is indeed compatible with judgments of moral responsibility in the unreflective sense, but that it is incompatible with judgments of moral rrsponsibility in the reflective sense. Paul Edwards rightly points out that it is not a question of the different senses in which the term is used by ignorant and unreflective people on the one hand, and by those who are concerned with the developments in the fields of Science, Religion and Philosophy. Both the reflective and the unreflective are found to use in certain contexts in the one sense and in other contexts in the other. Nearly all human beings employ the unreflective conception when they are swayed by violent emotions like anger, hate or prejudice. On the other hand a good man employs the reflective conception when uninfluenced by emotions. Paul Edwards observes that a moral judgment must be "impersonal" and also be independent of violent emotions. He adds that the judgment was moral only if framed in a calm and reflective state of mind. He says that from the fact that human beings do not ultimately shape their own character it follows that they are never morally

responsible. He guards himself against any misunderstanding of this remark by explaining what he means. The words "follow" or "imply" are akin to the sense in which a conclusion is deducible from the premises.

John Hospers in his papers contributed to the symposium has outlined several criteria of moral responsibiliiy and discussed them. He has concentrated on these conditions of the 'inner state'.

Responsibility is determined by the presence or absence of pre-meditation as against the "unthinking" or "impulsive". This cannot be agreed upon because some acts though not pre-meditated are responsible and some of those pre-meditated are not responsible. It may be added that a free act need not be reflective, for it might be impulsive as jumping in a river to rescue a drowning man. It involves no contradiction to say that a man on a particular occasion acted freely, responsibly and on impulse. We rush across the street to save the victim of an automobile collision. Here it is like a reflex action. But the behaviour is responsible. This act on the part of the person may be due to the training he has received. As Aristotle would put it virtue has become second nature through constant practice or habit. Sometimes, pre-meditation may not issue in action at all as for instance in the cases of neurotic individuals or persons who suffer from confusion.

A person is not responsible for his act unless he can defend it with reasons. This is no better than the previous one. Intellectuals could adduce many reasons than mon-intellectuals. What about persons who act from moral conviction? Moreover the motive of reasons itself may camourflage unconscious motives of which the agent knows nothing. Hamlet gave many reasons for not doing what he felt as his duty. His reasons contradicted one another.

A person is responsible for his action, unless it is the result of unconscious forces of which he knows nothing. Psychoanalysis would probably accept this criterion. Most people are unaware of the unconscious motives and unconscious conflicts determining human behaviour. If they become aware it is likely that they would refrain from holding persons responsible for certain actions. If this is accepted many actions will get excluded from the domain of responsibility. It may be contended that even our desire to change our behaviour may have its source in our unconscious life.

A person is responsible for his act unless it is compelled. It is difficult to state what compulsion means. When Psychoanalysis says that a man was compelled by unconscious conflicts to wash his hands

constantly, it cannot be literally understood. Nobody forced his hands under the lap. This is what Psychologists called " Compulsive Behaviour " It is inevitable for him. It is like a reaction to powerful external force. It is not within his conscious control. Infants cannot be held responsible for their action. Even so adults who indulge in compulsive actions cannot be found responsible because they are the consequences of infantile situations.

Man's responsibility for an act can be measured by the degree to which that act can be changed by the use of reason. A person who washes his hands constantly does so for hygienic reasons. He believes that if he does not do so, he will be poisoned by germs. We should expect the criteria outlined above call for extensive knowledge of Psychiatry. No one creterion is used to the exclusion of others. John Hospers, even after making these distinctions, says that in final analysis the question remains " whether we are responsible for any of our actions at all ". He puts it " How can any one be responsible for his actions since they grow out of his character, which is shaped and moulded and made what it is by influences—some hereditary, but most of them stemming from early parental environment—that were not of his own making or choosing " ?. This arises from a deeper sense, in which we are not responsible for our actions, since we are not responsible for the character out of which those actions spring. John Hospers quotes Matson ("The irrelevance of Free-Will to Moral Responsibility") and concludes that we did not cause our characters and that what we are is because of the influences over which we had no control. He answers the charge that may be made against him that he is deterministic by analysing certain confusions which underly the charge. Roderick W. Chisholm has furnished an explicit formulation of the reasoning of Edwards and Hospers. This may be usefully adopted for our consideration.

1. If a choice is one we could have avoided making, then it is one for which we are not morally responsible.

2. If we make a choice under conditions such that, given those conditions, it is (casually but not logically) impossible for a choice not to be made then the choice is one we could not have avoided making.

3. Every event occurs under conditions such that given those conditions it is (casually but not logically) impossible for that even not to occur.

4. The making of a choice is the occurrence of an event.

5. We are not morally responsible for any of our choices.

The dilemma that emerges when the above statements are scrutinised is Either our choices have sufficient causal conditions or they do not; if they do have sufficient causal conditions they are not avoidable if they do not, they are fortuitous or capricious; and therefore since our choices are either unavoidable or fortuitous we are not morally responsible for them.

Elizabeth Beardslay finds the thesis set forth by C. A. Campbell and Edward useful. People differ with regard to their reflectiveness concerning the problem of relating the concepts of cause and moral blame. She distinguishes four degrees or levels of reflective means. In the hierarchy at the bottom there are those who do not insist on the act being voluntary before the agent is blamed. At the second level are the individuals termed " unreflective " by Edwards. For these the voluntariness of an act is a condition of the blame-worthiness of the agent. They ask questions regarding the immediate causes of act. They do not proceed further. At the third level are those reflective persons disturbed by several considerations. They pursue their enquiry into remote causal conditions leading to the choice and reach a stage when they find that there are factors which do not relate to the voluntary acts. They make one of two drastic moves. Either they retain the notions of moral blame and responsibility abandoning the view that all acts of choosing have causal antecedents or being convinced that acts of choice have their antecedents, abandon the notions of moral blame and responsibility. At the fourth level are those who see both the force and flaws of the arguments advanced at the third level.

The premises are (1) that we are not morally responsible for acts unless they are voluntary. (2) that for many of the causes of our acts we are not morally responsible. All these are sufficient to yield the conclusion that we are not morally responsible for our voluntary acts.

Bhikkhu Ñāṇajīvako
(*Cedomil Veljacic*)

WHY IS BUDDHISM A RELIGION?

The purpose of the present paper is to single out from the discourses of the Buddho (Pāḷi *Sutta-piṭakaṁ*) the texts which best represent his attitude to religion in general and in its specific aspects. This documentary material, with a short explanation of the criteria for its selection, represents only a preliminary work for an essay intended to proceed to the analysis of problems implicitly contained in the present *prima facie* documentation.

The selected texts are divided in three groups :

I. Texts indicating that the specific teaching of the Buddho abstracts from any belief in revealed truths beyond the reach of our direct knowledge and potential experience.

II. Texts abstracting from the belief in an eternal, omnipotent and transcendent Absolute Being or God, and rejecting, at least, his absolutist and eternalist attributes.

III. Texts basic for the teaching on *anattā*, or negation of a permanent Self or Soul (*ātaman, jīva, pudgala*—Sanskrit terms used in religious teachings of his time in India).

It can be seen already from this classificatory survey that a negative, or at least critical, attitude to the traditional understanding of religion is emphasized in the selected texts. If this *prima facie* documentation can be considered sufficient to justify the title of the paper, in demonstrating the fact that a primordial and essential religious character of the teaching of the Buddho is questionable, its necessary consequence will be the requirement, postulated in the second part of the essay, to revise the definition of religion, and, implicitly, to analyse its relation to philosophy, in order to eliminate, first of all, the tendentious and sophisticated dilemma : Is the *Buddha-dhammo* a religion *OR* a philosophy?

In the present documentary paper it will be possible only to draft the scope of this analytical task in shortest possible terms, resulting from the salient points of the selected texts.

Texts

I

(1) *Udānaṃ, V*, 3, contains the standard formulation of an often repeated statement by which the Buddho has most clearly marked the difference between the tenets of religiosity in general—as far as adopted also by him as a common cultural heritage—and his own teaching, or more correctly "the teaching specific to the *buddhas par excellence*" *yā buddhānaṃ samukkaṃsikā dhammadesanā*): The Buddho "for the sake of Suppabuddho, leper, gave a gradual instruction dealing with almsgiving, virtue, heaven; with the danger, debasement and defilement inherent in sensual pleasures; and the advantage of renunciation. And when the Lord knew that the mind of Suppabuddho, the leper, was ready, softened, freed from obstructions, elated and clear, then he explained those *dhamma*—teachings which are essential to the *buddhas*: suffering, its arising, its ending, the way."[1]

In whatever terms the *Buddha-dhammo* may be defined, whether as philosophy or as religion, or else as victim of any other encyclopaedic classification, its proper understanding should remain both within the positive and the negative terms of this essential scope.

(2) This attitude towards, and not identification with, the standard requirements of religion and morality, even within the limits of his own teaching, is further specified by the Buddho in his restriction of moral and religious *heteronomy* (dependence), technically called *sīla-bbata-parāmāsa*, whose widest meaing is extended, beyond any possibility of exegetic doubt, also to the purport of the moral precepts (*sīlam*) in the basic text of the *Brahma-jāla-suttaṁ* (D. 1) as follows: "It is in respect only of such less important and inferior things concerning injunctions of moral conduct that a worldly man, when praising the Tathāgato, would speak. And what are such less important and inferior things concerning injunctions of moral conduct that he would praise?—Giving up the killing of living beings *samaṇo* Gotamo abstains from the destruction of life...from taking what is not given...from unchastity...from lying words....from wrong means of livelihood... But there are other mental states, deep, difficult to perceive, difficult to understand, peaceful, subtle, not to be attained by means of mere logic, accomplished, to be comprehended only by the wise......"

(3) Direct reference to the technical term *sīla-bbata-parāmāso* as a "fetter" on the way of spiritual liberation is contained in the following statement from *Sabbāsava-suttaṁ* (M. 2) (repeated in several other texts): "For him who has penetrated to the origin of suffering, to the origin of the arising of suffering, to the origin of the cessation of suffering, to the origin of the way leading to the cessation of suffering, three fetters are eliminated: the embodiment view, uncertainty, and moral and religious heteronomy (*sīla-bbata-parāmāso*)."

Some of the following texts will show it more extensively how the Buddho—while stressing the moral and religious prerequisites for the deeper understanding of his own teaching—intends to subordinate, in the traditional hierarchy of values, the purport of religious elements under the primacy of rationally evident moral precepts.

(4) While in the preceding text the stress was laid on the autonomy of *conscience* as prerequisite for understanding the specific teaching of the Buddho, in the following text—*Mahā-taṇhā-saṅkhayasuttaṁ* ("Greater discourse on the destruction of craving", M. 38)—the same idea of autonomy finds a still wider explicit extension over the whole range of *consciousness*, in the formulation of the *autonomy of intellectual understanding*:

—Would you, bhikkhus, knowing and seeing thus, say: "The teacher is respected by us. We speak out of respect for the teacher"?

—No, venerable sir.

—...Or would you say: "A monk told us so, and other monks did too, but we do not speak thus"?

—No, venerable sir.

—...Or would you acknowledge another teacher?

—No, venerable sir.

—...Or would you return to the ordinary monks' and brāhmans' practices and festival exhibitions, and consider these to be the essence?

—No, venerable sir.

—Do you speak only of what you have yourself known, seen and experienced?

—Yes, venerable sir.

—Good, bhikkhus. So you have been guided by me with this *dhammo* (true teaching) with effect visible here and now, not delayed, inviting inspection, onward leading, to be understood individually by the wise.

(5) Among the best known expressions of the postulate of moral and intellectual autonomy the following statements from the *Dhammapadaṁ* are quoted :

"Make an island for yourself, strive hard and be wise...(238)

"You yourself should make an effort; the Awakened Ones can only show the way...(276)

"A man defiles himself through his evil action. He purifies himself by avoiding evil. Purity and impurity depend on oneself. No one can purify another." (165)

"One oneself is the guardian of oneself. What other guardian would there be? With oneself fully controled, one obtains a refuge which is hard to gain." (160)

(6) The most extensive analysis of the problem of "faith", "belief", "trust" or "confidence" — as the term *saddhā* uses to be translated in Pāḷi contexts, as a designation for "religion" — is given by the Buddho in the dialogue with the young brāhman Kāpaṭhiko, in the *Caṅkisuttaṁ* (M. 95) : "...The brāhman youth Kāpaṭhiko spoke thus to the Lord :

— Master Gotamo, that which is an ancient *mantraṁ* of the brāhmans, transmitted by oral tradition, like a basket handed over from one to the other, and with regard to which brāhmans are unanimous in drawing the conclusion : "This alone is the truth, all else is falsehood" — what does Master Gotamo say about this?

— But, Bhāradvājo, is there even one brāhman among them who speaks thus : "I know this, I see this ; this only is the truth, all else is falsehood ?"

— No, Master Gotamo.

But, Bhāradvājo, is there even one teacher of brāhmans, even one teacher of teachers back through seven generations of teachers who speaks thus : "I know this, I see this ; this only is the truth, all else is falsehood"?

— No, Master Gotamo.

— But, Bhāradvājo, those who were formerly seers of the brāhmans, original makers and transmitters of *mantras*, whose ancient *mantras* as sung, taught and composed the brāhmans of today still sing, still speak; they still speak what was spoken, they still teach what was taught by Aṭṭhako, Vāmako, Vāmadevo, Vessāmitto, Yamataggi, Aṅgiraso, Bhāradvājo, Vāseṭṭho, Kassapo, Bhagu. Do even these speak thus: "We know this, we see this; this only is the truth, all else is falsehood?"

— No, Master Gotamo.

— So it comes to this, Bhāradvājo, that there is not a single brāhman...not a single teacher of brāhmans, not a single teacher of teachers back through seven generations of teachers who speaks thus: "I know this, I see this..." And those who were formerly seers of the brāhmans, original makers of *mantras*..., not even these could affirm it ...Bhāradvājo, it is like a string of blind men holding one to another — neither does the foremost see, nor does the middle one see, nor does the hindmost one see...What do you think about this, Bhāradvājo? This being so, does not the faith of the brāhmans turn out to be groundless?

— But, Master Gotamo, brāhmans do not merely go by faith in this matter; brāhmans also go by report.

— First you, Bhāradvājo, set off about faith, now you are speaking of report. These five things, Bhāradvājo, have a twofold maturing here and now. What four? *Faith, inclination, report, consideration of reasons, reflection on and approval of an opinion*...Moreover, Bhāradvājo, even although something may be thoroughly believed in...thoroughly inclined toward...well reported...well considered...well reflected upon, it may be empty, void, false. On the other hand, something not thoroughly believed in,... not thoroughly inclined toward,...not well reported,...not well considered,...not well reflected upon, it may be fact, truth, not otherwise. Preserving a truth, Bhāradvājo, is not enough for an intelligent man inevitably to come to the conclusion: "This alone is truth, all else is falsehood."

— But to what extent, Master Gotamo, is there *preservation of truth*? To what extent does one preserve truth? We are asking Master Gotamo about preservation of truth.

— Bhāradvājo, if a man has faith and says: "Such is my faith", speaking thus he preserves truth, but not yet does he inevitably come

to the conclusion: "This alone is the truth, all else is falsehood." To this extent, Bhāradvājo, is there preservation of truth..., but not yet is there awakening to truth ...

— But to what extent, Master Gotamo, is there *awakening to truth*?

— As to this, Bhāradvājo, suppose a monk is living depending on a village or market town. A householder or householder's son, having approached him, examines him concerning three states: states of greed, states of aversion and states of confusion. He thinks: "Does the venerable one have such states of greed (of aversion, of confusion) that, his mind obsessed by such states..., although not knowing, he would say, "I know", or although not seeing, he would say, "I see", or would he incite another to such a course as for a long time would be for his harm and suffering?" While examining him, he recognizes: "This venerable one does not have such states of greed (of aversion, of confusion). As is that venerable one's conduct of body, as is his conduct of speach, so is it not that of a greedy person (of a person with aversion, of a confused person). And when this venerable one teaches *dhammo*, that *dhammo* is deep, difficult to see, difficult to understand, peaceful, excellent, beyond dialectic, subtle, intelligible to the wise..." After examining him and beholding that he is purified of states of greed, aversion and confusion, then *he reposes faith in him*; with faith born *he draws close*; drawing close *he sits down near by*; sitting down near by *he lends ear*; lending ear *he hears dhammo*; having heard *dhammo he remembers it*; ... *he tests its meaning*, ... *he approves* of it; from approval *decision is born*; having decided he *makes an effort*; having made an effort *he weighs it up*; having weighed it up *he strives*; being resolute he realizes with his person the highest truth; and penetrating it by wisdom *he sees*. It is to this extent, Bhāradvājo, that there is awakening to truth......but not yet is there attainment of truth.

—But to that extent, good Gotamo, is there *attainment of truth*?...

—There is attainment of truth, Bhāradvājo, by following, developing and continually practising these things......"

Thus *faith* is reduced by the Buddho to a *minimum of reasonable trust* for a limited period of training (instrumental like a "raft"), justified by previous "examination" or test of the teacher's moral character and intellectual ability. It has no permanent value as a mood, in and for itself, since it is only the first step in a series of twelve (as enumerated in the underlined text above). It will remain vain and fruitless (like an empty basket) if it will not lead us to "see, by means of intuitive wisdom" "in this very life", "here and now", "bodily". It is also

important to add that such religious training should not be understood as a "multipurpose" technique, as it is often misconstrued by the interpreters of the *yoga* "in general", but remains dependent on "the only way" (*ekāyano maggo* of *sati-paṭṭhānām* or mindfulness), starting from moral purification and leading to the "purification from suffering" and attainment of "extinction" (*nibbānaṁ*). (Cf. Sati-paṭṭhāna-suttaṁ, M. 10)

II

The salient feature of the *Caṅki-suttaṁ*, by which it overlaps into our second section, is the absence of any reference to gods in this discussion on the supreme *authority in religion.* The Buddho does not discuss here the problem of the belief in gods but the problem of a *teacher's trustworthiness* exclusively.

The very existence of gods is an open problem for itself in the discourses of the Buddho. As we shall see from the following texts, it is always dealt with by him as a problem of secondary importance only. On such occasions accusations have been raised against the Buddho of being a "destroyer" and disbeliever in gods and "the other world". The existence of a strictly materalistic disbelief in such "supra-mundane" (*lokuttaram*) entities was not exceptional among his contemporaries in India. Teachings of this kind by several well-known masters, on various grounds, are sufficiently documented in a number of basic discourses of the Buddho (the best known is the *Samaññaphala-suttaṁ*, D. 2.). In rejecting such accusations, however, the Buddho is not interested to affirm the opposite view as his own, viz. his *belief* in the existence of gods or of the "other world" (*para-loko*). He insists always, as we shall see from the following texts, on making a point of it that we neither should nor reasonably can *believe* in such entities, and that *existence* as such should not be considered either as a matter of belief or of reasoning, but can be grasped meaningfully and without contradiction only by immediate, pre-reflexive pure *experience.* Existence can only be *existed.* Where experience is not immediately present, you can believe only a trust-worthy person. Thus the problem of belief is reduced to the problem of the trustworthiness of an *immediate witness.* Abstract beliefs in trans-human cosmic principles, necessarily based on rationally constructed ontological proofs, are but attempts to infiltrate mediate grounds into the immediate *moral* experience (then all existential experience is of a basically moral nature)and thus to subordinate ethics to a heteronomous metaphysical "point of view". It is well known that the Buddho, from his strictly and explicitly humanistic and acosmic stand-point, rejects all such "views" (*diṭṭhi*).

In the *Caṅki-suttaṁ* the relation of heteronomous and autonomous attitudes to religion is characterized by the distinction of the "preservation of truth" from the "awakening to truth". By these terms the Buddho has expressed in this context the essential difference between the *sincerity* and the *facticity* of a belief. A faithful and reliable understanding of words or "propositions" about ..., is in no way an adequate correlate, or even a guarantee, either for the actual *existence* or for a correct *representation* of *facts*. Therefore statements of belief have to be very carefully distinguished and *very explicitly formulated* in a different manner than statements of, or on, facts. It is always with a view to this basic principle that the Buddho either rejects or tries to reformulate the wording of *epistemologically incorrect questions*, or refuses to answer questions considered by him to be inadequate to the meaningful subject of his discourse on the *dhammo*.

As to the problem of heteronomous belief ("preservation of truth") the Buddho is far from ignoring its purport as a historical fact of social reality. The last two texts of this section will show how carefully he was able to evaluate both its negative and positive aspects.

(7) In the *Saṅgārava-suttaṁ* (M. 100), concerning the existence of gods, the stumbling point arises from a *wrong formulation of the question* by the interlocutor. The Buddho therefore tries to establish its proper scope by applying the criterion of disjoining the subjective element of sincerity in the "preservation" of a heteronomous belief from the facticity of an actual experience in autonomous "awakening to truth"—two incommensurable value-aspects which cannot be encompassed in *one* question and *one* answer without equivocation.

At the beginning of the *suttaṁ* teachers of religious life (*brahmacariyā*) are divided in three types: Those who claim "perfection of knowledge in hearsay", the "masters of the three Vedas"; the teachers of *takka-mīmāṁsā*, or "logical analysis" of the same kind of texts, whose "perfection of knowledge", based on "mere faith alone", corresponds to the class of "preservers". "Awakening to truth" is peculiar only to the third type of those "knowing directly by themselves *alone*", "here and now".

—Bhāradvājo, I say that there is a difference among those who claim to know the fundamentals of the religious discipline and to have attained here and now the integrity, the perfection of direct knowledge. (1) There are some monks and brāhmans who depend *on report*; these claim to know through report the fundamentals of the religious discipline and thus to have attained here and now the integrity, the perfection of direct knowledge. Such are the three-Vedā

brāhmans. (2) There are some monks and brāhmans who claim to have attained the same by *mere faith alone*...Such are the masters of logical analysis. (3) There are some monks and brāhmans who *by themselves alone* have attained direct knowledge of truth in matters that have not been heard before... I belong to the last of these (three groups)...

— Master Gotamo, are there gods?

[But the Master had just anticipated the reason why neither a question nor an answer on the existence of gods can be formulated adequately in identical terms from the first two standpoints and the third, since from this latter standpoint of "direct knowledge" the very idea of a belief in transmitted words has been excluded as an unacceptable criterion (*pramāṇam*). However, it is obvious from the context that just this epistemological distinction has created in Saṅgāravo's head a bewilderment out of which his question arises rather as an astonished exclamation.]

—The statement that there are gods [or, "statements about gods" (*adhidevā*), according to some manuscripts], Bhāradvājo, is for me established by experience.

—But why do you, Master Gotamo, on being asked if there *are* gods say that for you *statements* about gods are established by experience? Even if this is so, is it not still empty and false *talk*?

—If on being asked, Bhāradvājo, whether there are gods one should say: "There are gods", or: "The statement that there are gods is for me established by experience"—then, for certain, an inteligent person can *draw the conclusion* that there are gods.

—But why did not Master Gotamo answer me thus at the beginning?

—Bhāradvājo, it is *widely agreed* in the world that there are gods.

In his first, misunderstood, answer ["*Ṭhānaso me tam, Bhāradvāja, viditaṁ yadidaṁ atthi devā* (*or*: *adhidevā*) *ti*] the Buddho attempts to *restrict the meaning of the question* to the reasonable limits of the questioner's heteronomous, purely verbal, belief. This intention becomes clearly visible only from the second, unequivocal and concluding answer: "It is *widely agreed* in the world that there are gods." Unfortunately, the first intention of the Buddho has remained misunderstood not only by Saṅgāravo but still more by the successive generations of pious exegets and commentators until our days, so that the text of this "critical" sentence has become a stumbling block, considered to be corrupted

beyond repair by copyists. This, however, does not affect at all the clear intention reaffirmed in the final answer.

(8) The argument in the following text, *Dhānañjāni-suttaṁ* (M. 97) is the *inferiority of gods*, a consequence from the *acosmic standpoint* of the Buddho who considers the form of existence attributed to gods as temporary, intermediate in the cosmic process and therefore unimportant for the attainment of the ideal of "extinction" (*nibbānam*). We shall therefore have to define the acosmic position of the Buddho in a few additional texts (10-11).

Requested by the Buddho venerable Sāriputto visited the brāhman Dhānañjāni who was gravely ill.—"...Then the venerable Sāriputto thought:—These brāhmans are devoted to the world of Brahmā. Let me show the brāhman Dhānañjāni the way to Brahmā's retinue.—He said :—Dhānañjāni, I shall show you the way to Brahmā's retinue. Listen and attend carefully to what I shall say...What is the way to Brahmā's retinue? Here a bhikkhu abides in a state of mind endued with loving-kindness, pervading one quarter of the world, and so the second quarter, and the third, the fourth ...., and so the whole world everywhere in every way ... he continues to pervade in a state of mind endued with loving-kindness, far-reaching, wide-spread, immesurable, without enmity, without malevolence.... Again he abides in a state of mind endued with compassion, with gladness, with equanimity...pervading the world...This is the way to Brahmā's retinue.

— Then, Master Sāriputto, pay homage in my name with your head at the Blessed One's feet, and say :—Venerable sir, the brāhman Dhānañjāni is afflicted, suffering and gravely ill, he pays homage with his head at the Blessed One's feet.

Then the venerable Sāriputte having established the brāhman Dhānañjāni in the *low world of Brahmā*, although still more could have been done, rose from his seat and departed. And soon after he had left, the brāhman Dhānañjāni died and reappeared in the world of Brahmā.

The venerable Sāriputto went to the Blessed One, and after paying homage to him, he sat down at one side and said :

— Venerable sir, the brāhman Dhānañjāni is afflicted, suffering and gravely ill the pays homage with his head at the Blessed One's feet......

— But why did you, Sāriputto, having established the brāhman Dhānañjani in the low world of Brāhma, although still more could have been done, rise from your seat and depart?

— Venerable sir, I thought thus: These brāhmans are devoted to the world of Brahmā. Let me show the brāhman Dhānañjāni the way to Brahma's retinue.

— The brāhman Dhānañjāni is dead, Sāriputto, and he has reappeared in the world of Brahmā...."

(9) The problem of gods in Buddhism is determined by the humanist attitude of the Buddho to religion. The following three texts will show how this attitude leads ultimately to an acosmic and consequently anti-ontological position, formulated in the *cātu-koṭikaṁ* (tetralemma) rule, applied regularly by the Buddho to the *avyākatāni*, or indeterminate questions, and to dialectical antinomies of speculative thought.[2] "Neither being, nor non-being, nor both being-and-non-being, nor neither-being-nor-non-being" can express the existential purport and content of our human-reality.

Buddhist humanism is not metaphorical like the equivocal *Christian humanitarianism* of the merciful God-Saviour. Buddhist humanism goes in a straight line down to the ultimate ontological consequences. The acosmic essence of these consequences and the final antiontological attitude resulting therefrom have been clearly elicited also by the existential humanism in the contemporary European philosophy (K. Jaspers, G. Marcel, J. Wahl, N, Berdyaev).[3]

The following text, *Brahma-nimantaṇika-suttaṁ* (M. 49) will be significant also for the Buddho's argument against a permanent soul-entity (*anattā*). In this discourse, whose title has been translated as "Challenge to Brahmā",the Buddho is described as visiting the celestial assembly of the god "creator" Brahmā Bako, who has conceived the false conviction that he himself is eternal (having forgotten the distant past when he came to his actual position), and that all other beings in his universe were his own creations — a subject often recurring in the *suttas*.—"...Then Māro, the Evil One, entered into a member of the Brahmā's assembly, and he told me (the Buddho):

— Bhikkhu, bhikkhu, do not offend him, for this Brahmā is the great Brahmā, conqueror, unconquerable allpervading overlord and creator endowed with highest power, chief, disposer, master and father of all that have become and ever will be. Bhikkhu, there were monks and brāhmans in the world before you who condemned earth through *disgust with earth*, water through disgust with water, fire through disgust of fire, air through disgust of air, beings through disgust with beings, gods through *disgust with gods*—these at the breaking up of the body, when their breath was cut off, were established in an inferior body. Bhikkhu, there were monks and brāhmans in the world before you who

praised earth through delight in earth,.......gods through delight in gods — these after breaking up of the body,...were established in a superior body. So, bhikkhu, I tell this : Be sure, good sir, to do only what Brahmā says to you, do not go beyond Brahma's word...

(To all this the Buddho's answer was:)

— Brahmā, having had from earth direct knowledge of earth, from water (fire, air, beings, gods) direct knowledge of water (fire, air, beings, gods), and having had direct knowledge also of what cannot be adequately experienced as the earthness of earth, the waterness of water, the fireness of fire, the airness of air, the beingness of beings, the godliness of gods—I realized by the same direct knowledge that I was not earth,........., that I was not god, that I was neither in earth nor appart from earth, I did not claim earth to be mine, I did not affirm earth ;......that I was neither in gods nor appart from gods, I did not claim gods to be mine, I did not affirm gods.

— Brahmā, having had from *all* direct knowledge of all, and having had direct knowledge also of what cannot be adequately experienced as the allness of all — I realized by the same direct knowledge that I was not all, that I was neither in all nor appart from all, I did not claim all to be mine, I did not affirm all.—Thus, Brahmā I am not standing on the same level with you as regards direct knowledge, and it is not less that I know, but more than you."

At the end, the Buddho summarizes his attitude in the *gāthā* :

"I have seen anguish in being
and being in those who seek to disjoin from being ;
I have nothing to state on being,
I don't enjoy being, I don't cling on being."

(10) The most impressive and explicit declaration of the Buddha's *acosmic attitude* is contained in his first utterance after the Awakening, included in the *Dhammapadaṁ* (153-4) :

"Through many births I wandered in the stream of existence
seeking but not finding the builder of this house (the world).
It is sorrowful to be born again and again.
But now, o House-builder, you have been seen.
You will not build the house any more (for me).

All your rafters are broken, your ridge-pole is shattered.

The mind is beyond doubt, attained is the end of craving."

(11) The best known statement of the same humanistic principle in the *Aṅguttara-nikāyo, IV, 5, 5,* is formulated in such a sober philosophical explicitness that it would be rather difficult for me *not* to presume that Schopenhauer was acquainted with it when he expressed the same basic idea using the same comparison in his "Criticism of the Kantian Philosophy"[4].

—Indeed, friend, I declare there is no world wherein there is no birth, death, decay or repeated deaths and rebirths, the end whereof it is possible to know, see or reach by walking. But, friend, I do not declare that without reaching the end of the world one can make an end of sorrow. My friend, I do proclaim that in this very fathom-long body, with its feelings and mind, is the world, the world's arising, the world's ceasing and the path leading to the world's ceasing."

(12) The following *Apaṇṇaka-suttaṁ* (M.60) has not been selected here to serve as a further illustration of the same problem of gods, of their existence or the inferior position of their being in the universe, although Buddhist theologians use it regularly and with preference for that purpose. In this text and in the following one we shall concentrate our attention on the next problem of our inquiry—*the social facticity or moral and religious heteronomy* with regard to which the Buddho wished to establish a rational principle of *superiority of the moral criteria above religious injunctions* in cases of practical conflicts and *apories* arising within the socially and conventionally determined sphere of their applications.

The title has been translated as *correct* ("*mature*") *criterion* (*apaṇṇako dhammo* in the text) to be applied in such cases by the *puthujjano*, or worldly minded man, guided in his affairs by the avarage common-sense.

On the occasion of his visit to the brāhman village Sālā, in the country of Kosala, the Buddho asked those brāhmans :

—Householders, have you any dear and trustworthy teacher ?

—No, venerable sir.

—If you have no such teacher, then you can take a correct criterion and apply it in the following manner: There are, householders, some monks and brāhmans who maintain and teach the following opinion : "There is nothing given, nothing offered,

nothing sacrificed, no fruit or ripening of good and bad action, *no this world, no other world*, no mother, no father, no spontaneously arising beings, no monks and brāhmans whose conduct and behaviour are correct and who have themselves realized by direct knowledge and made known this world and the other world."—But there are some other monks and brāhmans whose theory is directly opposed to those...Now of those monks and brāhmans whose theory and opinion is that there is nothing given,...no fruit or ripening of good and bad action, no this world, no other world..., it is to be expected that they will avoid these three righteous criteria, namely, good bodily conduct, good verbal conduct, and good mental conduct, and they will adopt and apply these three wrongful criteria, namely, bodily bad conduct, verbal bad conduct, and mental bad conduct. What is the reason for it? It is that those reverend monks and brāhmans do not see the danger, the degradation and the defilement in doing wrong, nor the advantage and the purifying effect of renounciation for the sake of doing good...About this a wise man considers: "If there is not another world, then, on the dissolution of the body, this venerable person will be safe. But if there is another world, then, on the dissolution of the body, after death, he will reappear in a state of deprivation, on a sorrowful way, in perdition, in hell...But if it be granted that there is no other world, that the words of these monks and brāhmans are true, still this venerable person comes under wise men's censure *here and now* as an unvirtuous person with wrong view and theory that there is *nothing given*. But if there is indeed another world then this venerable person has had an unlucky trow on both counts: since he has come under wise men's censure here and now, and since on the dissolution of the body, after death, he will reappear in a state of deprivation...He has wrongfully taken and applied the correct criterion in such a way that while it extends only to one side it excludes the profitable count...

...There are some monks and brāhmans who maintain and teach the opinion that there is no *integral cessation of being*. But there are also some monks and brāhmans whose theory is directly opposed to those, and they say: "There is integral cessation of being."... About this a wise man considers: "When these venerable monks and brāhmans maintain and teach the opinion that there is no integral cessation of being, *that has not been seen by me*. And when these other monks and brāhmans maintain and teach the opinion that there is integral cessation of being, *that has not been known by me*. If I, not knowing and not seeing, were to take one side and decide: 'Only this is true, anything else is wrong' that would not be correct. Now if the monks and brāhmans who maintain and teach the

opinion that there is no integral cessation of being are right, then there is a certain possibility that the state of gods consisting of formless perception may be attained by me. But if the monks and brāhmans who maintain and teach the opinion that there is integral cessation of being are right, then it is possible that I might *here and now attain complete extinction* (*nibbanam*). Thus the opinion of those venerable monks and brāhmans who maintain and teach that there is no integral cessation of being is *tending to lust,* to bondage, to defilement, to cleaving, to grasping — while the opinion of those...who teach that there is integral cessation of being is tending to the absence of lust, of bondage, of defilement, of cleavage, of grasping. After reflecting thus, he practices *the way of aversion, dispassion and cessation of being.*

Granted that there are "blind" people in the world, the Buddho, in this discourse, tries to help with a seeing man's advice, as far as he can, also that "string of blind men" referred to in the *Caṅki-suttaṁ.*

Another detail from the concluding part of the foregoing text is worthwhile being singled out from the standpoint of comparative religion: It is those who believe in the "cessation of being", and not those who believe in its eternity, that behave in conformity with the ascetic teaching and criterion of the Buddho. From the viewpoint of any cosmically minded religion or maybe of any religion "in proper) sense" in accordance with the classical western Bible-centered standard) just the opposite should appear obvious.

(13) The *Kandaraka-suttaṁ* (M. 51) contains an often repeated classification of human characters corresponding to *religious superstitions* as means of justification for man's inborn cruelty — in its masochistic and sadistic forms, as we would term them today.

— ... These four kinds of persons are found in the world : (1) a person who is a *self-tormentor*, intent on the practice of self-torment ; (2) a person who is a *tormentor of others...*; (3) a person who is *both a self-tormentor and a tormentor of others* ; (4) a person who is *neither a self-tormentor nor a tormentor of others*...The neither self-tormentor nor tormentor of others is *here and now* allayed, extinguished, cooled ; he abides experiencing pleasure as one become divine in himself ...

... And which, bhikkhus, is the self-tormentor ?... In this case some person comes to be unclothed ... He does not consent to accept food offered or specially prepared for him or to accept an invitation to a meal ... He comes to be a one-house man or a one piece man or a two-house man or a two-piece man ... or a seven-house man or a seven piece man. He subsists on one little offering...on seven little offerings.

He takes food only once a day, only once in two days...once in seven days. Then he lives intent on such a practice as eating rice at regular fortnightly intervals....He is one who subsists on forest roots or fruits, eating the fruits that have fallen...He is one who plucks out the hair of his head and beard; and he is one who stands upright, refusing a seat; and he is one who squats on his haunches.... ; he makes his bed on covered thorns...Thus in many a way does he live intent on the practice of mortifying and tormenting his body. Bhikkhus, this is the person who is a self-tormentor...[5]

And which is the person who is a tormentor of others...? In this case, bhikkhus, some person is a cattle-butcher, or pig-killer, fowler, deer-stalker, hunter, fisherman, thief, executioner, jailer, or one of those others who follow a bloody calling. This is a person who is called a tormentor of others...

And which is the person who is both self-tormentor, and also a tormentor of others?...In this case, bhikkhus, some person is a noble anointed king or a very rich brāhman. He, having had a new sacrificial hall built to the east of the town, having had his head and beard shaved, having put on as haggy skin, having smeared his body with ghee and oil, scratching his back with a deer-horn, enters the sacrificial hall together with his chief consort and a brāhman priest.... Then he says: "Let so many bulls be slain for the sacrifice, let so many steers, heifers, goats, rams be slain for the sacrifice, let so many trees be felled for the sacrificial posts, let so much *kusa*-grass be reaped for the sacrificial spot." Those who are his slaves or messengers or workpeople, they, scared of the stick, scared of danger, with tearful faces and crying, set about their preparations. This, bhikkhus, is called the person who is both a self-tormentor and a tormentor of others...

And which is the person who is neither a self-tormentor nor a tormentor of others..., and who is here and now allayed, extinguished, cooled; who abides experiencing pleasure as one become divine in himself?...(This is the follower of) a perfect one, fully awakened, endowed with right knowledge and conduct, well-farer, knower of the world,...teacher of gods and men—a *buddho*..."

III

(14) The *soul theory* under its Vedāntic designation of *ātma-vāda* (for the Pāli term *attā-vādo* see, e.g., S. 38,4,12) is discussed, analysed and rejected in all its aspects in a series of discourses. The best

known and most extensive is the *Brahma-jāla-suttaṁ* (D.1).—47 theories representing specific positive views on the nature of the self (*attā*) are classified in 7 groups dealing with "the Self and the World" (3 groups), with the self-conscious aspect (3 groups), and with the substance aspect of its being (1 group). Sub-classes of these main groups are: *sassata-vādo* (8 "eternalist theories"), *adhicca-samuppannikā* (2 theories on "spontaneous generation" analogous to the Christian dogma on a "created" soul), *saññi-vādo* (16 theories on a conscious soul), *āsaññi-vādo* (8 theories on an unconscious soul), *n'eva-saññi-nāsaññi-vādo* (8 theories on a neither conscious nor unconscious soul), and *uccheda-vādo* (7 theories affirmming the "destructibility of a substantially existing soul).

(15) In the *Sabbāsava-suttaṁ* (M.2) "six kinds of views", concerning the permanence of sould or self-principle are specified and rejected as follows: In him whose mind does not penetrate to the origin, one of these six views arises: (1) rhe view, "For me there is a Self", arises in him as true and established; or the view, "For me there is no Self"..., or the view, "I cognize the Self by the Self"...; or the view, "I cognize the Non-Self by the Self"...; or the view, "I cognize the Self by the Non-Self"...; or else he has some such view as, "It is this my Self that speaks, knows and experiences here and there the ripening of good and bad actions; this my Self is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change, and will endure as long as eternity".—This is called pursuance of views, adherence to views, thicket of views, contortion of views, vacillation of views, fetter of views. No untaught ordinary man, bound by the fetter of views is freed from birth, aging and death, from sorrows and lamentation, frcm pains, griefs and despairs; he is not freed from suffering, I say.

(16) In the *Mahā-nidāna-suttaṁ* (D.15) four "statements on the Self" are reported with respect to its form and limits: "Either in the words, 'My Self has form and is minute'...or in the words, 'My Self has form and is boundless'..., or in the words, 'My Self is formless and minute'..., or in the words, 'My Self is formless and boundless'..."—The refutation of these theories is indicated with the reference to other analogous cases: "We have said enough about the case of one who is given to (such speculative) theories..."

(17) The *Poṭṭhapāda-suttaṁ* (D.9) is one of the most remarkable texts for the critique of the soul theory, based on a fine and extensive analysis of the functional nature of consciousness. On one point in this connection the Buddho refers to "these three assumptions on the Self: that it has a material shape, or a mental one, or that it

is shapeless...Now I teach a doctrine that leads to the abandonment of (each of these three) assumptions on the Self."

The Buddho's main argument against the soul theory has found its best explicit formulation in a number of texts in the *Khanda-saṁyuttaṁ* of the *Saṁyutta-nikāyo* (S.XXII). We shall conclude our survey with two quotations from that section whose typical argument, that there is no soul "*apart*" from the psycho-physical formations (*khandā*) either, is repeated in some more *suttas* of the same section.

(18) *Anurādho* (S. XXII, 86)

— What do you think, Anurādho: Do you regard the body as the *tathāgato*? (According to the generally applied commentarial explanation, the attribute *tathāgato* is understood in such connections as designating a human being in the widest sense.)

— Surely not, venerable sir.

— Do you regard the feeling, the perception, the activities, the consciousness as the *tathāgato*?

— Surely not, venerable sir.

— Do you regard the *tathāgato* as being in the body (or feeling, perception, activities, consciousness)?

— Surely not, venerable sir.

— Do you regard the *tathāgato* as being *apart* from the body (feeling perception, activities, consciousness)?

— Surely not, venerable sir.

— Do you regard the *tathāgato* as being *different* from the body (feeling, perception, activities, consciousness)?

— Surely not venerable sir.

— Do you regard the body, the feeling, the perception, the activities and the consciousness — taken together as a whole — as the *tathāgato*?

— Surely not, venerable sir.

— Do you regard the *tathāgato* as being *without* body, feeling, perception, activities and consciousness?

— Surely not, venerable sir.

— Then, Anurādho, since in this very life a *tathāgato* cannot be identified by you as existing in truth, in reality, is it proper for you to state that a *tathāgato* is the superman, the most excellent man who has attained the highest aim, and that a *tathāgato*, if he has to be designated, should be designated in other than these four terms: "The *tathāgato* exists after death"; or, "he does not exist after death"; or, "he both does and does not exist after death"; or, "he neither does nor does not exist after death"?

— Surely not, venerable sir.

— Good, Anurādho. Both formerly and now, it is just suffering that I proclaim, and the ceasing of suffering.

(The best known *suttaṁ* where the whole argument is repeated is the *Yamako-suttaṁ* in the same section of the *Saṁyutta-nikāyo*, § 85.)

(19) *Upāyo* (S. XXII, 53)

— Bhikkhus, should one say: "Apart from body, from feeling, from perception, from the activities, I shall explain how consciousness comes and goes, or how it disappears and emerges, or how it increases, unfolds and attains its full expansion"— he would not be able to do so.

— If desire for body is abandoned by a bhikkhu, as well as desire for (the mental formations of) feeling, perception, activities and consciousness, by the abandonment of desire its object is eliminated, too, and can no longer serve as a support of consciousness. Without that support consciousness cannot develop nor generate action and is freed.

Conclusions

All the texts selected for the documentary part of this essay can be used only for a further analysis concerning the *negative delimitation* of the *Buddha-dhammo* from the aspects of religious belief discussed in these texts, reflecting traditional religious ideas in India at that time. Thus the question formulated in the title of our eassy has not yet been answered but only delimited by elimination of the traditional aspects of heterogenous religious beliefs.

The negative effects of these arguments will appear still more salient if we try to determine Buddhism in contradistinction to modern standards of encyclopaedic definitions of religion. Universal as they may claim to be, their critical proceedings still remain inadequate in our case, both in essential and historical dimensions. A comparative examination could easily show to what extent such current definitions

of religion are prejudiced, still today, by the criteria of Biblical religions, assumed (though in a generalized form) as a fundamental standard. A comparative test could show, on one hand, to what extent analogous criteria could be formulated also in terms of our texts. But, on the other hand, it would demonstrate their incapacity to serve as predominant positive determinants for a general definition of religion. Within their limits religion remains restricted to the morphological varieties and possibilities of belief in God (or "gods") and immortality of the soul; in entities denoting the principles of transmundane and eternal life, or of Absolute Being, as the widest range of the encyclopaedic concept of "religion".

The most unprejudiced judgment on this shortcoming, to my knowledge, was pronounced by Swami Vivekananda, as a spontaneous reaction of religious feeling, at the Congress of Religious Unity in Chicago (1893): "Now, there are sects that do not admit of the existence of God — that is a Personal God. Unless we wish to leave these sects out in the cold,... we must have our platform broad enough to embrace all mankind ... I think we should love our brother whether we believe in the universal fatherhood of God or not, because every religion and every creed recognizes *man as divine*."[6]

If the *Buddha-dhammo* is to be defined as a religious teaching, it must be in entirely different terms of *religious experience* exclusively, leaving apart all premisses of *theological* speculation.

(1) *The problem of revising the definition of religion* was raised by *Schopenhauer* from a position influenced to a considerable extent by Buddhism.

"The fundamental difference in religions" is not to be found in the question "whether they are monotheism, polytheism, Trimurty, Trinity, pantheism, or atheism (like Buddhism)", but "in the question whether they are optimism or pessimism"— as Schopenhauer tries to define the whole problem of a new, better adequated, criterion in terms of his own system of philosophy.

".... The knowledge of God, as the personal ruler and creator of the world who made everything well, is found simply and solely in the religious doctrine of the Jews and in the two faiths derived therefrom (Christianity and Mohammedanism) which in the widest sense might be called Jewish sects, but it is not found in the religion of any other race, ancient and modern."—"Even the other two religions existing with Buddhism in China, those of Laotse and Confucius, are just as atheistic ... Incidentally it should be observed that the word

atheism contains a surreptitious assumption, in that it assumes in advance that theism is self-evident."[7]

(2) If we proceed to consider the results of the differential analysis contained in our documentation in the light of the contemporary philosophy of religion, the way of the "*philosophical belief*", indicated by *Karl Jaspers,* may facilitate our further approach to a positive solution of the initial question. The central conception of a contemporary philosophy of culture is based for Jaspers on the solution of the problem concerning the essential relation between religion and philosophy from the standpoint of an encompassing "philosophical belief".

"It is questionable whether *faith* is possible *without religion*. Philosophy originates in this question."[8] Faith is "hope grounded in reason itself and not in some other guarantee coming from outside." Consequently, "religion is not an independent source of truth", and doctrinal belief remains always "insecure".—These are conclusions drawn by Jaspers in his interpretation of Kant's *Religion Within the Limits of Mere Reason.*[9] Kant's philosophy as a whole has for Jaspers the value of a "revolution in man's *way* of thinking". "What we know is not the world but only our ways in the world". "Philosophy as a way" had to be "found by a turnabout". By following this way "we gain no knowledge of an object, but our consciousness of being is transformed. The *non-knowledge* of philosophical exploration transcends the understanding and transforms our awareness of being."[10] Expressed in classical terms, the way of philosophy is not a way of *cosmic knowledge* (*doxa, diṭṭhi*) but a way to *human wisdom*. This is why, in terms of Kantian criticism as understood by Jaspers, even rational "dogmatism always leads ultimately to skepticism and unbelief, while critique leads to *science and faith*."[11]

Already in his interpretation of the religious thought of St. Augustine, Jaspers defined philosophy as "a thinking that penetrates and makes for awareness", while "philosophical faith stands in the concreteness of its always unique, noncatholic, historical actuality, through which it is able to ascertain the true reality, for which there is no guarantee except in the freedom of man and its communicative realization *on the brink of the abyss* of failure in the reality of the world".[12]

The religion of the philosophical faith is thus a religion of continual risk, acceptable and bearable only for those who have already conquered the existential fear of failure and death.

Penetrating still deeper in the history of philosophical faith, in his interpretation of the fundamental religious wisdom of the Buddho, Jaspers formulates the well-known characteristic of this most aristocratic faith as follows: "By his inexorable either-or Buddha seized hold of the whole man.—But the *faith* required for this path of salvation *is a knowledge*...salvation itself is a knowledge, redemption is insight achieved simultaneously with it."[13]

(3) Expressions characteristic for the Buddhist attitude to these problems have been underlined by me in the preceding section. Within the limits of the present draft their comparative meaning has to remain implicit with reference to the *philosophical aspect of the philosophical faith* in the most consequent acosmic religion, the *Buddha-dhammo.*

What is the purely *religious aspect* of the same philosophical faith, understood as a *way of purification* (*catharsis,* Buddhist *visuddhi-maggo*)?

(a) As a *way of meditative reduction* of mental structures and of their contents (*noesis* and *noema*) it is a process which essentially is still not differentiated from the fundamental philosophical attitude of *Epoché* in its primal historical significance, as preached by Pyrrho of Elis and Timon, whose main concern was a moral and even religious attitude. Even as reinterpreted by Husserl, in its exclusively noetical significance, as method of phenomenological reduction, *epoché* is meant to serve the purpose of a "science of phenomena which lies far removed from our ordinary thinking...so extraordinarily difficult...a new way of looking at things, one that contrasts at every point with the *natural attitude* of experience and thought".[14]

Jaspers, in *The Great Philosophers,* in several references to ancient and mystical "experiences in meditation", insists on their essential difference from modern methods of "suspension" in transcendental analysis of the "subject-object relationship". The clearest formulation of the difference is given with reference to "Buddha's doctrine of redemption by insight": It "springs from experience in the transformation of consciousness and the stages of meditation". While modern "science and philosophical speculation remain within our given form of consciousness...this Indian philosophy may be said to take consciousness itself in hand, to raise it in higher forms by exercices in meditation."[15]

In whatever way the intrinsic connection between the presumed two aspects of *epoché* may be construed—as a philosophical method of transcendental analysis, or as the way for a transcending consciousness to attain to "ek-static" wisdom—its religious purport can be encompassed only from a still higher level of existential experience, to which

all "suspension" attained by *epoché* points out (already in the case of Pyrrho's original doctrine): It aims not—in either case—at a "mundane" transcendence; its essential attainments have always remained in the service of a *via negativa.* (Even Husserl was very consequent in stressing that his reductive method does not and ultimately cannot lead or even point to any further transcendence, beyond the "transcendence in the immanent". And Sartre was not less consequent in his critique of Husserl on this ground.)

It seems to me that Jaspers (as the whole existential trend in the contemporary philosophy) overempasises the importance of "ecstasis" and of its "all-encompassing" aim. From a European bias, this remains a specifically ontological aim or ideal. From the Indian bias the same ideal seems to be peculiar just to the Advaita-Vedānta. Here I cannot enter any farther into its differential analysis. The anti-vedāntin standpoint of the Buddho is also anti-ontological in equal measure: "Neither being, nor non-being, nor both being-and-non-being, nor neither-being-nor-non-being" can express the existential purport and content of our human-reality.

When utilized for religious aims of *catharsis* (Buddhist *visuddhi-maggo*) the method of *epoché* remains far from being exhausted in any "ecstatic" vision (not even in the meaning of Buddhist *vipassanā* in and for itself, whose proper primal significance cannot be successfully severed from its original location in the reductive structure of the way of *jhānaṁ*). The deepest motivation of philosophical faith is *release,* not *only* as "suspension", and not even as "freedom!" The proper religious meaning of "suspension", has been elicited most adequately to our context in Schopenhauer's aesthetical approach to the problem of pure contemplation: "And we know that these moments, when, delivered from the fierce pressure of the will, we emerge, as it were, from the heavy atmosphere of the earth, are the most blissful that we experience. From this we can infer how blessed must be the life of a man whose will is silenced not for a few moments, as in the enjoyment of the beautiful, but for ever, indeed completely extinguished ..."[16]

On the Indian side, *mokṣa* (Pāli *vimutti*) is not equivalent in its *ephectic* or *cathartic* meaning to a positive attainment of "freedom to...". It is a *release from* the "suspended" existential affirmation of being. It does not indicate any positive idea of "freedom to .." as its aim, but simply and purely abandonment of, leading to further realizations of revulsion and escape (Pāli *paṭikkūlaṁ* and *nissaraṇaṃ*) from any whatsoever "mundane" and "cosmical" intention.—To what purpose?—To *none.* Where *release-from* does no longer constitute a

freedom-to, "extinction" (*nibbānam*) can no longer serve any purpose either. Thus the process of release through *suspension* of existential judgment (*epochè*) contains its moral and spiritual value in itself. Why do we designate it—also in the Buddhist sense—merely as suspension? The reason has deep ontological implications. The same as Pyrrho's *apatheia*, Buddha's *upekkhā* cannot be considered as "annihilation" (*uccheda-vādo*).

Thus meditative reduction on the *via negativa* of religious experience cannot admit of any structural limitation of its intention. There is a fundamental mistake, from the standpoint limiting the "higher religion" to the aspect of mystical ecstasy, in taking the distinction between "mundane" and "transmundane" "levels" as an ultimate differential criterion, since the *via negativa* proceeds originally, in *all* attitudes of *epoché*, irrespective of intentional differentiations in their noematic aims, from an *attitude to consciousness*, from the "*terminus a quo*" of "all theoretical, axiological or practical attitudes" of my "*Cogito*" or "*sum cogitans*",[17] and not from an *attitude to the world*. The merely ecstatic conception of religion and of the "mystical" *epoché* (as envisaged by Jaspers) disregards, besides that, the ultimate *acosmic intentness of the ascetic religion* on which I shall try to base my definition of religion from the Buddhist standpoint.

(b) Postulated by this acosmic attitude, the ideal of the ascetic practice, of hermitic life, is the *escape* from the world. Only as deeply irreligious times of "*idola fori*" as the twenthieth century could so grossly misunderstand the highest religious ideal of escape for its social "unhealthiness" as it is brandmarked today.[18]

Regardless of any *consesnsus gentium* sanctioned by all "closed religions" (Bergson), understood as an integral social formation apart from our interest in philosophical faith, Buddhism can be considered a religion among other only in so far as a definition of religion can comprize the idea of *hermitic life* as a way to the ultimate attainment of its goal — beyond any transcending metaphisical justification. To this effect the philosophical aspect is limited in the *Buddha-dhammo* to the gnoseological scheme: *sīlaṁ — samādhi — paññā*, or to the belief that no attainment of wisdom (*paññā*) is possible for the introvert seeker (*sāvako*, "listener" becoming a *muni*, or "silent sage") without the existential prerequisite of purification through moral virtue (*sīlaṁ*) and mental discipline (*samādhi*). By this latter is meant the *sati-paṭṭhānam* method which proceeds by the "contemplation of the body *in* the body, of feelings *in* feelings, of mental states and their contents *in* mental states and contents", thus *strictly excluding* all ecstatic transcending in "transmundane" experiences. Without these preconditions all knowledge remains mere *diṭṭhi* (Greek *doxa*),

consisting of "views", "opinions" or "beliefs" concerning extrovert ("extensional", *āyatanam*) objectified facts of scientific knowledge-about-the-world (*lokāyatam*). Rationality or irrationality of knowledge have here no more bearing on the criteria of distinction between philosophical and religious knowledge.

(4) In the selection of elements for the *classification of religions*, with respect to the limits postulated in the specific case under discussion, careful consideration should be given to the following trends in religious experience :



Notes

(a) The diagonal line may serve to delimit Buddhism from any other type of Indian or European religions. (In this case I would like to leave open the problem of classification of Chinese religions.)

(b) When the definition of religions is elicited from the lowest specific difference, from the dichotomic belief in God and soul, it appears to be applicable only to the three Biblical religions: Judaism and its offshots, Christianity and Mohammedanism. (In the primitive polytheism, but also in its extant forms of popular Indian religions, the dichotomy of God and soul is rendered doubtful.)

(c) Even European pantheism, as at least a potential trend of philosophical belief, and the Indian Vedāntic belief in the Absolute as "one without a second" (*advaita*) would obviously remain excluded and "left out in the cold", as Vivekānanda put it.—Thus the area between the main diagonal and the broken line parallel to it forms a disputed area for an adequate application of the pseudo-inductive method starting from the "surreptitious assumption that theism is self-evident" and taking theism as its basic *differentia specifica.*

(d) At the same time we can consider this middle area, less artificially, as a historically given field of transitional formations, mainly between the acosmic and the cosmic trend, resulting, as it seems, from a more or less consequent and explicit recognition of *the ideal of asceticism as the fundamental phenomenon of religious experience.* In the formation of genuine religious mentality cosmic orientation will consequently appear as a "natural" impediment. A permanent dialectical tension in the development of historical religions seems to confirm this estimate.

In the early cryptic stages of Graeco-Roman religions, arising from oriental backgrounds of magic and mystery cults, the selective principle of *individual religious vocation* was still confirmed. Yet the ascetic discipline had already been replaced during an "axial" epic period by a bond ("*religio*") whose "yoke" (*yogaḥ*) was originally not less rigorous, but whose ultimate aim had been expanded into epical attainments of magic powers (*siddhi*). (Here *Rāmāyana* and *Mahābhārata* are considered as archetypes of "axial" history.) On the western soil the secularization of the sacerdotal office was a rapid process of emerging from the *decorum* of occult mysteries and abandoning them as unnecessary and even suspect to social morality.

A good deal of hymns in the extant collection of the *Rig-veda* are clearly marked by a fine irony of intellectual criticism denoting a not less rapid degeneration of the brāhmanic religion, down to the immoral conditions exposed by the Buddho in the *Kandaraka-suttam* (our text 13 above).

On the other hand, the *ascetic religion* re-emerges first as an immediate social reaction of heterodox mendicant orders (*Sannyāsins,*

Buddhist *samaṇā*), and then recedes, always again, to its primal stability in the hermitic *diaspora* of "Old Believers" (Pāli *thero,* Sanskrit *sthaviraḥ*, Russian *starets*), where it continues to survive and to reaffirm itself morally invigorated by hardship and persecution. Approaching the recesses of any hermitic religion, the first ambiguous figure that we may meet is *"le prophète qui crie dans le désert · et refuse d'en sortir"* (Camus).

Thus the area between the two lines on our seheme marks the epic "battlefield" (*dharma-kṣetraṁ* in the *Bhagavad-gītā*) of two antagonistic tendencies influencing the formation of religious mentality throughout historical processes.

1. Quotations of Pāḷi texts have been adapted prevalently from the Pāḷi Text Society Translations Series (London). For the *Majjhimanikāyo* the unpublished translation by the late Ñāṇamoli thero (of the Island Hermitage, Ceylon) has often been consulted with advantage. For the collections of texts conventional abbreviations by initials are used (M. for Majjhima-nikāyo, D. for *Dīgha-nikāyo, S.* for Saṁyutta-nikāyo, A. for Anguttara-nikāyo, Dhp. for Dhammapadam).

2. An astonishingly close analogy between the formulation of the four antinomies of the dialectical reason by Kant and the same basic structure of the four groups of "views" (*diṭṭhi*, cf. *doxa*) in the *Brahma-jāla-suttam* (D. 1) has been singled out in my papers, *Dependence of punar-bhava on karma in Buddhist philosophy*, and *My approach to Indian philosophy*, in *Indian Philosophical Annuals*, Vols. I and II (1965, 1966, University of Madras, under my lay name Chedomil Velyachich).

3. A parallel on this point is elicited in brief in my essay on *Aniccaṁ*, for a forthcoming publication of the Buddhist Publication Society, Kandy, Ceylon.

4. "We therefore compare all the dogmatists to people who imagine that, if only they go straight forward long enough, they will come to the end of the world, but Kant had then circumnavigated the globe, and has shown that, because it is round, we cannot get out of it by horizontal movement, but that by perpendicular movement it is perhaps not impossible to do so. It can also be said that Kant's teaching gives the insight that the beginning and the end of the world are to be sought not without us, but rather within." *The World as Will and Representation*, transl. by E. F. J. Payne, Dover Publications, New York, 1966; vol. I, pp. 420-1. Cf. My book, *Schopenhauer and Buddhism*, pp. 84-87, Buddhist Publication Society, Kandy, Ceylon. 1970.

5. Practices singled out in our condensation of the above text are those most prominently characteristic, still to-day, for Jain *munis.*

6. *The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda*, vol. VIII, p. 199. (Ed. Advaita Ashrama, Calcutta, 3rd ed. 1959.)

7. Cf. *Parerga und Paralipomena*, vol. II (P. Deussen's ed, *Arthur Schopenhauers Sämtliche Werke*, München, 1913), p. 422, § 181, and *Ueber den Satz vom Grunde* (2nd ed., Deussen, pp. 233, 237). Campare also my book, *Schopenhauer and Buddhism* pp. 11ff, 22, 31-33.

8. *Man in the Modern Age* (London, 1959), p. 142.

9. *The Great Philosophers* (London, 1962), pp. 313, 311.

10. Id., pp. 316, 279, 317, 316, 321.

11. Id. 351.

12. Id. 216.

13. Id. 45.

14. E. Husserl "*Ideas : General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology* (English transl. by W. R. Boyce Gibson, New York, Macmillan, 1931), pp. 41-3. In my article, *A Western Approach tu Buddhist Meditation* published in *The Buddhist* (Colombo) Vesak 1959, under my lay name C. Veljacic, a parallel is drawn between E. Husserl's modern version of *epoché* as epistemological reduction of noetic and noematic structures to the pure "stream of consciousness", and the Buddhist method of meditative reduction in the spheres or *rūpa* - and *arūpa-jhānaṁ* to the *bhavaṅga - sotaṁ*.— As to the obviously Indian provenience of Pyrrho's doctrine of *epoché*, the conjecture of a direct Jain influence, suggested both by doxographical and historiographical arguments, is proposed in my paper *Greek and Roman Sources of Information on India*, published in the Yugoslav journal *Antiquité vivante*, (with an English synopsis) in vol. I, 1961, pp. 78-81, and 94.

15. *The Great Philosophers*, p. 36.

16. *The World as Will and Representation*, vol. I, § 68 (Payne's transl., p. 390)

17. Cf. Husserl, *Ideen*, vol. II (M. Biemel's edition, Haag, Nijhoff, 1952), p. 105.

18. The protest against imposing imperatives of social subserviency to religion is becoming more and more acute as an issue of central importance also in the actual crisis of Christian dogmatism. Paul Tillich, in his book *The Eternal Now* (London, 1963), formulates this question in a sermon on St. Paul's Epistle, "Do not be conformed", and also with reference to the saying of Jesus, "I have come to set a man against his father...He who loves father or mother more than me is not worthy of me...", as follows : "Why does Paul attack conformism? Why does he not call the Christian the perfectly adjusted man?..His thought is far from this, and certainly he could not have been called a good educatator according to the criterion of 'adjustment'..Every Christian must be strong enough to risk non-conformity, even in the radical sense that Jesus describes with respect to one's family .." (pp. 115ff, 144).

S. Gopalan

CONCEPT OF MOKṢA: ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR HINDU ETHICS

Of the several criticisms levelled against Hindu philosophy the one with which a student of Hindu ethics is concerned most is that the Hindu philosophers do not accord importance to life in society. The fact that *mokṣa* is considered the ultimate ideal for man is pointed out to substantiate the view that Hindu philosophy is concerned with the individual rather than society and hence the other-regarding virtues—the essential pre-requisite of an activistic ethic are significantly absent in it.

In the Hindu ethics *mokṣa* is no doubt considered the supreme end of man (*paramapuruṣārtha*), but it is important that it be remembered that it is one of the four ends of man, the other three being *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma*. The concept of the puruṣārthas reflects the deep psychological insight into human nature of the Hindu philosophers who appreciated fully that man is neither completely different from nor identical with the animals. If the animal in him accounts for the biological urges, impulses and instincts found in man, the uniqueness of the human species is discernible in man's aspiring for certain ends other than the mere animate states of existence. The unique quality of self-reflective, self-critical and self-correctional approach to life is responsible for man trying to attain an integration of personality by bringing into unison the varied activities resulting from his basic psychological structure. The emphasis on self-analysis, the insistence on a searching inquiry into one's own conduct and the exhortation to better one's own behaviour imply clearly that the Hindu philosophers were individualists in the sense that they considered the individual primarily responsible for realising ideals in life. It should not be construed here that society is completely disregarded, for it is meaningless to talk of a society in the abstract without reference to the

individuals constituting it and ethics itself derives its significance only in a social context. The end of *mokṣa* envisaged becomes meaningful only in a social context since it cannot be attained without the individual getting rid of egoism and attaining an integrated personality. All the same the concept of *mokṣa,* by its very nature points to the cultivation of ascetic tendencies — marked by a sense of detachment which, when properly cultivated results in attachment to and consideration for all.

Such an analysis of the twin-aspects of *mokṣa* — the individual and social — points to the Hindu philosopher's view that no human being is either completely individualistic or solely social. The individual and the social elements are so inextricably woven together in the texture of human nature that the individual cannot escape from looking inward, keeping himself aloof from society and analysing himself, his own thoughts and feelings. At the same time again he cannot be so continuously or always because of the other elements in his nature which do make him outward-looking, socially inclined. Corresponding to these two tendencies are the individual's detaching himself from the others and being concerned with realising his own nature and the individual's having a concern for the others in society, mingling with them and finding pleasure in losing himself in working for their welfare.

The deeper significance of *mokṣa* as an ideal for man is understandable in the light of the analysis of human nature referred to above. Since the individual and social aspects of human nature cannot be separated completely, the more individualistic goals like *mokṣa* do have their social implications and do influence society. The realisation of the ideal of *mokṣa* by the individual is considered a consequence of his controlling and coordinating the various elements in him. Though as an ideal it is pursued by the individual for its own sake, once self-realisation takes place, he cannot but be useful to the others. In this sense the concept of *mokṣa* is the concept of spiritual perfection. When the individual aims at perfecting himself, he has to shed off all his egoistic and selfish tendencies. In the very process of striving to perfect himself the individual gets initiated more and more in the art of giving his all to others and it is only to be expected that when perfection is attained by him the individual does not cease to work for the welfare of the others. On the other hand working for humanity becomes his second nature and he spontaneously takes upon himself the responsibility of furthering the good of humanity.

Such a perfectionist type of philosophy points to an intimate relation between thought and will. Thought and will act and

react upon each other and so all philosophies have both their theoretical as well as practical sides to their teachings. It is in the concept of *mokṣa* in which the correlation between theory and practice as envisaged in the Hindu philosophy finds its fulfilment.

It might be objected here that the ideal, being eschatological rests on mere speculation or dogma; and that though it may be regarded as the goal of religion, it can hardly be represented as that of philosophy. Though on the face of it this seems to be an unanswerable objection, on a careful analysis we find it a misunderstanding of Hindu thought. For, thanks to the presence of positive thought in India, we find the *mokṣa* ideal being brought within the sphere of experience and verification as *jīvan-mukti* or deliverance during life. We see this as a part and parcel of a very influential doctrine in the *Upaniṣadic* period and, it has since been woven into the tissue of more than one classical system of thought. Even in the case of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* and the *Viśiṣtādvaita* systems which do not formally accept this ideal, there is clearly recognised a stage between enlightenment and actual liberation (*videhamukti*) which admits of being so described because it marks the culmination of securing *mokṣa* on reaching which the aspirant (*sādhaka*) has only to bide his time for attaining it.

The aim of *mokṣa* understood in this sense is not merely acquisition of knowledge (*jñāna*) or mere self-discipline but a certain immediate experience resulting from both. It is this experience typified in *jīvan-mukti* or the resulting attitude of mind towards life and the world that should be understood when we speak of *mokṣa* as the ideal or the ultimate goal of the individual.

This can be illustrated from two different points of view. The aim of the one is cultivating absolute and unqualified detachment from everything. The other view aims at detachment from the mere particular and, in effect, equal attachment to all. Though thus differing essentially, the influence of both the teachings alike is ascetic, so far as their bearing upon the disciple himself is concerned. But, the manner in which that result is brought about is somewhat different as the view is non-dualistic or dualistic.

The non-dualistic view denies the contrast between the individual and the world and affirms that the individual is non-different from Reality — a truth the necessary consequence of realising which will be the complete effacement of individuality. At this stage morality is necessarily to be transcended, for, the very idea of obligation disappears owing to the negation of all contrasts including that between the individual and society. Such a one the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*

says: "is not touched by thoughts like: 'Have I not done the right? Have I done the wrong'?"[1] This cosmological thinking signifies that the individual will feel equally attached to all that is, and that whatever he does will be inspired by love which knows neither preferences nor exclusions. Such an ideal may minimise the importance of society but that is because it has not less regard for society but more for that wider entity which comprehends the whole of being. Social morality, however much it may widen the outlook of man from the individual's standpoint really keeps him isolated from the rest of creation; all isolation is bondage in this view. The egotism of the species must also be got rid of and the individual will be able to do so only when he has transcended the anthropocentric view and can look upon everything as equally holy—whether it is a cow or elephant or dog, the cultured brahmin or the outcaste that feeds on dogs.[2]

According to the non-dualistic view *mokṣa* refers not to a new state to be attained but is the realisation of what has always been the case. It is realising what has always been one's innate nature. It is not the academic understanding of the identity between the individual self and the universal self that is considered vital for *mokṣa*. Purification of the affections and cultivation of the will are the necessary preliminaries. But, neither moral perfection nor religious acts are required as direct aids to it. The stage of morality should be transcended. Even the most advanced stage of moral perfection signifies that the individual is striving hard to fight against his lower self. The striving is completely overcome in the case of the liberated man.

The liberated man does not necessarily give up all activity as is illustrated by the strenuous life which Śri Śaṁkara himself lead, but it does not proceed from any selfish impulse or even a sense of obligation to others. Blind love for the narrow self which ordinarily characterises any man and the consequent clinging to the mere particular, in his case are replaced by enlightened and therefore equal love for all. The basis for this universal love is furnished by the Upaniṣadic teaching: "That thou art". We should do unto others what we do to ourselves, because they are ourselves — a view which places the golden rule of morality on the surest of foundations. The identity - feeling that the liberated man gets is described in the *Gitā*: "Who sees all beings in himself and himself in all beings — he will dislike none."[3] The various stages of realising the ideal are considered valuable since, for most individuals passing through them only enables them to attain the universal outlook. The concept

of *mokṣa* considered in this light and characterised by these qualities cannot, therefore be considered a purely individualistic one.

It is interesting to note that though there are differences between the non-dualistic and the dualistic systems, both agree in holding that ultimately speaking the individual is to get rid of his *ahaṁkāra* or egoism. Getting rid of egoism is indicated by voluntary self-surrender (to God), according to the pluralistic systems. The scope of "activity" is also greatly extended since surrendering oneself to God implies the obligation (felt) towards all that is and not merely towards fellow-men. The dualistic and pluralistic systems insist that this is accomplished by the *bhakti-mārga* or the path of devotion to god.

Bhakti is of the nature of supreme love of God.[4] Supremacy of love consists in three things. First, it should be free from egoism and must be untainted by any base ulterior motive. Secondly, it should prevent any other worldly love (understood as narrow love of things of the world) in the mind of the devotee. Thirdly, there should be complete self-forgetfulness on the part of the lover. So it can be maintained that man's surrendering to God can be said to be complete only when there is absolute merging of the devotee in God, i.e., when the ego completely disappears. This is indeed the highest experience of all saints as we find it described in the scriptures. For example Śuka says: "These indeed love themselves in Hari".[5] So also in describing the divine love of a gopi the *Bhāgavata* says: "A gopi whose mind is given to Krishna places her arm on another and says: See I am Krishna".[6] The *Bhāgavata* describes the various grades of bhaktas thus: "He is the foremost of bhaktas who finds in everything the God that is in his own self, and finds all these things in his own self which is God. He is a meddling devotee who cherishes affection, friendly feeling, compassion and indifference towards God, to his devotees, to the ignorant, and to those who hate him. He is a beginner who worships with faith Hari in images only and not in his devotees and others. It is evident from the above that the various types of bhaktas represent the varying degrees of perfection and that the true bhakta's attitude towards life and world is itself the culmination of all spiritual practices resulting in unselfish love and manifesting itself in selfless service in the spirit of worship of God. This is evident from Nārada's description of the realised man as having transcended the ego, comes to have a type of non-attachment that is spontaneous, and not the result of any effort.[7] He has no desire except the love of God and serving the world as his manifestation; he has no hatred except indignation against evil and unrighteousness. And he does not exert himself to promote his own self-interest, but works for the good of all without any sense of ego

or of any feeling of external compulsion. He, moreover, specifically points out that there is no inherent opposition between renunciation and service, for what is renounced is not external activity but the ego.

It is evident then that *mokṣa* cannot be reached by bypassing morality or ignoring it. The celebrated passage in the *Kaṭhopaniṣad* "Not he who has not ceased from evil conduct; not he who is not tranquil; not he who cannot concentrate his mind; nor even he whose mind is not composed can reach this (Self) through Knowledge."[8] gives us the minimum requirement for *mokṣa*, namely morality. Good life is indispensable and absolutely necessary for perfection. There is no jumping from an unregenerate life of impulse and instincts to *mokṣa*. It is thus seen that *mokṣa* as the ultimate goal in life, when attained, transforms the entire outlook on society, nay, the world. The man who has realised himself in the above sense is the perfected man and for him his own individual welfare is not more important than that of the others.

Thus the significance of *mokṣa* as an ideal for society is understood best when we consider it not as an isolated value, but as one of the four-fold fundamental aspirations of man (*caturvidhapuruṣārtha*). For the purposes of this paper an elaboration of *artha* and *kāma* as values instrumental to *mokṣa* has not been considered essential and has hence been merely referred to at the beginning.

1. II, 9.
2. *Bhagavad Gītā :* V. 18.
3. VI. 29.
4. *Nārada Bhakti Sūtras*, 2.
5. *Bhāgavatā :* X, 29, 15.
6. X, 30, 19.
7. *Nārada Bhakti Sūtra*, 5; Cf. *Bhagavad Gītā* : XVIII. 57.
8. II, 24.

R. Sundara Rajan

OBSERVATION AND INTERPRETATION

Problem: Contemporary philosophers of science take the so called H-D (hypothetico-deductive) as the central feature of the methodology of the exact sciences — Wisdom,[1] Popper,[2] Braithwaite[3] and Hempel[4] have stressed the role of deduction in scientific explanation as contrasted with the inductive accounts of Mill,[5] Reichen bach[6] and Von-mises.[7] According to H-D theorists scientific explanation is deductive with laws or law like statements as premises. Hempel's model of a H-D system which follows some remarks of Popper in '*The Logic of Scientific Discovery*' may be represented as a logical structure consisting of (1) a set of statements asserting the occurence of certain events, Cl......Cn at certain times and places and (2) a set of hypotheses such that (a) the statements of both groups are reasonably well confirmed by empirical evidence and (b) from the two groups of statements the sentence asserting the occurence of the event in question can be deduced.

Israel, Scheffler[8] and Ernst Nagel[9] use a simplified model as below :

Explanans

Logical deduction *Explanandum* { (a) initial condition statements
(b) universal hypothesis

Sentence describing the event
to be explained.

This deductivist approach to the problem of scientific explananation has the following essential features (1) the explandum i.e. the thing to explained, must follow logically from the explanans. (2) The

explanans must contain general laws (hypotheses) (3) the explanans must have empirical content.

H-D theorists have also claimed that this deductive model fits more neatly the methodology of the exact sciences and this claim has gone more or less unchallenged. Even N. R. Hanson[10] who is, in many ways, an acute critic of Popper — Hempel lines of thought in philosophy of science, has preserved the essentials of the Hempelian view, only distinguishing Retroductive inference (R-D) from hypothetical deductive inference (H-D). A classic illustration of the H-D mode of scientific explanation given in recent books of philosophy of science is Newton's *Principia*. Harry Prosch[11] summarises the contemporary interpretation of Newton's methods as follows: "In the first place, the scientist proceeding according to scientific method must already have arrange to get very carefully acquired and very objectively accurate data, or observational facts concerning the subject he is investigating. Kepler's work could not have been accomplished without the accurate information about the positions of the planets in the sky at particular dates and times which Tycho Brahe had so painstakingly recorded. Secondly the scientist must devise (i.e. think of) a hypothesis that will account for or 'explain' the data, that is a theory that will show how the events grew out of each other and are coherently related to each other in terms of certain general laws or principles or causal factors. Kepler tried a large number of curves which he hoped would fit the observed relative positions of the earth, the planets and the sun, before he found that elliipses would successfully do the job. Newton working in his time with the eliptical orbits of the planets as already proven, and thus more or less data themselves, had to try to explain the forces which would hold the planets in such eliptical orbits. *His* hyopthesis included such concepts as the atomicity and inertia of bodies, their gravitational forces and the laws of motion. These then became parts of the hypothesis which he found did account for and explain the data."

When one compares these modern interpretations of Newton's method with what Newton himself has to say a surprising fact at once impresses itself on us. Newton's hostility to hypothesis is a matter of common knowledge. In the opening paragraphs of the *Optics*[12] he writes "my design in this book is not to explain the properties of Light by Hypothesis. But to propose and prove them by reason and experiments." And similarly in the general scholium of the *Principia*[13] he tells us "hitherto I have not been able to discover the cause of those properties of gravity from phenomena and I frame no hypotheses. For whatever is not deduced from phenomena is to be called a hypothesis and hypotheses whether metaphysical or physical whether

occult qualities or mechanical have no place in experimental philosophy."

As Alexander Koyre[14] has pointed out Andrew Mott's translation of 'Hypothesis non fingo' as 'I do not *frame* hypotheses' does not seen to be correct either to the spirit or the letter of Newton. 'I *feign* no hypothesis' would be a more adequate rendering. Similary in the Regulae also Newton seems to be advocating a purely inductivist account.

Confronted by this specific and pointed animus against the use of hypothesis, it would seem necessary for a modern theorist to give some explanations of these abjurations. But unfortunately as Koyre[15] and Mandelbaum[16] have shown, a proper interpretation of these Newtonian ideas is among the most vexed of all points in the history of modern scientific thought. The present paper attempts to offer a few tentative remarks towards such an interpretation. But let us first see why this issue cannot be passed over lightly as having little philosophic consequence. Confronted by this descrepency between Newton's actual procedure and his description or interpretation of it, some have remarked that this is a capital case of philosophical lag and that this only shows the over riding importance of following a scientist's operative and actual methods rather than his methodology. In Kaplan's terms,[17] the actual procedures and methods would constitute a scientist's *lagic in use* while his post facto descriptions and interpretations would form his *reconstructed logic*, which may, on occasions, be some what distorting. In a similar way, Einstein is supposed to have said that if we wish to understand what science is we must observe what the scientist does and not merely what he says he does. Now, while there may be an element of truth in this, yet, the pre-supposition behind this attitude, namely, that action is, simpler and more intelligible than interpretation may not always be true.

Furthermore, we feel that this 'operational' point of view does not really touch the really intriguing question as to why Newton should have misdescribed his own practice. Some have argued that Newton looked at his own work through the distorting prism of Bacon's empiricism and while one may not agree that it was Bacon specifically who was the distorting medium, yet, if one accepts the discrepancy between his practice and his precepts, there must have been some, if not distorting atleast, a refracting medium.

But it may be claimed that this is afterall a matter of Newton's psychology. Now the clear cut distinction between the psychological context of discovery and the logical context of justification, as drawn

by Popper,[18] may perhaps fit a finished and completed scientific theory. When we have the entire theory before us, in a completed form we can no doubt distinguish its actual logical structure from the psychological aspects easily. To give point to this, let us show how such an attempted separation actually breaks down in a concrete case. Now, H—D theorists have argued that from the point of view of the logic of justification, the only question is whether a given set of hypotheses leads to a particular prediction of not i.e. the context of justification is solely concerned with the logical relations between hypotheses and their entailed logical consequences but actually scientists first meet with an unexpected or surprising situation, fact or event and then hunt for suitable laws or hypothesis which would explain them. In terms of Hanson's[19] distinction, we may therefore say that H—D arguments are logical R—d arguments are psychological. But as Hanson himself has pointed out the structure of both H—D and R—D arguments is the same. Consider the following schema:

H — D	*R — D*
A, B, C (initial conditions) plus H (hypothesis or Law)	D_1, D_2, D_3 (unexpected observations)
↓ ↓	↓ ↑
D_1, D_2, D_3, etc. (observation sentences)	A, B, C, (initial conditions plus H_1, or H_2 or H_3 (hypotheses)

Notice that the solid arrows represent the psychological order of of the arguments. The beginnig in the one case is H plus, A, B, C, which set is then unpacked into D_1, D_2, D_3; in the other case the occasion for enquiry is D_1, D_2, D_3. The argument move from these to a set of hypotheses A, B, C, and H which can explain the observations. In other words the H-D arguments move from the top of the page to the bottom whereas the R — D argument moves from the bottom to the top. But now notice the dotted arrow which represents the logical order of the two arguments, in both cases it points in the same direction i.e. from H to D. Hence, the logical cri teria for both the arguments are the same i.e. whether there is some logical route from H to D.

To put it in general terms what we are arguing for is this: We may have to philosophize about science at two levels or rather science

has two types of philosophy attached to it ; one when it is growing or developing, that is, when it is a research discipline, in Mead's terms, and the second when it reaches completion and achieves the dubious distinction of entering into text books. To regard the analysis of the first stage as merely the psychology of science and the second alone as the philosophy of it may be seriously distorting. The logical, epistemological and philosophical features of science are not invarient i.e. constant in the course of its development and distinctions which are important at one stage may be irrelevant when transferred to the other. Our present problem is a case in point. If we dismiss the question of the reasons for Newton's banishment of hypothesis treating it merely as a psychological detail, we feel that we would be missing a rare chance to clarify what 'observation', 'theory', 'hyopthesis', 'verification' etc. mean to science when it is at its most creative moment.

We feel that a clarification of this issue may be attempted in two stages. (1) A determination of the specific sense of 'hypothesis' which Newton seems to be having in mind and an (2) an interpretation of the philosophical purport of the celebrated Regulae, especially rule III. With regard to the first point, certain preliminary remarks have to be made. As F. Cajori[20] has pointed out "it should be noted that Newton does not advance 'hypothesis non fingo' as a general porposition applying to all his scientific endeavour ; it is used by him in a public statement relating to that special, that difficult and subtle subject, the real nature of gravitation." It may also be noticed here that the same point is made by P.E.M. Jourdain.[21] What Newton seem to be saying is that a speculative explanation of gravitation is not the concern of the *Principa*, although he did offer such an explanation elsewhere.

Secondly, Alexander Koyre has convincingly argued that Mott's translation of 'hypothesis non fingo' into 'I do not frame hypothesis' does not seem to be quite correct and that 'I do not feign hypothesis' would seem to be better; 'feign' (feindre) implies falsehood while 'frame' does not. Newton in a parallel passage of the Optics writes 'without feigning hypothesis'.

Now if the dictum is taken as 'I do not feign hypothesis' it becomes clear that Newton is using 'hypothesis' here pejoratively, as something vain or fictitious. But this pejorative use of 'hypothesis' is a special use and not at all universal in Newtonian circles ; even Newton seems to be using hypothesis non pejoratively in other cases. Hence it becomes necessary to briefly distinguish the various meanings of 'hypothesis' and then determine the specific sense in which it is used by Newton in this context.

The term 'hypothesis does not seem to have a univocal meaning; it covers a wide variety of meanings which easily pass into one another. However, all the meanings seem to have this in common, a hypothesis is not a judgment, properly speaking, but an *assumption* or a conjecture. From this one can easily pass on to the first or major meaning of 'hypothesis'; as a proposition or a group of propositions that one poses purely and simply to draw out its logical consequences. This seems to be the sense involved when Newton asks us to suppose or admit that bodies attract each other with a certain type of force and then consider what will be the result of those assumptions. It is true that when Newton analyses the implication of these different laws of attraction, he does not himself use the word 'hypothesis', but a Newtonian such as Clairaut[23] uses this term expressely.

Another meaning of the term can be distinguished when we attend to astronomical research. Astronomers since Ptolemy have termed 'hypotheses' propositions which allow one to deduce celestial phenomena or appearances from them. One variant of this astronomical usage would hold that the verification of these consequences does not in the slightest degree confer ontological truth upon the assumed propositions. It is thus that Osiander[24] presents the Copernican theory as a hypothesis—i.e. as a mere mathematical device pure and simple, which in no sense implies the truth of the system. This conception as Koyre[25] and Crombie[26] have pointed out, goes back to the Greeks and during the middle ages was adopted by Averroes and his followers.

The third meaning which seems to be a more extreme case of the second we have in Descartes who in is *Principia Philosophiaa*[27] tells us "I desire that what I have written be taken only as a hypothesis, something that is perhaps far removed from the truth, but however that may be I will believe myself to have really accomplished something if all the things which are deduced from it are entirely in conformity with experience." He also insists that a hypothesis, understood in this sense need not at all be true. "I will suppose here several (hypotheses) which I believe to be false, though their falsity does not at all prevent what may be deduced from them being true."[28] According to this view, a hypothesis seems to be a conscious fiction or falsity, assumed as such but which nevertheless leads to true consequences. Here, the divorce from truth seems to be complete.

We have now distinguished three main meanings or usages of the term 'hypothesis'. (1) hypothesis as an assumption or conjecture

which can be tested indirectly by way of its consequences. (2) A hypothesis as a purely mathematical or formal device whose sole function is to 'save the phenomena', and (3) a hypothesis as a conscious fiction, assumed as such, but which nevertheless leads to correct conclusions. Once we have distinguished three main meanings of 'hypothesis' we can perhaps become a little clearer as to the true purport and drive of Newton's banishment of hypothesis. It seems that he is clearly thinking of the Cartesian usage of the term, as a fiction or falsity consciously received as such. This may perhaps be supported by two sorts of considerations, direct as well as indirect. As for direct considerations we need only remark upon the explicit verbal formulation of the prohibition as "I do not *feign* hypothesis." As we have already remarfied 'feigning' clearly implies an element of fictitiousness or falsity i.e. if a hypothesis is *feigned* but not *framed*, then it is something like a conscious fiction known to be untrue. This seems to indicate that Newton is here specifically thinking of Descartes. Furthermore this imputation is further strengthened when we remmber that throughout the *Principia*, there is an under current of controversy with the Cartesians. As Koyre[29] has pointed out, after a careful study of the three editions of the *Principia*, the manuscripts show that Newton became progressively anti-Cartesian. Furthermore the very beginning of the Scholium[30] begins with a criticism of the Cartesians. "The hypothesis of Vortices is pressed with many difficulties." Again the projected fifth rule of the Regulae which was eventually dropped is clearly anti-Cartesian.[31] The projected fifth rule reads as follows: rule V "Whatever is not derived from the things themselves, whether by external senses or by the sensation of internal thoughts is to be taken for a hypothesis. Thus I sense that I am thinking which could not happen unless I have to sense at the same time that I am. But I do not sense that any idea whatever may be innate. And I do not take for a phenomenon only that which is made known to us by the five external senses, but also that which we contemplate in our minds when thinking : such as I am, I believe, I understand, I remember, I think, I wish, I am unwilling, I am thirsty, I am hungry, I rejoice, I suffer and those things which neither can be demonstrated from the phenomena nor follow from them by the argument of Induction, I hold as hypothesis."[32] As Koyre points out this projected rule seems to be specifically designed in an anti-Cartesian spirit against the doctrine of innate ideas. Thus both direct as well as indirect considerations seem to suggest that Newton is specifically thinking of the Cartesians in this context. But our task of interpreting Newton's philosophy of science is only half over. We have only clarified the negative part of his methodology ; the positive part (the Regulae) still remains to be understood. At first sight these Rules

of Reasoning in Philosophy seem to preach a pure inductivist doctrine. Rule I we are to admit no more causes of natural things than such as are both true and sufficient to explain their appearances.

To this purpose the philosophers say that nature does nothing in vain and more would be in vain, when less would serve ; for Nature is pleased with simplicity and affects not pomp of superfluous causes.[33]

Rule II—therefore to the same natural effects we must so far as possible assign the same causes.

As to respiration in a man and in a beast, the descent of stones in Europe and America the light of our kitchen fire and of the sun, the reflection of light in the earth and in the planets.[34]

As R.M. Blake[35] points out, these two rules are clearly methodological precepts of familiar inductivism ; the first is the rule of simplcity, while the second is one version of the principle of uniformity of nature. Similarly rule IV taken by itself seems to be straight forwardly inductivist. It reads : Rule IV in experimental philosophy, we are to look upon propositions inferred by general induction from phenomena as accurately or very nearly true, not withstandig any contrary hypothesis that may be imagined, till such time as other phenomena occur by which they may either be made more accurate or liable to exceptions. This rule we must follow so that the argument of induction may not be evaded by hypotheses.[36]

So far, Newton seems to be doing nothing more than merely insist upon the primacy of inductivist procedures, and certainly there is an important element of truth in this for there is an aspect of Baconian empiricism in Newton. But Rule III creates certain difficulties for such straight forward inductive interpretation of Newton. It is true that R.M. Blake[37] regards rule III as merely a formulation or application of rules I and II to slightly different cases but as Maurice Mandelbaum[38] has argued, this does not seem to be quite satisfactory ; rule IV does raise certain serious problems for any simple inductive or empiricist interpretation of Newton.

Rule III—the qualities of bodies which admit neither intensification nor remission of degrees, and which are found to belong to all bodies within the reach of our experiments are to be esteemed the universal qualities of all bodies what so ever.

For since the qualities of bodies are only known to us by experiments, we are to hold for universal all such as are universally in

agreement experiments, and such as are not liable to dimunition can never be taken away. We are certainly not to relinquish the evidence of experiments for the sake of dreams and vain fictions of our own devising; nor are we to recede from the analogy of nature which is wont to be simple and always consonant with itself. We in no other way know the extension of bodies than by our senses; nor do these reach it in all bodies but because we perceive extension in all that are sensible, therefore we ascribe it to all others also. That abundance of bodies are hard we learn by experience, and because the hardness of the whole arises from the hardness of the parts, we therefore justly infer the hardness of the individual particles, not only of the bodies we feel but of all others. That all bodies are impenetrable, we gather not from reason but from sensations. The bodies we handle we find impenetrable and thence conclude impenetrability to be an universal property of all bodies what so ever. That all bodies are movable and endowed with certain powers (which we call their inertia) of preserving in their motion, or in their rest, we only infer from the like properties deserved in the bodies which we have seen. The extension, hardness, impenetrability, mobility and inertia if the whole result from the extension, hardness, impenetrability, mobility and inertia of its parts, and hence we conclude the least particles of all bodies to be also extended and to be hard, impenetrable, movable and endowed with the proper inertia. And this is the foundation of all philosophy.

Lastly if it universally appears by experiments and astronomical observations that all bodies about the earth gravitate towards the earth and that in proportion to the quantity of the matter which they severally contained; that the moon like wise, according to the quantity of its matter gravitates towards the earth; that, on the other hand, our sea gravitates towards the moon and all the planets towards the sun; we must, in consequence of this rule, universally allow that all bodies what so ever are endowed with a principle of mutual gravitation; for the argument from the appearances conclude with more force for the universal gravitation of all bodies than for their impenetrability, of which, among those in the celestial regions we have no experiments, nor any manner of observation."[39]

Rule III, which has a more complex articulation than the others, seems to be made up of many levels. When Newton talks of 'not relinquishing the evidence of experiments for the sake of dreams and vain fictions of our own devising,' he is on the level of usual anti-cartensian polemics; at another level, when he talks of the analogy of nature and of perceiving extension in all sensible bodies and therefore ascribing it to other bodies as well, he seems to be making the

common inductive point regarding generalistation on the basis of experience. But there are complications yet, for at another level, Newton talks of ascribing properties such as hardness, mobility, impenetrability, inertia etc. not merely to bodies which are capable of being given in experience, but also to 'undivided particles',which are beyond experience altogether. In other words, Newton is concerned not merely with a common inductive generalisation from some cases to all, but also with an inference from experience to theoretical entities like particles etc. In recent times, Prof. Donald Williams[40] has called such an inference 'transdiction', Professor Price[41] would call this 'vertical causation.' It may be described as a movement of thought which goes from the level of experiential data to the level of theoretical grounds or conditions of those data. Obviously, in the present rule Newton seems to be thinking of transdiction as well as simple inductive generalisations. But the issue is even more complicated for at a fourth level, Newton talks of *perceiving* gravitation or inertia in observed bodies and this at once raises the question as to how this is possible. If Newton is interpreted as merely saying that we can legitimately *infer* certain properties from other properties of observed or experienced bodies, we can read him as merely emphasizing the legitimacy and importance of such transdictions. It is true that even this is enough to show that Newton is not a simple or naive inductivist. But actually the present rule is more complex than that, for it suggests that in some peculiar sense Newton regarded inertia and gravitational properties as facts; they are said to be perceived in bodies given in our experience and this goes far beyond the legitimacy of transdictive inferences. If we may give point to this, we can perhaps say that such transdictive operations are not merely inferential procedures; or, in other words, Newton holds that we can *see* intertia to be a property of bodies. This we feel is the heart of the matter and that, if only we can clarify the sense in which Newton claims this, we would have gone a long way towards understanding an important aspect of Newton's philosophy of science.

We wish to argue that in a sense Newton was right in his claim that he did not invent or frame hypotheses, but this need not mean that there were no hypotheses at all, or that he was merely recording facts and then generalizing them into laws. We wish to suggest that Newton's 'facts' and 'data' were not bare facts and data but facts seen in the light of or within a theoretical frame work; he was not just seeing, but *seeing as*. The theoretical component was constutive of the very facts selected, such that lacking this theoretical orientation, they would not have been what they were for Newton. The comparison of Newton with Aristotle on intertia would bring this out vividly.

But let us first distinguish the two concepts of observation, namely, *seeing and seeing as.*

Prof. N. R. Hanson[42] has called attention to this feature of the concept of seeing or observation in his *Patterns of Discovery*. After a brilliant analysis, Hanson concludes that observation, in any sense important for science is already a theory — laden activity. We need not repeat here the phases of Hanson's analysis, but we wish merely to emphasize one aspect of it. The usual mode of conceptualising observational situations as firs *seeing* patterns and then interpreting them as coherent figures, very soon ends in puzzlement as Hanson so clearly shows. Part of the puzzlement here we think is due to our continuing to use the language of 'interpretation'. If, instead of talking even analogically of interpretation, we talk, of perceiving organised shapes and figures, we can come to understand the situation some what better. Organisation is out there, in the things themselves; it is not imputed by us. It is of course not an item, but rather the way the elements are appreciated".[43] The organisation or articulation of a figure is not seen in the sense in which the elements are seen; but neither is it an imputation or an inference made by us. "The plot is not another detail in the story, nor the tune just one more note. Yet without plots and tunes details and notes will not hang together. Similarly organisation is nothing that registers on the retina along with other details; yet it gives the lines and shapes a pattern".[44] Where this is lacking, we would be left with an unmeaning chaos; were this wholy lacking, we would be left with an unnameable chaos. It is important to emphasise here that organisation is not given in the sense in which the details are given, for once, this nonsensory character of organisation is underlined, it is not necessary to stop at perceptual organisation, sensory, gestalten. The simplest level, of course, is perceptual organisation; but it can and does assume more complex forms; there could be a kind of organisation brought about by a whole theory. Experience may, in some cases, be shaped and structured in accordance with a new theoretical pinciple; a new idea may lead to new perceptions, an abstract hypothesis may actually structure our perceptions, our visual data, so closely that we see them as instances, embodiments of the principle itself. In such cases, the idea shapes the reality for us. The presence and operation of such high level theoretical organisation factors become noticeable not normally, but only in certain special cases, where two such principles are struggling for mastery. It is in such exceptional situations that a new theory is born; only when we follow the birth and emergence of the new theory, of a new point of view, do we become conscious of the depth of meaning hidden in the little word 'observation'. Observation, for

an emerging theory, is no passive mindless affair of simple receptivity. It is, rather the conquest of data by a principle or an idea. At such crucial turning points in science, the theory or hypothesis is a constitutive and not merely an epistemic element in the facts. We can, if we like. put it this way: Science does not see the world; it sees it as a world. If we are to understand the depath and profoundity of the controver in science, we must understand the sense in which Kepler and Tycho, Aristole and Newton, Soddy and Einstein, Heisenburg and Bohm do not see the same thing. In these travail and crises of the theories, a new vision, a new way of looking at the world is struggling to be born. Observation, for an emerging theory, is not just seeing but seeing as or seeing that; it is an activity which is theory laden, as Ryle[45] would put it and unless we appreciate this theory laden character of observation, we cannot fully appreciate the fundamental advances in science.

It is time now to give point to these remarks in terms of our specific example, Newton. The clearest example of the constitutive role of principles and abstract theoretical points of view is perhaps the phenomenon of motion, for, in motion, while there is an undeniable sensuous factor, yet the factor of abstract order and rational systematisation is equally present. Both kinematically and dynamically, unless we grant ceetain theoretical principles, unless we take up a certain conceptual point of view, motion ceases to be intelligible. Kinematically, this is the deep moral of zeno's paradoxes. To us now, motion as a continuous occupation of point-positions, is perfectly intelligible, because we implicitly acknowledge the principle of mathematical continuity, according to which there is an infinite number of points between any two given points, i.e. given the finite line-segment A — B, we implicitly accept that the number of points between A and B is nevertheless infinite. We are so used to this principle that we seldom remark upon its paradoxical character, for what it implies is that the infinite can be bounded by limits. To the Greeks this seemed utterly impossible and in Aristotle, we have a clear rejection of the actual infinite.

But granted this Greek denial of infinite, Zeno has very little difficulty in showing that motion is impossible. So here, we have a case where a certain abstract mathematical principle, the principle of continuity alone renders motion a significant fact.

Dynamically also the same constitutive role of principles and theoretical postulates can be illustrated. In Aristotle there occurs the startling statement that the motion of living beings or animals is more intelligible than the motion of in animate objects. P. Frank[46] is no

doubt correct in regarding this remark as a symbol of the radical contrast between the Aristotelian and the modern world views. For us the exact opposite would be true; the motion of animals is a highly complex affair whereas the motion of physical bodies is relatively simpler and more intelligible. But let us make a conscious effort to place ourselves within an Aristotelian frame work inorder to understand the significance of his remark. The important point to remember in this connection is that, for Aristotle, force is the causes of motion and merely of acceleration or change of motion, as for us. In other words, his principle of inertia is only the first half of the modern principle. In terms of the Aristotelian principle, it is easy to see why the motion of living beings should seen simpler and more intelligible. As long as a cat is stalking a mouse, for example, an Aristotelian would say that there is a force or conatus in operation and that when this conatus is withdrawn, the motion ceases. But consider the motion of a stone thrown up, in terms of this principle. The force is withdrawn the moment the stone leaves the hand and so according to this principle its motion should cease instantly, but as a matter of fact the stone describes a parabolic path. This seems unintelligible in terms of rational principles and naturaly therefore the motion of animals would be considred in some sense truer and more intelligible. But for us the exact opposite is the case, again because of our acceptance of a highly theoritical principle, namely Newton's first law or the modern principle of inertia. For us the two forms of natural motion are the horizontal inertial motion and the vertical gravitational motion of a body and any deviation from the resultant path determined by these two requires an adequate force function. Now, the path of a projectile is a very simple illustration of the operation of these two motions, whereas the path of a cat stalking a mouse is lighly deviant; in other to account for the complicated pattern of turns, twists, bounds and pauses of which the cat is capable, we must think of a bewilderingly complicated force function. Thus, for us, the motion of a physical body is far simpler and intelligible than that of an animal. The important fact to notice is that the radical change in the way we look at the world has been brought about by a change in theoretical principles.

The point of interest in this comparison of Aristotle's and Newton's formulations of the principles of inertia is that the difference between them does not remain a merely theoritical difference but spills over into a radical divergence of *ways of seeing the world.* The facts themselves are not the same for both. Aristotle quiet naturally sees the facts of motion as constantly dependent upon a force where as Newton sees force as outside the moving body, changing its velocity or direction. Aristotle looks upon motion as a phenomenon

which occurs now and then, against a constant background of rest and stability; whereas for Newton, motion itself has become a natural state, and hence the background. In terms of Gestalt theory therefore ground and figure have shifted and hence a change in preception has been brought about.

This radical change in the way of looking at the world is what is hinted at, almost as if it were a matter of course, in the complex articulation of rule III. For Newton the two principles of inertia and gravitation have become axiomatic and he *sees* the body as having both an inertial and gravitational motion. In Kantian lanhuage the rules are not merely in the understanding; they are in the sensibility itself. In the light of this we can perhaps understand why Newton should write almost as if inertia and attraction were phenomenological facts. But his is not a case of bare seeing, but a seeing as, a seeing highly charged with fundamental theory, a seeing under the agis and auspices of an idea. His arguments and descriptions and rules therefore are neither precepts for inductive generalisation, nor rules for inferential postulations but a species or type of 'argumentum ad oculos' in Curry's[47] phrase. In this sense therefore Newton is correct in holding that he did not invent or feign hypotheses as the Cartesians did. His hypotheses went far deeper; they were in the very seeing itself.

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C. Sampurna

THE CONCEPT OF PERSON IN STRAWSON AND VEDĀNTA

In P. F. Strawson's[1] description of our common conceptual structure, logical particulars play a fundamental role. Of these particulars, there are two types which he calls basic particulars. They are basic in the sense that they cannot be introduced or defined in terms of any other particulars or type of particulars. These two types of particulars are 1. Material bodies and 2. Persons. Strawson's claim is that we cannot think at all without employing directly or indirectly either of these two types.

The concept of a Person

Strawson starts by laying down three conditions of the applicability of the concept of a person.[2] These conditions may be called the condition of ownership, of unity and of intersubjectivity respectively. The first condition states that the concept of a person is the concept of a logical subject to which both physical and psychological states, properties and dispositions can be ascribed. In this sense, the person may be said to own or possess both types of predicates. The second condition further states that the two types of predicates are attributed to one and the same subject. There is no dualism of subjects as in Descartes. And the last condition lays down that one can apply the concept of a person in one's own case, only if one is prepared to apply it to others. In other words, there can be no solipsistic application of the concept; rather, one can describe oneself as a person only insofar as one recognizes others as persons.

These there general conditions of the applicability of the concept the person rule out certain influential philosophical theories. For example, the first condition rules out any Humean type of 'no self' doctrine, while the second rules out Cartesian dualism and third would refute solipsism.

The properties and attributes that may be ascribed to a person Strawson divides into two main categories-Material predicates or M-predicates, such as a certain weight, colour. etc., and psychological predicates or P-predicates, such as sensation, thought feeling, intention etc.[3] Strawson's first claim is that both M-predicates and P-predicates are attributed to one and the same subject. His second important claim is that the meaning of the predicate is the same both when it is applied to oneself and when it is applied to others. In other words, there is no type ambiguity, By 'type ambiguity' we mean that the meaning of a term changes when it is appled to oneself from what it is when it is applied to others. As far as M-predicates are concerned, clearly there is no type ambiguity. But Strawson seems to hold that even in the case of M-predicates, type ambiguity enters at another point. According to him, there is type ambiguity in the following:

A: I am hit by a stone.

B: This window is hit by a stone'.

In these two cases, the predicate 'hit by a stone' means two different things, 'If we want to locate type ambiguity, we would do better to say that thay mean one thing when applied to material things and another when applied to persons'.[4] We may summarise by saying that there is type ambiguity between personal and non-personal application of the predicate, but none at all between first person and second person applications of the predicate. However, we may remark here that the view that there is type ambiguity in the case of M-Predicates seems open to doubt. Certainly Strawson's specific example does not seem to indicate any difference in meaning. Hamphshire and others have claimed that in certain other predicates, such as 'beautiful' a difference can be noticed.[5] But if 'beauty' is regarded as purely an M-predicate, there does not seem to be any difference in meaning.

But the case of P-predicates is more complicated. They admit of first person as well as second person applications. However, according to Strawson, in their case also there is no type ambiguity. But he holds that there is a difference in the way in which P-predicates are applied. When I ascribe the predicate to myself, I do so directly, without any need of observation of behaviour. Strawson puts this by saying that first person uses are criterionless, whereas in the case of second person applicatioes behaviour serves as a 'logically adequate criterion'.[6] Behaviour, for Strawson, is not merely a symptom but a criterion. By this he means that we

do not merely infer that another person is depressed by observing his behaviour but we know that he is depressed. Strawson, is therefore, committed to two claims :

First person uses have no criteria, while second person uses have, but there is no type ambiguity between the two uses.

Here two important problems arise.

1. Can we ever make an assertion without a criterion ?

2. Can a predicate which has a criterion in one case and none at at all in another, yet mean the same in both the cases ?

We may compare Strawson's view with Cartesian dualism on the one hand, and Ryle's logical behaviourism on the other. For Descartes also, there is no type ambiguity because first person uses alone are proper applications. At the other extreme, for Ryle also, there is no type ambiguity ; but the reason here is the exact opposite of Descarates. For Ryle, second and third person uses alone are proper applications. From this it is clear that on the first point, there is no difference between the three positions. However, Strawson differs from Descartes as well as Ryle on second point. For the Cartesians there is no radical difference between first and second person uses because second person use is merely a derivātive use. Similarly, for Ryle also, there is no dfficulty because here the first person use is a derivative use. However, Strawson differs from both the positions because for him both uses are equally basic and inter-dependent ; nevertheless, there is a radical difference in their applications. It must be obvious both the extreme positions enjoy a certain advantage over Strawson.

Strawson, may be compared with Malcolm ; for both Malcolm and Strawson, first person uses have no criteria, but precisely on this ground Malcolm holds that first person uses are not cognitive and that they are not genuine statements.[7] But Strawson maiutains that they are genuine statements although there are no criteria in their case. The difference between Malcolm and Strrwson my be explained in terms of their different logical and epistemological presupositions. For Malcolm, a sentence can express a genuine assertion only if it is either true or false. Here Malcolm would seem to accept Russell's position. However, Strawson, like Frege,[8] seems to hold that there can be genuine sentence which are neither true nor false. Epistemologically also, for Malcolm, there can be no knowledge without criteria. Hence, he concludes that first person uses are not cognitive and that they do not give us knowledge. But for Strawson, there can be knowledge without criteria. The position of Strawson,

therefore, has a greater complexity. On the one hand, he has to argue that it is by meens of observed behaviour that we ascribe P—predicates to others; we do not have any direct knowledge of other minds. However, he has also to argue external behaviour is not merely a symtom but a criterion. This means that we do not merely infer other people's mental states but that we have a logically adequate basis for our knowledge of other minds.

The distinction between symptoms and criteria is therefore crucial to Strawson, but he nowhere clearly brings out the difference on the basis a few scatterd remarks. We may say that a criterioh, unlike a symptom, is a feature which is essentially involved in the very definition of a concept. Thus, 'making a certain sound' is a symptom of rain in the sense that although sound usually accompanied rain, yet there might be soundless rain. However, coldness and wetness are not symptoms but criteria of rain in the sense that we cannot even imagine rain which is not cold or wet. This is because coldness and wetness are what we mean by rain: as such, they constitute the meaning of the concept. Applying this distinction, we may say that Strawson is saying that a certain form of behaviour is involved in the very definition of a mental state. Taking anger as an example, we may say that anger consists of two parts, a certain feeling which we may call anger feeling and a certain form of behaviour which we may call anger behaviour. Usually, two positions may be taken in the analysis of the meaning of a P—predicate. One may say that anger behaviour is a mere symptom and therefore not essential to the concept af anger. Or, one may say that there is no such inner private state as the anger feeling and that anger means anger behaviour. But Strawson holds that the concept of anger includes both and that behaviour is as much a criterion as feeling. In our own case, we have a direct awareness of the feeling and in the case of others, we observe the behaviour, but since both are criteria of one and the same thing, we can very well claim that anger means the same whether it is applied to oneself or applied to others. This would seem to be a better way of defending the thesis that there is no type ambiguity in the case of P—predicates but this is not Strawson's way, for he does not regard feelings or inner experienced states as criteria at all. This brings him very close to Ryle, although he does not formally accept the position of Ryle. The only way out would be to accept inner experiences as criteria.

The acceptance of inner experiences as forms of criteria would lead us to a phenomenological form of Non-cartesian dualism, which would be acceptable to Vedānta. It seems to me that Vedānta could accept behaviour as a criterion in Strawson's sense, but it would also accept inner experiences as equally criteria,

since according to Vedānta, the person is essentially a self, The position of Vedānta therefore enjoys a logical advantage over Strawson and Ryle. Furthermore, it also goes beyond the contemporary forms of Non-Cartesian dualism we find in Smythies, Beloff, Kuhlenbeck and others,[9] for accrding to these these thinkers, there is a pulurality of pure selves. But one of the most difficult problems of Non-Cartesian dualism, is how to distinguish one pure self from another. Since the physical or the bodily aspects are not regarded as essential, the problem of distinguishing one pure self from another becomes insoluble in terms of Smyties' theory. For Vedānta, on the other hand, the plurality of selves is not an ultimate truth; ultimately, the self is one pure undivided consciousness.

The Concept of a person according to Vedānta

The Vedānta doctrine of the person has been frequently misunderstood and caricatured by rival schools both in India and the West. Pluralists and theists have accused Advaita of suprressing the value and dignity of the personality; they have said that Advaita glorifies an impersonal and abstract principle, But the true logical subtlity and philosophical depth of the Vedānta concept of a peason can be recovered only when we contrast it with contemporary discussions of the problem. One might almost says that the Vedānta view was far ahead of its times. As we shall see, not only do most of the contemporary problems arise within the terms of its conception but it also provides a way for reconciling and answering many of these contemporary questions.

To begin with general features: the Vedānta concept of a person is descriptive in very much the sense of Strawson. In the Introduction to his Sūtra-bhāṣya, Śaṁkara, while explaining how we attribute objective predicates to the self, states that allhough this attribution is false yet this is a natural course of conduct and language. Similarly, for Strawson, both M-predicates and P-predicates are attibuted to one and the same subject. Like Strawson, Śaṁkara would also locate this feature as due to the structure of our common language. But along with the structure of language, Śaṁkara would also include practical action as responsible for this. This is a hint that it is action rather than the structure of language that is the source of our concept of a person. Upto this point, the Vedānta view is descriptive, but it becomes revisionary in Strawson's sense when this super-imposition is regarded as a paradigm case of *avidyā* or metaphysical illusion.

Strawson would hold that task of philosophy is pure description and that it is philosophically wrong to say that a certain concept that

we all use is self-contradictory or incoherent, and that the task of philosophy is not to propose revisions or reconstructions. But even if one accepts the presuppositions of descriptive metaphysics, yet the Vedānta doctrine need not be brushed aside as merely revisionary for there are at east three modes of description. One might describe the structure of thought as revealed in language. This would mainly be the approach of linguistic philosophy. Vedānta would certainly admit the legitimacy of this approach in its own proper context. But one might also describe the phenomena as they present themselves to consciousness. This would be the approach of Phenomenology. The Vedānta description of the four states of the self is, in part, such a phenomenological description. Or, finally, one might describe the existential situation in which the person is presented and presents himself. The structural analysis of the ontological basis of the coucept of the person would be the only finally satisfactory explanation of both the phenomenological and linguistic descriptions. If one does not complete the phenomenological and logical analyses by means of a metaphysical theory, then, one's conception of the person could only be partial. It is precisely such an ontological analysis that we find in Vedānta.

We may better understand the Vedānta position if we see how it reconciles the two most influential of the contemporary theories of the mind-body relationship, namely, the Identity hypothesis of Feigl and the Non-Cartesian dulism of Smythies.

According to Feigl's hypothesis, there is an identity between the mental state and the corresponding neurophysiological state of the brain. This brain-mind identity is the core of his view. But according to Vedānta, there is an even deeper identy-not merely between the state of the mind and the state of the brain but also between the '*vṛtti*' (mental state) and the object. According to Vedānta, the mental state is a certain modificaeation of the *a ntaḥkaraṇa* which is physical. Thus, the mind, for Vedānta, is not radically opposed to the brain. But this identity is is grounded in a deeper identity between the subject and the object. As the Advaita Vedānta is an obsolutism, it admits the reality of the Absolute Self which is Pure Being, Pure Consciousness and Pure Bliss. It identifies the ātman with Brahman and regards the individual self as the ātman limited by *avydiā*. In the Sūtra-bhāṣya, it is stated that 'the individual soul is to be considered a mere appearance of the of the highest self, like the reflection of the sun in the water; it is neither directly That (i.e. the highest) self nor a different thing'.[10] Here, the word 'appearance' means that that the self is the effect of nescience. This implies that the individual self is the ātman which has appeared as an empirical individual because of Ignorance. "By

the word 'jīva', we must understand, according the received meaning and etymology of the word, the intelligent (principle) which rules over the body and sustains the vital airs."[11] This implies that though the the individual self is limited by ignoranc, yet it is intelligent and eternal. It is the preciever, enjoyer and experiencer of the empirical world. For the Advaitin, for practical purposes, both the world and the empirical self are real. Hence, at the empirical level, the Self being condtioned by Ignorance, identifies itself with the body and imagines itself to be affected by the experiences of pleassure and pain.

The instruments of knowledge, including thc mind, are limiting adjuncts of the self; i.e. from an empirical standpoint, it is said that the self is known only through its limiting adjuncts. Mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*) is the cause of all experiences and it is the primary limiting adjunct of the mind. The limiting adjunct is known in different places by different names such as 'manas' (mind), 'buddhi' (intelligence), 'vijñāna' (knowledge) 'citta' (thought).[12] Hence from the empirical standpoint, the self becomes identical with the *buddhi* and other instrumentalities of the body. 'The connection of the soul with the *buddhi* and other adjuncts lasts as long as the soul (is) in its *saṁsāra* state'.[13]

As the Advaitin accepts Consciousness as the ultimate reality, for practical purposes, this consciousnes appears as a subject, an object and a cognition, due the limiting adjuncts and it is also said to be a knowledge-relation between the self and its objects. When consciousness is defined by the internal organ (mind), it is called *pramātṛ-caitanya*; when consciousness is defined by the finite object, it is called *viṣaya-caitanya* and when consciousness is defined by the menlal modes, it is called *pramāṇa-caitanya.*[14]

From the above brief description of the general features of the Vedānta position, we can formulate three levels of identity; first of all, there is the identity between the mental mode (*vṛtti-caitanya*) and the object of perception. This identification makes possible the immediacy and directness of perceptual knowledge. The Vedāntin can, therefore, be a direct realist. This is no mean advantage because, unlike many contemporary theories of perception, the the problem of the validity of perceptual knowlege does not arise in his case. At a deeper level, there is also the mind-brain identity which, in Vedānta is expressed as an (emprical) identity between the self and its chief limiting adjunct, i.e. the *antaḥkaraṇa*. This emprical identity is analoguous to what Feigl calls 'referential identity' between the mind and the brain. The peculiarity of Vedānta is that this

identity is yet emprical and not ultimate. Ultimately, the real identity is between the individual self and Brahman. It is because of this ultimate identity thht the other empirical identities are dissolvable. This would mean that the self, though it empirically indetifies itself, for the purposes of practical knowledge and action, with the instrumentalities of the body, yet ultimately it is other than and independent of these limiting adjuncts. The existence of the self as a pure factor of awareness brings the Vedānta view much closer to contemporary forms of Non-Cartesian dualism. But as we have remarked earliar, these contemporary forms run into a serious mataphysical puzzle—the plurality of pure selves. However, for Vedānta, the final element of identity between Ātman and Brahman eliminates this last puzzle too. Hence, it could be said that the position of Vedānta includes harmoniously three 'aspects' of contemporary views: (1) it eontains within itself the main features of the logical analysis of the concept af a person as found in empirical discourse, (1) at a deeper level of analysis it also provides for the central features of the Identity Hypothesis of Feigl and others and (3) it also would point to the truth of the Non-Cartesiam forms of dualsim, namely the existence of a pure factor of consciousiousness or awareness.

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CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS VOLUME

1. ANDRE MERCIER,
Ph.D., Professor of Natural Philosophy, Secretary General, International Federation of Philosophical Societies, Berne.

2. BHIKKU ÑĀṆAJĪVAKO (Chedomil Veljacic),
Island Hermitage, Dodanduwa, Ceylon.

3. DE SMET, R. V.,
S.J., Ph.D., Institute of Indian Culture, Bombay, and De Nobili College, Poona.

4. DEVARAJA, N. K.,
M.A., D.Phil., D.Litt., Director, Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy, Banaras Hindu University.

5. ELIOT DEUTSCH,
B.S., Ph.D., Professor of Philosophy, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawaii (U. S. A.), Editor, *Philosophy East and West*.

6. FREDERIC H. YOUNG,
Chapman College, Orange, California, U. S. A.

7. GOPALAN, S.,
M.A., M.Litt., Ph.D., Lecturer, Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras.

8. JOHN HICK,
M.A., Ph.D., D.Phil., H. G. Wood Professor of Theology, University of Birmingham, England.

9. KALIDAS BHATTACHARYYA,
M.A., Ph.D., Professor of Philosophy, Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy, Vice-Chancellor (Retd), Visva-Bharati University.

10. LEWIS, H. D.,
M.A., B.Litt., Hon. D.D., Professor of the History and Philosophy of Religion, King's College, London, Editor, Muirhead Library of Philosophy.

11. NIKAM, N. A.,
M.A., Professor of Philosophy, Vice-Chancellor (Retd), University of Mysore.

12. OLIVIER LACOMBE,
M.A., D.Litt., Director, Institute of Indian Civilization, Paris.

13. RAMALINGAM, C.,
M.A., Dept of Philosophy, Annamalai University.

14. SAMPURNA, C.,
formerly Research Scholar, Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras.

15. SANTOSH Ch. SENGUPTA,
M.A., Ph.D., Professor and Director, Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy, Visva-Bharati University.

16. SUNDARA RAJAN, R.,
M.A., M.Litt., Ph.D., Lecturer, Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras.

17. TRIPATHI, R.K.,
M.A., D.Litt., Reader, Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy, Banaras Hindu University.

18. VENKATAKRISHNA RAO, U.,
M.A., Professor of Sanskrit (Retd), Madras Christian College, Tambaram.

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